Redefining Artemis: Transitioning from a Lunar Gateway to a Martian Highway

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Overview

NASA’s Artemis program primarily focuses on sending humans to the Moon as a stepping stone for deeper space exploration. Established in the wake of multiple previous attempts to return astronauts to the lunar surface, Artemis has gained momentum and funding commitments to create an enduring human presence near and on the Moon. The program involves several spacecraft elements, such as the Space Launch System (SLS), the Orion crew vehicle, a lunar orbiting Gateway outpost, and a Human Landing System (HLS) that will carry astronauts to and from the lunar surface. The following illustrations provide a perspective on the current Artemis mission plans:

The rationale for starting with the Moon includes the opportunity to test life-support technologies, human factors, and mission operations in a relatively close environment. The Moon’s proximity allows for quicker crew rescue if unplanned issues arise. But a growing faction in the spaceflight community advocates pivoting to a “Mars-first” strategy. This would emphasize direct development of systems intended for Mars travel and landing, possibly skipping large-scale exploration on the lunar surface or using it only as an optional testbed. The question becomes how best to transition Artemis from a lunar-oriented venture to a Mars-focused endeavor.

Achieving a “Mars-first” trajectory entails reassessing fundamental components of Artemis, including spacecraft design, propulsion, launch architecture, crew modules, and ground infrastructure. Significant differences separate a lunar round trip from an interplanetary journey to Mars. These differences include far longer travel times, higher cumulative radiation exposure, the need for more robust life-support systems, bigger propellant requirements, and greater crew autonomy. To accomplish such a shift, NASA and its partners must examine technology readiness, logistics feasibility, budget impacts, and the broader international framework that currently supports lunar exploration.

This article assesses three prospective scenarios for transitioning Artemis to a Mars-first approach, each describing how existing or developing elements might be repurposed, enhanced, or substituted.

Using Current Artemis Program Components

Building Upon the Established Lunar Framework

The first scenario retains all major components of Artemis in their existing configurations, essentially maintaining continuity with the original plan. The elements that define Artemis include:

• Space Launch System (SLS): A heavy-lift rocket designed by NASA to launch both crew and cargo beyond low Earth orbit (LEO).
• Orion Crew Capsule: The spacecraft that will transport crews to lunar orbit (and potentially beyond), featuring advanced life support and navigation systems.
• Gateway: A small station planned for lunar orbit, intended as a flexible staging point for missions to the Moon. The Gateway could host crew for short durations, provide refueling opportunities, and facilitate technology testing.
• Human Landing System (HLS): A lander that ferries astronauts between orbit and the lunar surface.

Retaining these elements for a Mars-first program would require evaluating their suitability for interplanetary missions. Each of these hardware systems was initially conceptualized around the distance, duration, and environmental considerations of the Earth–Moon system, which requires only three days of transit time each way. For a Mars mission lasting months in transit, these considerations multiply.

Adapting SLS for Mars Missions

The SLS is designed to carry large payloads beyond Earth’s gravitational well. It has an intended capability to deliver over 95 metric tons to LEO in its Block 2 configuration. This capacity, while potentially applicable to launching interplanetary spacecraft, may need further modifications for Mars.

• Upper Stage Modifications: For lunar missions, the SLS uses an upper stage capable of inserting Orion into a translunar trajectory. For Mars, an upgraded and more powerful upper stage, sometimes referred to as an Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), would be important for heavier spacecraft and extended cargo loads.
• Frequency of Launches: A Mars-first approach might demand more frequent or more powerful launches to send both crew and cargo. Current production rates and operational constraints for SLS might not easily scale up to the frequency required to build out a robust Mars program.

Additionally, mission risks and costs scale with each SLS flight. Because SLS is not reusable, each launch accumulates enormous expense. Although NASA has invested extensive time and resources into SLS, further changes to mission profile, structural components, and ground infrastructure might be necessary if the rocket becomes the backbone of a Mars campaign.

Evaluating Orion’s Suitability

Orion’s design caters to crew safety and robust spacecraft systems for lunar distances. Its life-support systems, radiation shielding, and crew accommodations are already advanced, but not initially optimized for months-long interplanetary travel.

