Watchdog Organizations

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a federal agency operating with a multi-billion dollar annual budget, is subject to continuous oversight from independent government bodies. This oversight is principally conducted by the NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Throughout 2025, these watchdog organizations published a series of audits, evaluations, and assessments examining the agency’s performance, from its largest flagship programs to its internal management.

These 2025 reports provide a detailed snapshot of an agency managing immense, complex, and high-risk endeavors. The findings highlight persistent challenges in cost and schedule management, particularly within the Artemis program, while also pointing to systemic weaknesses in areas like cybersecurity and contract oversight. This article explores the key findings from these 2025 audits, providing insight into the health and challenges of America’s space and aeronautics enterprise.

All 2025 audit reports are listed with with hyperlinks at the end of the article.

The Role of Independent Audits at NASA

Before examining the specific findings, it’s useful to understand the function of these auditing bodies. They operate independently of NASA management and report their findings to both the NASA Administrator and Congress.

The NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) is an internal watchdog. Its mission is to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. It conducts audits, investigations, and inspections of NASA’s programs, projects, and operations. OIG reports often provide specific, technical recommendations to NASA management for corrective action.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, non-partisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the “congressional watchdog,” the GAO investigates how the federal government spends taxpayer dollars. Its reports on NASA tend to take a high-level view, often assessing the performance of major projects over many years and identifying systemic, long-term risks to the agency’s portfolio. The GAO is also known for maintaining a “High Risk List” of federal programs and operations susceptible to waste, fraud, or failure; NASA’s acquisition and contract management has been a persistent member of this list.

The audits released in 2025 reflect these roles. They cover multi-billion dollar human spaceflight programs, complex robotic science missions, and foundational agency functions like information technology and property management.

The Annual Assessment of Major Projects

One of the most significant reports issued during the year was the GAO’s annual assessment of NASA’s major projects. This report, released in mid-2025, provides a portfolio-level view of the cost and schedule performance for NASA’s most expensive undertakings – those with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million.

The 2025 report (GAO-25-107591) analyzed a portfolio of major projects valued at approximately $74 billion for fiscal year 2025. The overall performance was characterized as generally unchanged from the previous year, though this stability masked significant underlying issues.

Auditors found that in the past year, four of NASA’s 18 major projects currently in development experienced cost overruns. These overruns collectively added more than $500 million to the agency’s commitments. A significant portion of this annual cost growth – over $360 million – was attributed to a single project: the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, the capsule intended to carry astronauts for the Artemis missions.

The GAO’s assessment also looked at long-term historical trends. It noted that of 53 major projects tracked since 2009, three specific projects accounted for nearly $7 billion in total accumulated cost overruns. These projects are all foundational elements of the Artemis program. This finding underscores a central theme of 2025’s oversight: the Artemis program, while representing the agency’s future, is also the single greatest source of its financial and schedule risk.

The report highlighted that NASA’s project portfolio is increasingly dominated by Artemis. The agency recently initiated nine new projects related to the lunar effort, with estimated total costs exceeding $20 billion. Auditors warned that these projects are highly interdependent; a delay in one component, such as a lander or a Gateway module, can create a cascading delay across the entire program, complicating cost and schedule estimates.

In response to these persistent challenges, NASA management pointed to its creation of the Moon to Mars Program Office, which is designed to improve oversight and integration. Despite this, the GAO affirmed in 2025 that NASA’s acquisition management remains on its High Risk List, signaling that, from the auditors’ perspective, the agency’s systemic issues with managing large, complex contracts are not yet resolved.

Scrutiny on the Artemis Program: The Return to the Moon

As NASA’s primary human spaceflight endeavor, the Artemis program was the subject of intense and specific audits throughout 2025. Auditors from both the OIG and GAO examined not just the high-profile rockets and spacecraft but also the vast, complex web of contracts and government-owned property that underpins the entire effort. The findings reveal a program straining under the weight of its own complexity, cost, and ambitious schedule.

The Space Launch System: Costs and Sustainability

The Space Launch System (SLS) is the super-heavy-lift rocket designed to launch the Orion capsule and its crews to the Moon. While audits in previous years focused heavily on its development, the 2025 audit focus shifted to its long-term production, affordability, and contract management.

