The space domain is undergoing significant changes as a growing number of countries and commercial actors become involved in space. While this has led to more innovation and benefits on Earth, it has also resulted in increased congestion and competition in space. From a security perspective, more countries are leveraging space to enhance their military capabilities and national security. This has incentivized the development of counterspace capabilities that can be used to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy space systems.
The existence of counterspace capabilities is not new, but the circumstances surrounding them have changed. There are now greater incentives for countries to develop offensive counterspace capabilities, as well as potentially severe consequences from their use that could have global repercussions. This article summarizes key points from the following document published in 2024 by the Secure World Foundation:
This article reviews the counterspace capabilities being developed by the United States, Russia, China, and India, with a focus on direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapons, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, directed energy weapons, electronic warfare, and cyber capabilities.
The United States
The United States has the most advanced military space capabilities in the world, although the gap with China is narrowing. During the Cold War, the U.S. worked on developing co-orbital anti-satellite capabilities and demonstrated a successful co-orbital intercept in the Delta 180 experiment in 1986. More recently, the U.S. has conducted multiple tests of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) that could potentially support a co-orbital ASAT capability. However, there is no definitive proof these capabilities are being developed for counterspace purposes as opposed to intelligence gathering or other missions.
In terms of direct-ascent ASAT capabilities, the U.S. demonstrated an ability to destroy a LEO satellite with a modified SM-3 missile interceptor in Operation Burnt Frost in 2008. The U.S. likely possesses the ability to develop a DA-ASAT capability in the near future using its midcourse missile defense interceptors if it chose to do so. The Ground-Based Interceptors would be capable of reaching satellites in LEO if used in an ASAT role.
The U.S. has an operational electronic warfare offensive counterspace system called the Counter Communications System (CCS) that can jam satellite communications uplinks. The U.S. likely has the capability to jam global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers in a local area and has demonstrated doing so in several military exercises.
The U.S. has conducted significant research and development on the use of high-energy lasers for counterspace purposes. With its satellite laser ranging sites and research facilities, the U.S. likely has the ability to dazzle or possibly blind the sensors on imaging satellites. However, there is no indication that either high-power or low-power laser counterspace capabilities have been operationalized.
The U.S. Space Force is researching the potential for space-based directed energy weapons, although there is no evidence of any current capability. If developed, such weapons could have latent ASAT capabilities. Overall, the U.S. has very advanced space situational awareness capabilities to support its military space operations.
Russia
Russia has been developing a range of offensive counterspace capabilities and has conducted on-orbit tests of technologies for RPO in LEO and GEO that could potentially lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. Some of these tests have involved the deployment of “sub-satellites” at high velocities, suggesting at least some of the LEO RPO activities may be of a weapons nature. However, most of the observed RPO activities to date are consistent with surveillance and intelligence missions.
After over a decade of development and testing, Russia successfully demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability against a LEO satellite with its Nudol system in November 2021. It is unclear if the Nudol system will become operational in the near future. Russia has historically had a DA-ASAT potential through its anti-ballistic missile capabilities.
Russia places a high priority on integrating electronic warfare into military operations and has been modernizing its EW forces. Most upgrades have focused on multifunction tactical systems that can jam satellite communications and GPS receivers within a local area. Russia likely has the capability to jam communications satellites uplinks over a wide area from fixed ground stations. It has operational experience using counterspace EW capabilities in current conflicts.
Russia has a strong technological knowledge base in directed energy physics and is developing a number of military applications. It has a mobile laser dazzling system that may be intended to target the optical sensors of imagery satellites. Although not their intended purpose, Russia’s satellite laser ranging facilities could be used to dazzle optical imaging satellites. There is no indication Russia is developing high-power space-based laser weapons.
Russia has sophisticated space situational awareness capabilities that are likely second only to the United States. It is able to maintain a catalog of space objects that is somewhat smaller than the U.S. catalog, but more robust in GEO. Russia is seeking to match U.S. space capabilities and mitigate U.S. space superiority through the development of a variety of offensive counterspace systems.
