The Role of Satellite Services in the 2026 US-Iran War

Key Takeaways

• U.S. military space-enabled systems played a central role in the opening phase of Operation Epic Fury, supporting strike coordination, navigation, communications, and battle management.
• Iran’s campaign against Starlink and other satellite-dependent services showed that even large low Earth orbit communications networks can be degraded by a mix of jamming, spoofing, terminal seizures, and domestic enforcement.
• Commercial satellite imagery made the war unusually transparent, while also exposing the limits of open access when imagery providers believed their products could help adversaries.

The Opening Salvo From Space

At 01:15 Eastern time on February 28, 2026, American B-2 bombers, stealth fighters, and Navy strike aircraft crossed into Iranian airspace alongside Israeli aircraft, beginning what U.S. Central Command called Operation Epic Fury. Nearly 900 strikes were launched in the first twelve hours. The world would spend the next week watching the campaign unfold not just through news reports but through satellite photographs made available by commercial providers like Planet Labs and Vantor, formerly Maxar Intelligence.

That visible layer of space-based surveillance was only the most publicly apparent dimension of how satellites shaped this war. Below what imagery providers posted on the internet lay a deeper architecture of military communications, precision navigation, electronic warfare, and information denial that proved as consequential as any bomb or missile. The conflict that began on February 28 was, at its foundations, fought as much in orbit as over the Persian Gulf.

The context matters enormously. Tensions between Washington and Tehran had escalated through the first two months of 2026. Nationwide protests inside Iran, erupting in late December 2025 following economic collapse and a currency crisis, were suppressed with lethal force. Thousands of Iranians were killed by security forces during a period of near-total internet blackout beginning January 8. The protests, the blackout, and the role of satellite internet services in that moment created conditions that directly shaped how satellite technology entered the war. By the time U.S. and Israeli forces launched their opening strikes, satellite services had already become a contested resource in Iran’s internal conflict – a fact that carried real operational consequences once the shooting started.

The prelude to war also included one of the biggest U.S. military deployments in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Multiple carrier strike groups were positioned for the crisis, with the USS Gerald R. Ford ordered to join the USS Abraham Lincoln and other naval assets already in or moving toward the region. B-2 bombers also flew a 37-hour round-trip mission from the continental United States, while surveillance aircraft had been moved into the Middle East in recent weeks. The buildup depended heavily on satellite communications, GPS-based positioning, navigation, and timing, and overhead imagery visible in commercial satellite data. By mid-February 2026, commercial satellite imagery was already showing a visible concentration of U.S. aircraft and related systems at key regional bases and at facilities used by U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.

The diplomatic track ran in parallel. U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper attended the first round of indirect talks in Muscat, Oman, on February 6, making it the first time a senior U.S. military commander had been present at negotiations with Iran. On February 20, President Trump issued a ten-day deadline for a deal. A third round of talks in Geneva on February 26 ended without agreement. Two days later, the bombs started falling. The satellite services that supported that entire sequence – intelligence collection informing U.S. demands, communications linking negotiators to Washington, surveillance tracking Iranian nuclear sites for evidence of compliance or continued construction – were already operating at wartime tempo before the war officially began.

The American Satellite Architecture

For the United States military, space-based capabilities are not simply an adjunct to conventional warfare. They underpin communications, positioning, navigation and timing, missile warning, command and control, and intelligence support. Those functions rely on satellites operating across low Earth orbit, medium Earth orbit, and geostationary orbit about 35,786 kilometers above Earth. When Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said at the Air and Space Forces Association’s Warfare Symposium on February 23, 2026 that the Space Force’s 15-year objective force work was focusing on navigation warfare, space domain awareness, and satellite communications, he was identifying mission areas that were already rooted in current operational responsibilities and active Space Force programs, even as the broader roadmap itself looked out to 2040.