The OIG has previously reported that a single SLS launch costs over $4 billion. In 2025, auditors continued to scrutinize the sustainability of this cost. They examined the contracts for producing the rocket’s core stages and engines, noting that NASA is still struggling to transition from a development mindset to a more efficient production and operations model.

Audits highlighted the high cost of the rocket’s RS-25 engines, which are refurbished engines left over from the Space Shuttle program. The supply of these engines is finite. OIG reports examined the progress of NASA’s contract with Aerojet Rocketdyne to restart production of new, more affordable versions of the RS-25. Auditors found that this effort is also facing schedule pressures and cost risks, complicating the long-term manifest for Artemis missions beyond the first few flights.

The management of the SLS program’s primary contractor, Boeing, also received attention. Auditors reviewed the “cost-plus” nature of the contracts, which reimburse the contractor for allowable costs and add a fee. This structure places the majority of the financial risk on NASA and the taxpayer. OIG reports in 2025 reiterated long-standing concerns about the contractor’s cost reporting and efficiency, urging NASA to exert stronger oversight and cost control.

Orion Crew Capsule: Safety and Schedule

The Orion capsule, built by Lockheed Martin, is the vehicle that will house astronauts during their journey to lunar orbit. As noted in the GAO’s major projects report, Orion was responsible for the single largest share of cost overruns in the past year, adding over $360 million to its baseline.

Audits in 2025 examined the reasons for this growth. Findings pointed to challenges in resolving technical issues that were discovered following the uncrewed Artemis I test flight in late 2022. Specifically, issues with the capsule’s heat shield, which showed unexpected charring and erosion during re-entry, required extensive investigation, analysis, and redesign.

OIG audits assessed the impact of the heat shield investigation on the schedule for Artemis II, the first crewed mission. They found that the timeline for resolving the issue, testing the new design, and implementing it on the Artemis II vehicle was a primary driver for the mission’s schedule, which had already slipped into 2026. Auditors cautioned that NASA’s revised schedule for Artemis II remained aggressive and had little room for further setbacks.

Another area of focus was the development of Orion’s software and avionics. With Artemis II set to be the first human flight, auditors reviewed the test and verification process for the capsule’s life support systems and flight computers. They noted the immense complexity of verifying millions of lines of code and ensuring all systems would perform perfectly. The audits found that while NASA’s test regimen is thorough, the schedule pressure to launch Artemis II creates a risk of overlooking or deferring non-essential system verifications.

Human Landing System: Managing New Commercial Contracts

The Human Landing System (HLS) is the component that will ferry astronauts from the Orion capsule in lunar orbit down to the surface of the Moon. Unlike the SLS and Orion, which are managed through traditional government contracts, NASA is acquiring the HLS as a commercial service from SpaceX and, more recently, Blue Origin.

In 2025, auditors began to look closely at NASA’s management of these novel, fixed-price contracts. An audit from the OIG assessed NASA’s insight into the development of SpaceX’s Starship, which is slated to perform the first landing on the Artemis III mission.

Auditors found that while the fixed-price model protects NASA from cost overruns, it also reduces the agency’s direct insight into the contractor’s technical progress and challenges. The OIG report examined how NASA verifies that SpaceX is meeting the numerous safety and technical requirements for human-rating the Starship vehicle. Auditors noted that NASA’s approach relies heavily on contractor-provided data and milestones. They cautioned that NASA must ensure it has sufficient technical staff and resources to properly validate this data and independently verify the lander’s safety before committing a crew to the mission.

The HLS audits also examined the interdependency between the lander and the rest of the Artemis architecture. To land on the Moon, the Starship HLS must first be refueled in Earth orbit by a series of tanker flights. Auditors noted that this operational concept – which has never been done on this scale – adds significant complexity and risk. A failure or delay in the tanker flights would directly impact the launch schedule for the Artemis III crew. The 2025 reports urged NASA to develop more detailed contingency plans for managing this complex “mission before the mission.”

Artemis Program Property: A $26 Billion Audit

Perhaps one of the most detailed and revealing audits of 2025 was the OIG’s report on government property furnished for the Artemis campaign. This audit, (IG-25-010), published in August 2025, provided a staggering look at the sheer volume of taxpayer-funded equipment managed by NASA’s contractors.