• Extended Life-Support Systems: Mars missions demand closed-loop life-support systems capable of recycling water, air, and waste, reducing dependence on resupply. This is more advanced than what may be required for shorter missions to the Moon.
• Radiation Protection: Astronauts traveling outside the Earth–Moon system face heightened radiation risks, particularly from solar flares and cosmic rays. Orion would require thicker or more sophisticated shielding, increasing mass and complexity.
• Crew Comfort and Habitability: Long-duration missions require additional living space, onboard exercise equipment, and psychological support. While Orion is spacious compared to earlier spacecraft like Apollo, it is still small for trips possibly requiring multiple months in transit.

As a result, Orion might serve as only one part of a Mars vehicle stack, potentially docking with other modules designed specifically for habitation en route to Mars. These modules could be launched separately and then assembled in Earth orbit before departure.

Reimagining the Lunar Gateway as a Mars Staging Post

The Gateway is envisioned as a station in a Near-Rectilinear Halo Orbit around the Moon, offering convenient access to the lunar surface and a stable orbit for visiting spacecraft. Repurposing this station for Mars staging could pose engineering and operational complexities:

• Propellant Depots: If the Gateway were to serve as a way station to Mars, it would need the capacity to store propellant and effectively manage refueling operations. Currently, the Gateway’s preliminary design focuses on enabling short lunar stays and providing a science platform, not functioning as a deep-space fueling depot.
• Orbital Dynamics: The orbit around the Moon is not inherently aligned with an efficient departure path to Mars. Additional propulsion would be required to shift to a more favorable orbit.
• Crew Transfers and Life Support: The Gateway’s modules would require expansion to house crews for extended periods. A Mars transfer vehicle, if staged at the Gateway, might rely on the station for final checkouts and crew readiness before heading to Mars.

Still, building upon Gateway’s existing contracts and designs could maintain program continuity. Reusing key Artemis contracts may reduce administrative overhead and preserve NASA’s partnership framework. However, the architectural complexities of bridging lunar orbit operations with Mars departure might offset some of the perceived benefits.

Cost Implications and Programmatic Continuity

Continuing forward with current Artemis elements and then adapting them for Mars could be seen as an incremental path. Incremental paths typically preserve institutional know-how and maintain workforce stability. Major redesigns or cancellations of existing contracts can result in delays, contract termination fees, and lost expertise.

Yet incremental approaches also risk high total program costs, because each Artemis-specific feature may not be perfectly suited to Mars. Additional funding would be needed to redesign life-support systems, radiation protection, habitat modules, and the propulsion stack. Proponents of this scenario might argue that the use of proven hardware lessens the chance of unexpected failures. Critics, on the other hand, might counter that the mismatch between lunar-oriented hardware and Mars mission requirements leads to expensive workarounds and inefficiencies.

Combining Artemis Components with Commercial Options

Embracing a Hybrid Model

A second potential path blends existing Artemis infrastructure with commercial spacecraft and services. This scenario acknowledges the significant investment in SLS and Orion but seeks to complement them with emerging capabilities from private industry. In this way, NASA could continue to provide a government-operated crew launch system while outsourcing some cargo and technology needs to commercial partners.

Commercial Launch Systems for Cargo and Fuel

Several commercial launch vehicles under development or already operational are capable of lifting heavy payloads to orbit. Examples include:

• United Launch Alliance (ULA) Vulcan
• Blue Origin New Glenn
• SpaceX Falcon Heavy

In a hybrid Mars-first plan, these commercial vehicles might be used to deliver cargo, fuel, and habitat modules to Earth orbit, where they could be assembled or pre-positioned for a Mars transfer. By offloading some heavy-cargo missions to these commercial providers, NASA could reduce the flight rate demands on SLS. This approach could lower overall costs and possibly expedite schedules. Multiple commercial flights might occur in parallel, shipping everything from pressurized modules to radiation shielding components, rovers, and scientific payloads.