U.S. Space Command described itself publicly as a “first mover” in Operation Epic Fury, meaning its operators were providing real-time intelligence to support targeting from the moment the first aircraft crossed into Iranian airspace. Lt. Gen. Gregory Gagnon, head of the Space Force’s Combat Forces Command, had said weeks before the strikes that space effects are as important to modern military operations as flour is to baking. The remark reflected a decade of institutional investment in treating space as an operational domain rather than a support function, a shift that began in earnest after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the irreplaceable role of satellite communications and the vulnerability of GPS-dependent weapons to jamming.

The specific systems backing Operation Epic Fury spanned multiple mission areas. GPS satellites in the Global Positioning System constellation provided the precision navigation that transformed conventional bombs into precision munitions. B-52s carrying the Joint Direct Attack Munition family converted standard gravity bombs into GPS-guided weapons capable of striking fixed targets with high accuracy. The GBU-31 variant, built around the BLU-109 penetrator warhead, was specifically designed to destroy reinforced structures and underground facilities – exactly the type of targets Iran had spent years hardening. B-2 bombers dropped dozens of 2,000-pound penetrator bombs targeting deeply buried ballistic missile launchers, as Admiral Brad Cooper confirmed in a briefing on March 5. Without functioning GPS guidance throughout the attack runs, the operational effectiveness of those sorties against dispersed hardened targets across mountainous terrain would have been substantially reduced.

Satellite communications kept aircraft, ships, and ground stations connected across a theater spanning from the eastern Mediterranean through the Arabian Sea. The volume and geographic spread of the strike campaign – nearly 2,000 targets struck across 24 of Iran’s 31 provinces in the first 48 hours – required a communications infrastructure that no terrestrial network could have provided across that geography with the required reliability. Tactical data links, voice communications between aircraft and command cells, and high-bandwidth sensor feeds all flowed through military satellite relay systems that were invisible to the public but essential to the operation.

Mission Delta 3, the U.S. Space Force formation responsible for space electromagnetic warfare, operates systems including the Remote Modular Terminal, a small deployable jammer developed by the Space Rapid Capabilities Office. During Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025, when B-2 bombers struck Iranian nuclear facilities, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that Space Force electromagnetic warfare units helped ensure the bombers could safely engage their targets. In Operation Epic Fury, the first moves by U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Space Command were intended to disrupt, degrade, and blind Iran’s ability to see, communicate, and respond, and the opening phase of the campaign targeted Iranian command-and-control infrastructure. Those effects are consistent with the stated purpose of the Remote Modular Terminal, which was described by officials as a tool to jam satellite communications and block adversary kill chains and targeting links. Disrupting Iranian military communications would not remove the missile threat by itself, but it could interfere with the sequence of sensing, communicating, targeting, and firing described in modern kill chains and kill webs, creating better opportunities for follow-on strikes against mobile systems before they could be moved.

The Space Development Agency had been building a proliferated constellation of data transport and missile tracking satellites, with the first two batches of operational units launched in the fall of 2025. In December 2025, the agency awarded $3.5 billion in contracts to four companies to build 72 missile warning and tracking satellites – the largest deal in the program’s history. That constellation contributed to the missile-tracking picture that helped U.S. and allied air defenses intercept Iranian ballistic missiles and drones fired across the region. Iran launched roughly 585 ballistic missiles and more than 1,500 drones in the opening days of the conflict, according to open-source tracking. Satellite-based infrared and radar sensor networks formed the foundational early-warning layer that allowed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and Patriot batteries to respond with intercepts across multiple Gulf states simultaneously.

For intelligence purposes, U.S. classified reconnaissance satellites provided persistent surveillance over Iranian military sites, leadership compounds, and naval facilities long before the first strike. The intelligence that led to the targeting of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s compound on the morning of February 28 came in part from overhead collection. According to reporting from Axios, Netanyahu called Trump on February 23 to convey intelligence about Khamenei’s upcoming meeting with top advisors and its location. That five-day window between receiving the intelligence and launching the strike suggests that the location was being monitored continuously in the interim – through some combination of overhead imagery, signals interception, and human collection – to confirm that the target remained valid when the operation began.