The OIG found that as of February 2025, NASA had allocated $26.6 billion in government-furnished property to its contractors. This property is not the final rocket or spacecraft but includes everything from specialized manufacturing tools and test equipment to high-speed cameras, computers, and unique spacecraft components. This property is spread across 27 active prime contracts supporting the six main Artemis programs: SLS, Orion, Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Gateway, HLS, and the program for new spacesuits (Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility, or E&HSM).

The audit examined NASA’s oversight of this massive inventory. While NASA has policies for property management, the OIG found that oversight could be strengthened. Auditors identified weaknesses in how NASA and its contractors track, value, and dispose of this property.

For example, the audit found inconsistencies in property records. In some cases, high-value equipment was not properly entered into NASA’s property tracking systems, making it difficult to know where the equipment was, what condition it was in, or if it was still needed. Auditors also raised concerns about the valuation of this equipment. Without accurate records, NASA cannot be sure of the total value of its assets or ensure that contractors are being held financially responsible for lost or damaged property.

The OIG recommended that NASA improve its property management by conducting more rigorous physical inventories, ensuring all property is properly recorded, and enforcing contract clauses that hold contractors accountable. The report underscored that without this diligent oversight, billions of dollars in government property are at risk of being lost, misused, or left idle, rather than supporting the mission.

Spacesuit Performance and Development

A related area of concern identified in 2025 was the state of NASA’s spacesuits, formally known as Extravehicular Activity (EVA) suits. In late 2025, the OIG published a report highlighting a “performance decline in critical spacesuit maintenance” for the suits currently in use on the International Space Station (ISS).

These suits, which are decades old, are showing their age. The audit found a growing backlog of maintenance and refurbishment tasks, component failures, and a diminishing supply of spare parts. This situation places an increased risk on ISS operations, as any reduction in spacewalk capability could jeopardize the station’s long-term maintenance and science goals.

This finding has direct implications for the Artemis program. NASA is currently funding the development of a new generation of spacesuits through its E&HSM program, with contracts awarded to Axiom Space and Collins Aerospace. These new suits are intended for use on both the ISS and the lunar surface.

The OIG audit on the legacy suits implicitly underscores the urgency of the new suit development. However, the E&HSM program is itself a complex undertaking being tracked by auditors. As part of the $26.6 billion in government property, NASA has furnished significant hardware and data to the new suit vendors. Auditors in 2025 were monitoring the E&HSM program’s schedule, ensuring that NASA’s oversight is sufficient to get the new suits delivered, tested, and certified in time for both the ISS’s extended life and the first Artemis landing missions. Any delay in the new suits, which are a required component for the Artemis III mission, would be yet another schedule risk for the lunar landing.

Challenges in Major Science and Aeronautics Projects

While Artemis dominated the headlines, NASA’s multi-billion dollar science and aeronautics portfolios were also under the auditors’ microscopes. Here, too, they found programs struggling with significant cost and schedule pressures, exacerbated by a difficult budget environment.

Mars Sample Return: A Program in Crisis

The Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, an ambitious joint project with the European Space Agency (ESA) to retrieve rock samples collected by the Perseverance rover, faced an existential crisis in 2025. The program was a major focus for auditors due to its severe and escalating problems.

An independent review in late 2023 had already found the MSR mission to be in deep trouble, with a potential price tag exceeding $11 billion and a sample return date drifting into the 2040s. This was deemed unacceptable by NASA leadership and Congress.

In response, NASA spent early 2025 soliciting new, lower-cost mission profiles from industry and its own centers. However, news reports in January 2025 confirmed that NASA was delaying a decision on a new mission architecture until at least mid-2026.

This delay and uncertainty were the central focus of auditor assessments in 2025. The GAO’s “Major Projects” report included MSR as one of its projects in development, and its findings were bleak. Auditors analyzed the new proposals NASA was weighing, which had cost estimates ranging from $5.8 billion to $7.7 billion and projected return dates between 2035 and 2039.

The auditors expressed significant skepticism about the realism of these new, lower-cost plans. They noted that the program was still in an early design phase, a point at which cost and schedule estimates are notoriously unreliable. The OIG and GAO both cautioned that NASA was at risk of repeating its past mistakes by committing to an ambitious plan without a stable budget or mature technology.