Commercial Habitats and Refueling Depots

As part of NASA’s push for Low Earth Orbit commercialization, several companies are developing private space station modules or inflatables. A hybrid Mars-first plan might adapt these inflatables for deep space or cislunar use. These modules could provide the extra volume astronauts need for long-duration missions without NASA having to invest heavily in new designs.

Refueling depots, either in Low Earth Orbit or at the Moon, could be essential for reducing mass constraints. A depot-based approach allows for launching spacecraft “dry” (with minimal propellant) and then refueling in orbit. Such an approach can dramatically reduce the heavy-lift requirements for departing Earth. In turn, NASA could focus on delivering crew safely in Orion, while commercial flights supply propellant. This method can mitigate one of the biggest hurdles in interplanetary travel: the need for enormous amounts of fuel.

Leveraging NASA’s Oversight and Certification

Even if NASA collaborates with commercial entities, the agency still retains an important role in safety certification, mission management, and scientific planning. Past programs, including the Commercial Crew Program, illustrate NASA’s capacity to oversee commercial providers in a manner that ensures rigorous safety standards for human spaceflight.

This scenario allows NASA to maintain SLS and Orion as the core crew transport system while fostering competition among commercial providers for cargo and propellant delivery. With multiple commercial players, the space agency can remain flexible, awarding contracts based on performance, cost, and reliability. This synergy might accelerate the timeline for Mars exploration by distributing the development burden among many partners, each bringing specialized expertise.

Technical and Policy Challenges

A hybrid approach does raise coordination challenges:

• Interface Requirements: Multiple spacecraft and modules must be able to dock or berth with one another. NASA must define standardized interfaces to ensure these modules connect reliably in orbit or on the surface of Mars.
• Mission Timelines: Successful Mars missions require tight scheduling, especially for planetary alignment windows (which open every 26 months). Any delays in cargo or refueling deliveries might disrupt an entire mission cycle.
• Funding and Contracts: A hybrid approach may demand complex budgeting across a range of industry partners. Government oversight must ensure consistent progress within programmatic constraints.
• International Cooperation: NASA’s Artemis program involves international partners, such as ESA, JAXA, and CSA. Integrating commercial solutions could reshape or shift these international roles, requiring careful management of political and financial agreements.

Still, many observers believe that such a hybrid strategy capitalizes on NASA’s established Artemis infrastructure while integrating the dynamism and cost-effectiveness of commercial space. In this view, NASA benefits from private-sector innovation without sacrificing the reliability and mission assurance that come with government-built systems.

Using SpaceX Technology

Starship as a Mars-First Launch and Landing System

SpaceX has proposed a fully reusable transportation architecture to reach the Moon, Mars, and potentially other deep-space destinations. The system is composed of the “Starship” spacecraft upper stage and the “Super Heavy” booster. Starship itself is designed to land on planetary surfaces, refuel (where infrastructure is available), and launch again. This concept is built on the principle that reusability drastically lowers per-launch costs over time.

For a Mars-first mission, SpaceX’s Starship could serve multiple roles:

• Cargo Transport: Its large pressurized volume would allow it to carry rovers, habitats, life-support equipment, and scientific instrumentation.
• Crew Transport: Once human-rated, Starship could transport astronauts all the way to the Martian surface and back, functioning as both the transfer vehicle and the lander.
• On-Orbit Refueling: Several Starship tankers would launch to low Earth orbit to fill the crewed Starship with propellant, enabling it to depart for Mars with a full tank.

In a scenario where NASA embraces a Mars-first approach relying heavily on SpaceX, the program might deemphasize or retire some Artemis components. Orion, Gateway, and the dedicated HLS could become optional or secondary, providing alternatives or backups rather than forming the central architecture.

Engineering and Regulatory Hurdles

Although Starship and Super Heavy have made significant progress in development, ongoing tests, and iterative design changes, there remain engineering challenges. Achieving reliable reusability at the scale SpaceX envisions involves:

• Thermal Protection: Starship requires a sophisticated heat shield to survive atmospheric reentry from interplanetary velocities.
• Life-Support Systems: Extended spaceflights of up to six to nine months each way to Mars demand robust life-support capabilities, redundancy, and advanced recycling technologies.
• Landing on Mars: Landing a vehicle of Starship’s size and mass on the Martian surface requires solving aerodynamic and propulsive questions, including the “belly flop” maneuver tested in Earth’s atmosphere but not yet demonstrated in real Martian conditions.