NATO airborne warning and control aircraft – the E-3 Sentry AWACS platform – were reported to be surveilling Iran from Konya Airport in Turkey, though Turkey denied participation in the strikes themselves. AWACS provides wide-area surveillance and battle management, operating as an airborne relay node that connects aircraft operating over Iran to command networks stretching across the theater. Several E-3 aircraft staged at Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Air Base were captured on satellite imagery published by China’s MizarVision in the days before the operation began – a detail that complicated the pretense of operational security around the buildup and illustrated how thoroughly commercial imaging had changed the pre-conflict surveillance environment.

The Starshield Dimension

Running beneath the publicly visible satellite story is a classified one. SpaceX has been developing Starshield – a more secure, capability-enhanced version of Starlink designed specifically for U.S. government and military use. The existence of Starshield is public knowledge; the specifics of what it can do and how it was used during Operation Epic Fury are not.

In 2021, SpaceX entered a $1.8 billion classified contract with the National Reconnaissance Office to construct hundreds of spy satellites for continuous real-time monitoring of targets around the globe. The satellites were built in cooperation with Northrop Grumman and began operations from May 2024, starting with NROL-146. The Starshield name was publicly announced in December 2022, and the Space Force awarded SpaceX a $70 million contract for Starshield satellite communications in September 2023. That initial contract supported 54 mission partners across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. In December 2025, the Space Force began contracting for MILNET – a planned 480-satellite communications backbone using the Starshield satellite bus, expected to reach initial operating capability by late 2027.

The key difference between Starshield and commercial Starlink is that Starshield incorporates high-assurance cryptographic capability – end-to-end encrypted, jam-resistant communications of the kind previously limited to purpose-built military satellite communications systems. The Starshield terminals are compatible with both the commercial Starlink constellation and government-owned Starshield satellites, allowing U.S. forces to roam between networks as operational conditions require.

Elon Musk publicly stated that “Starlink needs to be a civilian network, not a participant to combat” and that “Starshield will be owned by the U.S. government and controlled by DoD Space Force.” That distinction matters operationally because it reflects an effort to separate the civilian Starlink network from national security missions after Musk’s personal control over access became a visible issue in Ukraine, including his refusal to extend or activate Starlink coverage for a Ukrainian attack in Crimea and later reporting that he ordered coverage shut off in parts of occupied territory during a 2022 counteroffensive. Public reporting supports the point that these episodes raised concern inside the Pentagon and the wider U.S. defense community about dependence on a privately controlled communications system.

Whether Starshield’s classified reconnaissance constellation was actively imaging Iranian facilities throughout the Epic Fury strikes is not confirmed in open-source reporting. Given the NRO program’s design parameters – continuous real-time monitoring of global targets, with imaging capabilities described as superior to most existing U.S. government spying systems – it would be unusual if it weren’t contributing to the intelligence picture. The implications for targeting are substantial. Forces with access to near-real-time satellite imagery at the resolution levels the NRO program achieves would have had a persistent awareness of Iranian force movements and facility status that no public account of the strike campaign has fully captured.

Commercial Satellites and the Transparent Battlefield

Wars fought in the age of commercial satellite constellations look fundamentally different from conflicts that preceded them. In the 1991 Gulf War, only state actors with classified reconnaissance programs could observe the battlefield from orbit with any resolution worth using. By 2026, any organization willing to pay a commercial subscription fee – or sometimes any person with internet access – could obtain high-resolution imagery of military targets within hours of their being struck.