The MSR situation was complicated by the FY2025 budget request. NASA had requested $300 million for the program, an amount auditors and external experts noted was insufficient to make significant progress on any of the new designs. The audit reports in 2025 painted a picture of a flagship science mission that was effectively paused, caught between an unworkable original plan and an unfunded, undeveloped new one, all while the samples wait on the Martian surface.

Earth Science and the Shifting Political Landscape

NASA’s Earth Science portfolio, which includes a fleet of satellites monitoring climate change, weather, and natural disasters, also faced scrutiny in 2025, though much of it was related to political and budgetary context rather than specific project mismanagement.

A change in presidential administration in January 2025 brought a new set of priorities to the federal government. News reports throughout the year, particularly in late 2025, detailed a new agency focus away from Earth science and climate research. This shift had a direct and disruptive effect on NASA’s science centers.

Reports emerged of significant workforce reductions and office closures, including NASA’s Office of the Chief Scientist and the Office of Technology, Policy, and Strategy. The Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Maryland, a primary hub for NASA science, was reported to be disproportionately affected.

The most prominent example was the closure of the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) in New York City. This closure was chaotic and forced the hurried relocation of equipment and personnel for active missions, such as the PACE (Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem) satellite, which had launched in 2024 to study ocean health.

While not a direct audit finding, this political environment forms a critical backdrop to the 2025 audits. A late 2025 news investigation, supported by a Senate committee report, alleged that NASA leadership was prematurely and improperly implementing budget cuts from the President’s 2026 budget request, even before Congress had finalized its funding. This created an atmosphere of instability that directly impacts program performance.

Auditors look for stable requirements and funding. The political and budgetary turmoil surrounding Earth science in 2025 creates immense risk for these multi-year projects, making it difficult for managers to plan, execute contracts, and retain a skilled workforce.

Commercial Partnerships: Performance and Oversight

NASA’s increasing reliance on private companies to deliver services, from crew transport to lunar payloads, was another major theme for auditors in 2025.

Commercial Crew Program: The Starliner Stalemate

The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) was designed to provide crew transportation to the ISS from two different American providers: SpaceX and Boeing. This “dissimilar redundancy” was meant to ensure human access to the station if one provider’s system was grounded.

By 2025, this goal had not been achieved. SpaceX’s Crew Dragon was flying regular operational missions, but Boeing’s Starliner capsule was still not certified for crewed flight. After a series of technical failures and delays, Starliner’s first crewed test flight was now projected for no earlier than 2026.

While no single major CCP audit was released in 2025, the program’s status was a key component of the GAO’s major project assessments and a standing concern for the OIG. Auditors’ ongoing work in this area focused on several key risks.

First was the cost to NASA of the Starliner delays. The agency had contracted for six operational missions from Boeing. Auditors were examining the contract terms to see what, if any, financial remedies NASA had for this multi-year failure to deliver.

Second was the risk of relying on a single provider. With Starliner grounded, NASA is 100% reliant on SpaceX for crew transport. OIG and GAO reports have long warned that this lack of redundancy exposes the ISS program to significant risk. If an issue were to ground the Crew Dragon fleet, NASA would have no way to launch its astronauts.

Third, auditors were assessing NASA’s oversight of Boeing’s technical corrections. Given the persistence of Starliner’s problems, auditors were reviewing whether NASA’s oversight was sufficiently rigorous and whether the agency was “accepting” too much risk from the contractor in an effort to get the capsule flying.

Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS)

The CLPS program, which buys payload delivery services on small, commercial robotic landers, also received audit attention. After several of the initial CLPS missions failed to reach the lunar surface in 2024, auditors in 2025 were examining NASA’s management and risk posture for the program.

An OIG audit assessed how NASA manages the CLPS contracts, which are firm-fixed-price. Similar to the HLS program, auditors examined how NASA gains insight into the private companies’ progress and how it manages the integration of government-funded science instruments onto privately-built landers.

The audit found that NASA had accepted a high-risk posture for CLPS, expecting that some missions would fail. While this approach encourages innovation and lowers costs, auditors cautioned that NASA must have a clear framework for learning from these failures. The 2025 report recommended that NASA enhance its process for collecting and sharing lessons learned from failed missions among its other CLPS providers to improve the chances of success for future flights.