Additionally, government regulations and NASA certification processes for human spaceflight missions remain significant. SpaceX would need to demonstrate that the vehicle meets NASA’s safety standards before carrying astronauts. As with all space programs, risk assessment and crew safety remain paramount.

Transforming NASA’s Role

Should NASA select SpaceX’s Starship as the central element of a Mars-first strategy, NASA’s role might shift from spacecraft developer to mission coordinator and customer. This mirrors the Commercial Crew model, wherein NASA outlines requirements, invests in private partners, and purchases flight services.

In this approach, NASA could refocus its internal teams on mission planning, extravehicular activity (EVA) suit development, surface habitat technologies, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) research, and scientific objectives for Mars. The advantage could be rapid progress enabled by SpaceX’s iterative testing philosophy. Another advantage might be reduced overhead, as a single integrated vehicle lowers the complexity of having many different spacecraft.

The downside could involve reliance on a single vendor and architecture. If Starship encounters significant technical or operational setbacks, the entire Mars-first plan might stall. Some stakeholders advocate continuing to fund alternative capabilities to ensure that the nation’s deep space objectives are not held hostage to one vehicle’s success or delays.

Potential Partnerships and Funding Streams

Although SpaceX has substantial in-house funding and resources, a Mars-first strategy that attempts to realize rapid mission timelines would likely still require NASA support. This might be in the form of direct contracts, cost-sharing for key technology demonstrations, or purchasing seats and cargo capacity on Starship flights.

International partners might also join, providing scientific payloads or components for Mars surface operations. The degree of cooperation would depend on how quickly SpaceX can offer consistent, reliable flights and whether partner agencies see Starship as an affordable, feasible route to achieve their scientific and exploration goals.

Considerations for a Mars-First Transition

Technological Readiness Levels

Moving from a Moon-first to a Mars-first plan requires a thorough assessment of where each subsystem stands in terms of technological readiness. NASA has developed the concept of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) to gauge how mature a technology is, from basic principles (TRL 1) to flight-proven systems (TRL 9). Some Artemis components, like Orion, are fairly advanced (high TRLs) for near-lunar operations. However, that does not automatically guarantee readiness for months-long interplanetary travel.

Life support, habitat modules, power generation, and radiation shielding for Mars might be at lower TRLs, needing significant development. Additional funding and test programs could raise their readiness levels. The viability of a Mars-first strategy rests, in part, on whether these important technologies can be advanced quickly.

Budgetary and Political Landscape

The space community recognizes that large-scale missions beyond low Earth orbit often require consistent political support and substantial budgets. For Artemis, Congress and the White House have allocated funds to develop SLS, Orion, and HLS. A pivot to a Mars-first approach could entail renegotiating these allocations, adjusting cost estimates, and convincing stakeholders of the value in reprioritizing.

Policy shifts also affect international partnerships. Agencies such as ESA and JAXA are investing in lunar-focused missions under the Artemis umbrella. A sudden pivot to Mars might strain these relationships or require them to rewrite their own priorities. The timeline for building the Gateway, or the roles of Canada’s robotic systems, might require revision if the program’s emphasis switches to interplanetary objectives.

NASA has historically faced budgetary constraints that caused delays or cancellations of advanced exploration programs. A stable, long-term funding commitment is important for a Mars-first approach. Without that, development might face the same cycle of stops and starts that has plagued ambitious space exploration plans in the past.