Planet Labs, the California-based company operating several hundred Earth-observing satellites designed to image every landmass on the planet at least once per day, became one of the primary sources of visual documentation for Operation Epic Fury. Its imagery revealed smoke rising above Tehran, burning vessels at the Konarak naval base in southern Iran, cratered runways at Iranian air facilities, and destroyed underground missile tunnel entrances in the mountains of northern Iran. The Khorramabad underground missile base – believed to house missile silos buried deep below the surface – was photographed before and after strikes, with before images showing intact tunnel entrances and after images revealing heavily cratered access points. Vantor provided complementary high-resolution imagery at resolutions as fine as 30 centimeters, capturing aircraft damage at Shiraz air base and destroyed warships at Bandar Abbas.

CSIS and other analysts drew on commercial satellite imagery from providers including Vantor and Planet Labs to assess damage at sites such as Natanz, the missile base near Tabriz, and Iranian naval facilities at places such as Konarak and Bushehr. Public reporting and imagery analysis indicated that Natanz had sustained new visible damage in March 2026 beyond the damage associated with Operation Midnight Hammer. Separate imagery and reporting also showed damage at Bushehr military and naval facilities. Airbus Defence and Space’s Pléiades Neo imagery captured the aftermath of the strike on Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s compound in Tehran, showing heavy damage and smoke.

Before these strikes, satellite imagery from Planet Labs had already been documenting Iranian preparations in the months leading up to Epic Fury. Images of the Parchin military complex traced a sequence from October 2024 Israeli strikes through repair work and, by January 2026, coverage of the site in concrete – apparently to harden it against future strikes. The Shiraz South missile base showed repair work and reconstruction. Satellite imagery of the Natanz site near a mountain showed ongoing efforts to strengthen tunnel entrances, with heavy equipment and construction activity visible. All of this imagery was available to any subscriber, which meant that both the U.S. government and the Iranian government knew that their adversary could see the same reconstruction activity. This mutual surveillance shaped the pre-war calculus in ways that are difficult to fully reconstruct.

The tension in how commercial satellite services function during wartime became apparent quickly. After Planet’s imagery revealed damage to several U.S. and allied military installations from Iranian retaliatory strikes – including the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and a billion-dollar American-built early-warning radar in Qatar – the company announced a temporary restriction. New imagery collected over the Gulf states, Iraq, Kuwait, and adjacent conflict zones would be subject to a mandatory 96-hour delay before appearing in its archive. Images of Iran itself were not included in the restriction. Vantor had never released imagery of U.S. forces or allied military bases throughout the conflict.

Planet holds profitable contracts supplying imagery to U.S. military and intelligence agencies, and the timing of the restriction raised questions about whether the decision was voluntary or reflected communication with U.S. authorities. Planet did not confirm whether it had acted at the government’s request. The episode illustrated the regulatory gap at the center of commercial space services: these companies operate in a legal environment that doesn’t clearly specify when they can be compelled to restrict their services for national security reasons, and what standards govern voluntary decisions to do so. This isn’t a problem unique to Planet Labs. It applies to every commercial satellite imagery provider operating under any government’s jurisdiction.

Starlink and the Battle for Iranian Connectivity

The most publicly visible satellite conflict preceding the war had nothing to do with targeting or reconnaissance. It was a fight over internet access for ninety million Iranians – and it began weeks before the first bomb fell.

Starlink became a politically important system in Iran before it became a wartime subject. During the government blackout imposed in January 2026, Reuters reported that thousands of terminals had been smuggled into Iran, giving some users an alternative path to communicate with the outside world.

SpaceX announced on January 14 that it was waiving subscription fees for all Starlink users in Iran. Elon Musk publicly confirmed that Starlink beams were active over the country. For protesters and dissidents, the terminals represented one of the only remaining means of sharing video evidence of the crackdown with the outside world and of receiving news from abroad. Iran had passed legislation making Starlink use punishable by severe penalties – in some cases, by death – before the protests began, reflecting how seriously the regime viewed satellite internet as a threat to its information control architecture.