China
China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for rendezvous and proximity operations in both LEO and GEO that could potentially lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. However, the available evidence suggests China has not conducted an actual destructive co-orbital intercept of a target, and there is no proof these capabilities are definitively being developed for counterspace use as opposed to intelligence gathering or other purposes.
China has at least one, and potentially as many as three, active direct-ascent ASAT programs, either dedicated counterspace systems or midcourse missile defense systems that could provide counterspace capabilities. China has engaged in multiple tests of these capabilities since 2005, indicating a serious development effort. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against LEO targets is likely mature and may be operationally fielded on mobile launchers. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against satellites in MEO or GEO is likely still in the experimental or development phase.
China likely has significant electronic warfare capabilities to counter satellite communications, although the full nature and status of these capabilities is difficult to assess from open sources. Chinese military doctrine emphasizes the importance of EW as part of the broader information warfare, and China has taken steps to integrate its space, cyber, and EW forces under a single military command. However, there is limited open source evidence of Chinese EW counterspace capabilities being operationally deployed.
China is likely developing directed energy weapons for counterspace use, including at least five laser weapons testing facilities, but information on the operational status of any fielded capabilities is limited in the public domain. China has a sophisticated network of ground-based optical and radar sensors for tracking and characterizing space objects to support its space situational awareness. Since 2010, China has launched several satellites capable of conducting RPO on orbit to aid in its ability to characterize and collect intelligence on foreign satellites.
While official Chinese statements on space warfare have remained aligned with the peaceful purposes of outer space, China has designated space as a military domain, and Chinese military writings state that the goal of space warfare is to achieve space superiority through offensive and defensive means. China’s development and testing of counterspace capabilities suggest it views space as a domain for potential future conflict.
India
India has over five decades of experience with space capabilities, but most of that has been civil in focus. Only relatively recently has India started to build out explicit military space capabilities. India’s missile defense and long-range ballistic missile programs could potentially lead to direct-ascent ASAT capabilities. India demonstrated a DA-ASAT capability in March 2019 when it destroyed one of its own satellites in LEO. While India has stated it is against the weaponization of space, it may be moving toward a more offensive counterspace posture. India is also in the early stages of working on directed energy weapons and electronic warfare capabilities.
Cyber Capabilities
Multiple countries possess cyber capabilities that could potentially be used against space systems, but evidence of actual cyber attacks in the public domain is limited. The United States, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Israel have all demonstrated the ability to conduct offensive cyber attacks against non-space targets. There is also a growing number of non-state actors actively probing commercial satellite systems and discovering cyber vulnerabilities. However, to date there have only been a few publicly disclosed cyber attacks directly targeting space systems, and most have focused on the user segment, not the satellites themselves. The most notable was a Russian cyber attack on the user terminals for Viasat’s satellite internet service in Europe that coincided with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
There is a trend toward lower barriers to entry and more widespread vulnerabilities in space systems, especially as the space sector becomes more commercialized and digitized. Many satellite manufacturers and operators have not yet implemented the same level of cybersecurity as other sectors. This creates the potential for less sophisticated actors to target space systems with cyber attacks in the future. However, at present, there is still a significant gap between the cyber capabilities of leading nation-states and other actors.
Conclusion
The space domain is becoming increasingly competitive and contested as more countries integrate space into their national military capabilities and overall strategy. The development of offensive counterspace capabilities by major space powers poses a growing threat to the ability to use space for peaceful purposes. Many of these counterspace capabilities are dual-use in nature, making it difficult to assess a country’s intent. Furthermore, the actual use of destructive and debris-generating counterspace weapons could have long-lasting consequences for the space environment.
Ultimately, space is not the sole domain of militaries and intelligence services. The entire global society and economy is dependent on space infrastructure to some degree. A future conflict that extends into space could have massive, worldwide impacts felt by all. It is critical that discussions on space security and stability involve all relevant stakeholders, and that these issues are addressed in a transparent manner on the international stage. Conflict in space is not inevitable, but all spacefaring nations must work together to develop norms of responsible behavior and strengthen the international legal and policy framework governing space activities.