Crew Health and Psychological Factors

A key driver for a Mars-first approach is demonstrating NASA’s and the space industry’s willingness to send humans to another planet. Yet the human dimension brings additional challenges. The Moon serves as a nearby testbed, offering short round-trip times for emergencies or resupplies. Traveling to Mars imposes significantly more risk:

• Extended Isolation: Crews would experience months of isolation and confinement, which heightens psychological challenges.
• Communication Delays: Mars can be up to 22 minutes away in terms of light travel time, making real-time communication impossible. Crews must act more autonomously and manage emergencies without immediate input from mission control.
• Medical Readiness: A Mars-first plan demands advanced telemedicine, surgical capability in space, and robust health monitoring systems. Additional mass and volume would be necessary for medical supplies and equipment.

If the Moon is used extensively to simulate these conditions—albeit at a smaller scale—it might reduce the risk for the first interplanetary missions. A Mars-first approach that moves quickly to deep space might face difficulties in training and building up the necessary operational experience.

Scientific Trade-Offs

Scientific discovery is a strong motivation for exploring both the Moon and Mars. Each body offers insights into planetary formation, geology, and potentially biology (since Mars may once have been habitable). A Mars-first approach might allocate fewer resources to detailed lunar studies or reduce the scope of lunar science instrumentation.

Alternatively, a balanced program might continue to support robotic exploration of the Moon while focusing human exploration on Mars. This could mean that missions such as Artemis might pivot to a stepping-stone role, with smaller human missions to the lunar surface or orbit to test out hardware and procedures. However, that bridging role might be overshadowed if the official focus, budgets, and schedules prioritize Mars mission hardware and readiness above all else.

International Engagement and Diplomatic Factors

International collaboration remains significant for achieving large exploration goals. The Artemis Accords—signed by multiple nations—outline principles for space exploration, including interoperability, transparency, and peaceful use. Shifting from a Moon focus to a Mars focus might compel these partners to redefine their contributions:

• ESA: Has provided the European Service Module (ESM) for Orion and hopes to gain further involvement in Gateway modules. If Artemis shifts to Mars, ESA’s role might be reshaped to develop components for Mars transit or surface infrastructure.
• JAXA: Looks to supply technologies such as advanced life support and robotics, but these might need reorientation for Mars.
• CSA: Canada’s contribution of robotic arms or sensors would need reevaluation for the red planet’s environment.
• Additional Partners: Entities like Roscosmos (Russia) or emerging space nations might reconsider their roles or propose separate collaborative ventures.

Diplomatic ties formed around lunar activities might carry over, but many partners joined specifically for lunar science or economic potential such as in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) of lunar water ice. A Mars-first pivot might spark negotiations over how to equitably manage resource use, data sharing, and mission priorities.

In-Situ Resource Utilization

One major advantage of the Moon is the potential for extracting resources such as water from permanently shadowed craters near the poles. Water can be split into hydrogen and oxygen for rocket fuel, or refined for drinking and life support. If the program shifts heavily toward Mars, the question of whether to pursue robust ISRU on the Moon becomes more complex.

Mars itself offers possible resources, including water ice at the poles and in some mid-latitude subsurface deposits. However, harnessing Martian resources requires extensive scouting and technology demonstration to mine and refine them. These technologies are still at an early stage, though multiple concepts exist for producing oxygen from Martian atmospheric CO₂. As a result, a Mars-first plan needs to decide if it invests in parallel development of ISRU or remains reliant on Earth-supplied propellant and consumables.

Robotic Precursors and Test Missions

Any Mars-first strategy would benefit from advanced robotic missions that characterize surface conditions, identify suitable landing sites, and gather data on dust, radiation, and resource distribution. The Perseverance rover and the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter already provide some insights, but more specialized precursor missions might be needed:

• Site Surveys: Identifying safe terrain with potential resource availability.
• Technology Demonstrations: Testing hardware for oxygen or methane production, 3D-printing habitats, or drilling for water.
• Mars Orbital Infrastructure: Establishing communications relay satellites or navigation aids for safer landings.

Relying heavily on robotic exploration can reduce the risk of human missions. If NASA invests in this approach, it might reduce the immediate need for extensive lunar exploration under Artemis. Critics might still argue that the Moon is better for shakedown tests of human-rated systems, but a large-scale robotic portfolio at Mars could fill a parallel role.