Iran’s countermeasures began almost immediately. On January 8 and 9, Filter.Watch, an Iranian internet rights organization, reported a sharp rise in interference affecting Starlink connections, including packet loss of about 30 percent and, in some areas, far worse degradation. At the same time, Cloudflare recorded internet traffic from Iran falling nearly 90 percent between 16:30 and 17:00 UTC on January 8, before dropping to effectively zero later that day, while NetBlocks confirmed a severe national blackout and later said non-satellite connectivity was running at about 1 percent of normal levels. The shutdown reduced ordinary internet access in Iran to a tiny fraction of normal traffic, while satellite access remained patchy.

The methods Iran deployed against Starlink drew on a layered architecture. The first layer was GPS jamming. Starlink terminals depend on GPS signals to calculate their position and lock onto satellites passing overhead at roughly 550 kilometers altitude. By flooding GPS frequencies with high-power interference, Iranian operators prevented terminals from locating the constellation’s fast-moving satellites, breaking the connection even though the satellites themselves were functioning. SpaceX had countered Russian GPS jamming attempts in Ukraine within hours by pushing software updates. No comparable fix appeared quickly for Iran – the difference may reflect the sophistication of Iranian jamming equipment, which state media claimed incorporated Russian and Chinese technical assistance.

A second layer reportedly involved radio-frequency interference against Starlink terminals, which uses Ku-band and Ka-band antennas and links. Defense reporting has described Iran as fielding or seeking Russian-origin electronic warfare systems including the Krasukha-4, a broadband jammer that has been described as capable of interfering with X-, Ku-, and Ka-band satellite communications at ranges up to about 300 kilometers. Separate reporting has also claimed that Iran received the Murmansk-BN, that system is described as a long-range high-frequency communications jammer with reported reach of about 5,000 kilometers or more.

The mobile deployment strategy – units moving between neighborhoods, creating localized disruption zones that shifted as SpaceX engineers responded – made the jamming harder to counter than the static infrastructure Russia employed in Ukraine. Russia attempted to attack Starlink satellites directly during its invasion of Ukraine, but those installations were large, visible, and became targets for Ukrainian forces. Iran’s mobile approach was specifically designed to avoid creating fixed targets.

NasNet, a group involved in supporting Starlink use in Iran, reported that a SpaceX software update had at one point reduced packet loss in Tehran from about 35 percent to nearly 10 percent, a claim that suggested engineers were trying to counter interference in near real time. Reuters separately reported that Iranian authorities were using jammers and fake GPS signals to disrupt Starlink. The broader back-and-forth described by NasNet, in which satellite operators pushed updates while Iranian operators adjusted interference tactics, is consistent with reporting that Iran was attempting to jam and spoof the service and that access remained patchy rather than fully eliminated. This appears to have been an emerging form of non-kinetic electronic contest between a satellite communications provider and state countermeasures.

A third layer involved physical enforcement against Starlink use inside Iran. During the January 2026 blackout, reports described plainclothes officers raiding locations where people were using Starlink terminals, while security forces also stepped up efforts to track down and confiscate devices. On January 20, 2026, one report said fourteen people were detained after a raid on a villa outside Tehran where Starlink was being used. By that point, Starlink was already banned in Iran, and outside reporting said Iran had passed legislation imposing severe penalties, including death, on unauthorized use or distribution. Taken together, the combination of jamming attempts and physical confiscation appears to have amounted to one of the most aggressive state campaigns yet mounted against Starlink at national scale.

The Rest of World described the Iran episode as a meaningful challenge to Starlink’s image as a censorship-resistant system designed to stay online through a distributed low-Earth-orbit satellite constellation. In Ukraine in 2022, Russia tried to interfere with Starlink, and SpaceX said it had reprioritized resources to overcome signal jamming. In Iran, public reporting suggested that a combination of internet shutdowns, electronic interference, and physical confiscation of terminals made the service less reliable, though available reporting does not show that Iran fully eliminated Starlink nationwide. One report in The Washington Times said Iran deployed the Russian-made Murmansk-BN, which it described as having counter-GPS capabilities. The implications extended beyond Iran: in Myanmar and Sudan, as well as other conflict zones cited by Rest of World, Starlink had become an important communications tool for civilians, aid workers, journalists, and armed opposition groups, so Iran’s disruption campaign raised wider questions about how dependable the service would remain against a determined state adversary.