Agency Management and Internal Operations

Beyond the high-profile missions, auditors also examined the internal machinery of NASA itself. The 2025 findings in cybersecurity, contract management, and infrastructure reveal systemic weaknesses that affect the entire agency.

Cybersecurity: A Persistent Weakness

For years, both the OIG and GAO have identified NASA’s information security as a major management challenge. The audits of 2025 showed that this problem persists.

The OIG’s annual evaluation of NASA’s compliance with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), released in July 2025 (IG-25-007), gave the agency a “Level 3” (Consistently Implemented) rating. This is not a passing grade; an effective program must reach “Level 4” (Managed and Measurable).

The audit identified three specific areas of concern that have been repeated in previous years:

1. Decentralized Cybersecurity: NASA continues to lack a unified, agency-wide approach to risk management. Individual centers and missions often manage their own cybersecurity, leading to inconsistent policies and protection.
2. Incomplete Documentation: Auditors again found that key security documents were missing or incomplete. This included System Security Plans and, notably, Business Impact Assessments (BIAs), which are supposed to define acceptable system downtimes. Without a BIA, a center can’t effectively plan for recovery after an attack.
3. Inconsistent Privileged Access: The agency was found to be inconsistent in how it manages “admin” or “privileged” user accounts. This is a significant security lapse, as these accounts are a primary target for hackers seeking to gain broad access to a network.

The GAO echoed these findings in its own June 2025 report (GAO-25-108138), “NASA Needs to Fully Implement Risk Management.” This report, a public version of a sensitive report issued in March, assessed the cybersecurity for two major projects. It found that NASA had not fully implemented key risk management steps.

The GAO made 16 recommendations, including the need for an organization-wide cybersecurity risk assessment – a direct mirror of the OIG’s finding of a “decentralized” approach. Together, these reports paint a clear picture of a major agency weakness: NASA’s federated, center-based structure is hindering its ability to defend itself as a single, unified enterprise against sophisticated cyber threats.

Contract and Grant Management

Audits in 2025 also looked at the fine-grained details of NASA’s contracting. An OIG audit (A-24-04-00-MSD) of NASA’s awards to Small Disadvantaged Businesses (SDBs) provided a unique window into these processes.

The audit itself was formally closed in February 2025. Its original basis – an executive order from the previous administration to increase SDB contract awards to 15% – was rescinded by the new administration in January 2025, resetting the goal to the statutory 5% minimum.

Despite closing the audit, the OIG published its findings as a memorandum. It noted that while NASA consistently exceeds the 5% goal, its internal processes are flawed. Auditors found that the SDB contracting goals set for individual NASA centers did not align with the agency’s overall goal, as they often excluded the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a major contractor-operated facility.

The report also noted that the agency’s small business specialists are often not involved early enough in the acquisition planning process, limiting their ability to shape contracts to include small businesses. Finally, the OIG found that the very data used to track SDB awards was not always accurate. These findings, while focused on a specific program, point to broader bureaucratic inefficiencies in NASA’s multi-billion dollar procurement system.

Infrastructure and Resilience

A final key area of 2025 audits was NASA’s physical infrastructure. The agency manages a vast portfolio of aging facilities, from wind tunnels and test stands to launch pads, many of which date back to the Apollo era.

An OIG audit (IG-25-008) from August 2025 examined “NASA’s Approach to Infrastructure and Operational Resilience.” This audit assessed how NASA is managing its aging facilities and preparing for disruptions, such as the increasing threat of climate-related events like hurricanes and sea-level rise at its coastal centers (like Kennedy Space Center in Florida and Stennis Space Center in Mississippi).

The audit found that NASA’s deferred maintenance backlog continues to grow, posing a risk that a critical facility could fail at a key moment, delaying a major program. Auditors also assessed the agency’s resilience planning, finding that while NASA has plans, they are not always consistently implemented or funded. The report urged NASA to better prioritize its infrastructure investments and to fully integrate resilience planning into its master facility and program plans.

Summary

The audits of NASA in 2025 paint a consistent and challenging picture. The agency continues to pursue bold and inspiring missions, but it is hampered by persistent, systemic problems.