Program Schedule and Timelines

Historically, NASA’s timeline for landing humans on Mars has fluctuated with budgetary and political changes. A Mars-first pivot might demand an aggressive schedule to capitalize on public enthusiasm and political will. Setting a near-term crewed Mars target—like the late 2030s—would require aligning technology demonstration, vehicle development, testing, and international contributions in a condensed timeframe.

On the other hand, if NASA continues the Artemis path for the Moon, the timeline for Mars could stretch further, pushing a human landing toward the 2040s. Proponents of a Mars-first approach see such delays as a missed opportunity, emphasizing that technology breakthroughs and commercial competition can expedite progress. Yet skeptics highlight that moving too quickly might increase risk to crew safety, overtax budgets, or leave insufficient time for critical engineering validation.

Balancing Cost and Innovation

Cost remains an overarching factor. The annual NASA budget must cover not only human exploration but also space science missions, aeronautics research, and Earth observation programs. Large-scale shifts toward a Mars-first architecture need legislative approval and consistent support. Commercial partnerships may help lower costs, but major new developments—like building a brand-new Mars transfer vehicle—still demand multi-year commitments of funding.

Innovation thrives when teams push boundaries, but they also need stable programmatic backing. NASA’s commercial successes in low Earth orbit underscore the potential benefits of forging strong partnerships with private industry. Still, a purely commercial approach may not materialize unless the business case for Mars exploration is sufficient. As such, any Mars-first approach likely involves a blend of government stewardship and private-sector creativity, especially when it comes to heavy-lift launch, life-support system design, and habitat technologies.

Integrating Public Support and STEM Inspiration

Public enthusiasm has historically played a big role in shaping space policy. The Apollo program captured global attention, and Artemis aspires to do the same. If NASA reorients the storyline toward Mars, the appeal of exploring an alien planet with possible traces of ancient life could inspire the next generation of scientists, engineers, and explorers. Educational and outreach programs could anchor themselves on the promise of sending humans to Mars, spurring academic institutions to invest in relevant fields like robotics, planetary science, and advanced propulsion research.

Still, such inspiration depends on tangible achievements. If Artemis is perceived as overshadowed by shifting priorities, public trust might erode. Consistency in near-term milestones—like successful test flights, orbital demonstrations, and technology readiness—helps maintain momentum. Balancing the message of an eventual Mars landing with intermediate “wins” in lunar exploration can keep the public and political stakeholders engaged.

Assessing the Three Scenarios in Context

Each of the three scenarios described above—using current Artemis components exclusively, combining Artemis hardware with commercial solutions, or relying heavily on SpaceX technology—offers a different trade-off in terms of cost, schedule, technological risk, and strategic flexibility. In a Mars-first paradigm:

• Using Current Artemis Components preserves institutional knowledge and keeps existing contracts intact, but may require retrofits and expansions that add complexity and expense.
• Combining Artemis with Commercial Options harnesses the best of both worlds, enabling NASA to continue leading crew transport while letting private providers handle cargo, fuel, and possibly specialized modules. Coordination complexity increases, but overall program agility might benefit.
• Leaning on SpaceX Technology could result in a single end-to-end system, drastically simplifying the supply chain. This might accelerate schedules if Starship proves reliable and if NASA is comfortable adopting a commercial vehicle as the backbone of its Mars effort. However, it carries reliance on a single developer and technology path.

In each instance, NASA, its partners, and commercial stakeholders must decide how to balance risk with opportunity. They must also consider workforce transitions, the fate of existing Artemis contracts, and the retention of engineering talent. Making the shift to a Mars-first approach is not just about spacecraft hardware but also the broader ecosystem of research centers, private aerospace companies, universities, and international agencies that collectively shape humanity’s foray into deep space.

Ultimately, a successful Mars-first strategy—and the specific form it takes—depends on sustained policy support, technological breakthroughs, and effective collaboration across the global space community. By exploring multiple scenarios and understanding their ramifications, decision-makers can craft a blueprint that aligns the excitement of a Mars mission with the realities of budgets, safety, technology readiness, and public engagement.

Last update on 2025-12-11 / Affiliate links / Images from Amazon Product Advertising API