The Euronews analysis of Starlink’s potential expanded applications noted that the service’s newer Direct-to-Cell capability – which connects ordinary mobile phones directly to Starlink satellites without requiring a separate terminal – was not yet available in Iran, partly due to regulatory restrictions requiring Federal Communications Commission authorization to transmit cellular signals into the country and Treasury Department clearance under sanctions regulations. Iranian activists lobbied the Trump administration to authorize this capability. No such authorization had been publicly confirmed by the time the war began on February 28.

How the United States Used Satellite Data to Target Iran

The targeting architecture that allowed U.S. forces to strike nearly 2,000 Iranian sites in the first two days of Operation Epic Fury depended on satellite data collected over months. This was not improvised. The intelligence preparation had been running in parallel with the diplomatic process, with satellite imagery of Iranian nuclear sites, missile bases, naval facilities, and leadership compounds being updated continuously through services from Planet Labs, Vantor, and classified reconnaissance assets.

The strike against Khamenei’s compound on the morning of February 28 required precise, current intelligence about where the supreme leader would be at a specific time. According to reporting from Axios, Netanyahu called Trump on February 23 to convey intelligence about Khamenei’s upcoming meeting with top advisors and its location. That five-day window between receiving the intelligence and launching the strike suggests the location was being monitored continuously to confirm it remained valid when the operation began.

Admiral Brad Cooper confirmed in a briefing at CENTCOM’s Tampa headquarters that U.S. forces had targeted Iranian infrastructure and assets enabling Iran to conduct operations in space. He did not specify which facility was struck or what capabilities were destroyed. The implication was that the United States moved to degrade not just Iran’s conventional military infrastructure but its ability to conduct space-assisted operations – a mission consistent with doctrine that Space Command had been developing around offensive space control.

GPS-guided weapons performed as expected against fixed and semi-fixed targets throughout the campaign. Iranian air defense sites, naval bases, underground missile silos, and command facilities were struck with high accuracy. Satellite imagery from Planet Labs and Vantor confirmed strikes at the Konarak naval base, at Bandar Abbas, at multiple IRGC headquarters buildings in Tehran, and at missile tunnel entrances in mountainous terrain. The IRGC’s Malek-Ashtar building in Tehran was documented as completely destroyed in footage released by Iran International on March 2. The Leadership House was captured in Airbus Pléiades Neo imagery showing the compound heavily damaged.

The naval dimension of the campaign relied heavily on satellite-based targeting and battle damage assessment. CENTCOM confirmed by March 4 that more than 30 Iranian naval vessels had been sunk or critically damaged. Satellite imagery showed the large support ship IRNS Makran ablaze at its pier in Bandar Abbas. The Makran – originally a Japanese-built Aframax crude oil tanker converted into a military vessel capable of supporting helicopter operations and special operations forces – was struck within hours of the operation beginning. The IRGC drone carrier, a converted container ship roughly the size of a World War II aircraft carrier capable of operating Shahed-series unmanned aerial vehicles, was set on fire and eliminated as a mobile strike platform within the first day. On March 4, the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena was sunk by a torpedo from the USS Charlotte, a nuclear-powered submarine, approximately 40 nautical miles south of Galle, Sri Lanka – the first warship sunk by a submarine in combat since the British sank the ARA General Belgrano during the Falklands War, and the first by an American submarine since World War II. The Navy’s ability to locate and track Iranian vessels operating in the Indian Ocean reflected persistent satellite-based maritime surveillance that had been running continuously since the military buildup began.