The Government Accountability Office and NASA’s own Office of Inspector General repeatedly identified cost and schedule management as a primary weakness, with the Artemis program and the Mars Sample Return mission serving as the most prominent examples. The GAO’s 2025 report, which kept NASA’s acquisition management on its “High Risk List,” confirms that this is a long-term, unresolved issue.

Auditors also highlighted deep internal weaknesses. The agency’s cybersecurity posture remains decentralized and rated as “not effective,” a dangerous vulnerability for an organization that handles sensitive, high-value data. Management of contracts and billions of dollars in government-furnished property was also found to be lacking rigorous oversight, creating risks of waste and loss.

These findings were delivered against a backdrop of significant political and budgetary uncertainty in 2025, including a change in administration, a government shutdown, and a programmatic pivot away from Earth science. This environment makes it even more difficult for NASA to execute its complex, multi-year plans. The 2025 audits, in total, serve as a clear call for improved management, stronger oversight, and more realistic cost and schedule estimates as the agency reaches for the Moon and Mars.

Reports Issued in 2025 by NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG)

February 2025

• NASA’s Compliance with Federal Export Control Laws (IG-25-003) – February 4 2025

March 2025

• Audit of NASA’s Zero Trust Architecture (IG-25-004) – March 27 2025

May 2025

• NASA’s Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for FY 2024 (IG-25-005) – May 12 2025

June 2025

• NASA’s Implementation and Management of Its Planetary Defense Strategy (IG-25-006) – June 24 2025

July 2025

• Evaluation of NASA’s Information Security Program under FISMA FY 2025 (IG-25-007) – July 29 2025
• NASA’s Standing Review Board Practices (IG-25-009) – July 31 2025

August 2025

• NASA’s Approach to Infrastructure and Operational Resilience (IG-25-008) – August 4 2025
• Audit of Government Property for the Artemis Campaign (IG-25-010) – August 6 2025

September 2025

• NASA’s Management of the Dragonfly Project (IG-25-011) – September 9 2025
• NASA’s Management of ISS Extravehicular Activity Spacesuits (IG-25-012) – September 30 2025

Reports Issued In 2025 by U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)

June 2025

• Cybersecurity: NASA Needs to Fully Implement Risk Management for Selected Systems (GAO-25-108138) – June 25 2025

July 2025

• NASA: Assessments of Major Projects (GAO-25-107591) – July 1 2025
• In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing – Benefits, Challenges, and Policy Options (GAO-25-107555) – July 10 2025

August 2025

• Priority Open Recommendations – NASA (GAO-25-108199) – August 28 2025

In-Progress OIG Evaluations (Active During 2025)

These items represent active OIG workstreams during 2025. They are presented alphabetically by assignment code. Hyperlinks to Wikipedia are included where helpful.

• A-24-09-00-HED – Assessment of NASA’s Management of the Human Landing System Contracts
  Covers oversight of the Human Landing System used in the Artemis program.
• A-24-14-00-HED – NASA’s Management of the Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services Spacesuits Contract
  Addresses commercial procurement of next-generation spacesuit services.
• A-24-15-00-HED – NASA’s Management of Its Commercial Crew Program
  Focuses on NASA’s commercial partnership structure supporting International Space Station crew transport.
• A-25-02-00-MSD – Audit of NASA’s Launch Infrastructure
  Concerns physical infrastructure tied to launch site readiness.
• A-25-04-00-FMD – Audit of NASA’s FY 2025 Financial Statements
  Annual financial assessment.
• A-25-05-00-SARD – NASA’s Management of Its Aerosciences Evaluation and Test Capabilities Portfolio
  Addresses NASA’s aerodynamics test facilities; includes wind-tunnel capability stewardship.
• A-25-06-00-SARD – NASA’s Management of the GRACE-Continuity Mission
  Reviews cost, schedule, and performance of GRACE-C, supporting Earth science and gravity-field monitoring.
• A-25-07-00-SARD – NASA’s Role in the National Academies’ Decadal Surveys
  Examines participation in strategic Decadal survey priority-setting for astrophysics and planetary science.
• A-25-08-00-MSD – NASA’s Management of Elevated Privileges for Information Systems
  Focuses on privileged IT access practices supporting cybersecurity.

Notes

• GAO does not maintain a public, real-time tracker of in-progress NASA evaluations; only issued products are routinely posted.