Iran’s Satellite Strategy and Its Limitations

Iran’s space program has grown more capable over the past decade, but it remains fundamentally different in character from the American one. Tehran has demonstrated the ability to launch small satellites using domestically developed solid-fuel space launch vehicles – whose technology overlaps significantly with ballistic missile development – and received Russian assistance in satellite launches, including a February 2024 launch from a Russian site that placed an Iranian satellite in orbit alongside 18 Russian satellites. Iran claimed in early 2025 to have placed multiple satellites into orbit in a single launch for the first time, which the Iranian Space Agency described as evidence of an independent national space capability.

The practical military utility of Iran’s own satellites in the 2026 war appears to have been limited. Iran’s genuine strength in the space domain lies not in orbital platforms but in ground-based electronic warfare systems designed to deny adversaries the use of their space-based capabilities. The Defense Intelligence Agency had documented Iran’s development of satellite communications and GPS jamming technologies well before the conflict, noting that Iran recognizes the strategic value of disrupting American space-based advantages. Iran’s approach – focusing on jamming, spoofing, and cyber intrusion rather than developing its own anti-satellite weapons – reflects a rational cost-benefit calculation. Direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons are expensive to develop, technically demanding, and provocative to test or deploy. Jamming systems can be built domestically, procured from Russia or China, and employed in ways that preserve plausible deniability.

Iran has domestic electronic warfare capability through organizations such as Iran Electronics Industries, which U.S. officials and independent trackers have linked to jamming, monitoring, eavesdropping, and other EW-related activity. Iran’s 2011 capture of a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel established that the drone ended up inside Iranian territory, but Tehran’s claim that it used GPS spoofing to bring the aircraft down has never been officially confirmed by the United States and remains disputed. In a 2026 interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine, Space Force officer Maj. Gen. Jason Galbreath described Iran’s counterspace capabilities as “nascent,” saying basic brute-force jamming is relatively easy to field while more sophisticated effects may reflect assistance from another country.

During the 12-Day War with Israel in June 2025, Iranian forces deployed GPS jamming against Israeli drones, forcing navigation failures on aircraft relying on civilian GPS signals. That experience accelerated Iran’s integration of China’s BeiDou-3 satellite navigation constellation into its military infrastructure. BeiDou-3, completed in 2020 with 35 satellites, was designed with hardened signal architecture specifically intended to resist the jamming techniques that had proven effective against GPS. Iran’s integration of BeiDou-3 had been underway since at least 2022, and the June 2025 war confirmed the practical value of that investment.

By the time Operation Epic Fury began, Iran’s military systems were operating on a combination of GPS, GLONASS, and BeiDou-3, giving Iranian drone and missile operators navigation redundancy that hadn’t existed in the earlier war. Open-source analysts tracking Iranian missile launches during Epic Fury noted that the accuracy and sustained tempo of Iranian strikes against U.S. bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE suggested intact navigation capability despite American electronic warfare operations. Iran struck the U.S. Space Force’s AN/FPS-132 Block 5 ballistic missile early-warning radar in Qatar – satellite imagery from Planet Labs confirmed significant damage. The targeting precision required to hit that specific installation demonstrates functioning guidance systems operating despite American countermeasures. Iran also targeted AN/TPY-2 radars at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, at Al-Ruwai Air Base in the UAE, and at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia – a pattern Hudson Institute analysts assessed as a coherent strategy to blind the sensor network supporting American missile defense across the Gulf.

Iran launched roughly 585 ballistic missiles and 1,522 drones through the first week of the conflict, according to open-source tracking. The missile salvo rate had declined by approximately 70 to 85 percent from the first day of strikes, thanks to what CENTCOM attributed to the systematic hunt for Iranian mobile missile launchers. That hunt was conducted primarily through satellite and airborne surveillance identifying launcher positions. Yet Iran’s missile and drone forces had not been eliminated. Iranian forces struck Dubai International Airport, one of the world’s busiest, causing temporary closure. They struck the Jebel Ali Port in Dubai, the region’s largest maritime hub. They struck residential areas in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. A top Iranian official told CNN as of March 9 that the government was prepared for a long war.

GPS Jamming and the Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz, twenty-one miles wide at its narrowest point, handles approximately a fifth of global oil and gas exports. Its function depends on reliable navigation, established maritime lanes, and the ability of vessel operators to know where they and other ships are. All three of those conditions collapsed in the opening days of Operation Epic Fury.

Iran’s GPS jamming operations around the strait were extensive and deliberate. The interference that displaced more than 1,100 commercial ships’ navigation systems on February 28 reflected coordinated regional jamming rather than isolated incidents, according to Windward, a shipping intelligence firm. Vessels were erroneously placed at airports, on land inside Iran, near nuclear facilities, and at positions their crews knew to be dangerously false. The Automatic Identification System that commercial vessels use to broadcast their positions – an internationally mandated safety system – also failed under the jamming. AIS signals, which rely on GPS timing, showed false positions for vessels throughout the Gulf, making it functionally impossible to know the accurate location of any vessel transiting the region.

Tanker traffic had effectively come to a standstill even before Iran formally threatened to fire on passing vessels. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said in a briefing that the timeline for restoring safe passage was “something that is being calculated actively by both the Department of War and the Department of Energy.” The U.S. Navy committed to escorting oil tankers through the strait when necessary. Oil prices swung between nearly $120 and below $90 per barrel within a single trading session on March 9, with U.S. stocks erasing early losses as oil prices retreated from their peaks – a reflection of genuine uncertainty about how long the supply disruption would last.

Jamming and spoofing also slowed marine traffic throughout the broader Gulf. The practical effects extended to navigation by warships on all sides. A navigation error caused by GPS spoofing in a congested, contested waterway where American, Iranian, and allied naval vessels were all operating simultaneously creates genuine collision and miscalculation risk. Electronic interference had been a growing issue for shipping since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. June 2025 had produced a navigational incident involving oil tankers Adalynn and Front Eagle off the UAE coast – attributed at least in part to electronic interference. The Iran war simply intensified and compressed a trend that had already been accelerating.

GPS spoofing also affected aircraft. The number of GPS signal loss events affecting aircraft had increased by 220 percent globally between 2021 and 2024, according to the International Air Transport Association. Airlines operating across the Middle East reported degraded navigation signals forcing pilots to revert to backup navigation or refile altered routing. Dubai International Airport, already struck and temporarily closed by Iranian drones on March 1, had been routing aircraft around Iranian airspace even before the physical strikes began. The combination of physical damage and navigation degradation effectively halted commercial aviation across much of the region.

Defence Security Asia analysis noted that Iran completed a quiet but consequential shift during the conflict: transitioning its military and state logistics toward China’s BeiDou-3 for maritime and aviation navigation, reducing its own exposure to the GPS jamming environment it was creating. Iranian forces that had already shifted to BeiDou-3 were unaffected by the interference they were generating across the strait – operating in a precision navigation environment from which commercial shipping was effectively excluded.

How Iran Tracked American Forces With Chinese Eyes

The counterintelligence dimension of satellite services in the 2026 war produced one of the conflict’s most striking dynamics. While the United States maintains classified reconnaissance satellites operating well above the practical reach of any Iranian countermeasure, the proliferation of commercial imaging constellations meant American force movements could be tracked in near real time and published publicly.

MizarVision, a Chinese geospatial intelligence company identified in reporting as Shanghai-headquartered, made some of the most visible public use of commercially available satellite imagery during Operation Epic Fury. The company used AI-based analysis and annotation on commercial imagery that may have included data associated with the Jilin-1 constellation, although the exact source of the imagery has been publicly disputed and some analysts have argued that at least part of it may have come from Western providers rather than Chinese satellites alone. MizarVision publicly posted imagery tracking the USS Gerald R. Ford after its departure from Souda Bay in Crete, and also posted imagery of the USS Abraham Lincoln operating in the Arabian Sea. Its published imagery also identified F-22 fighters at Ovda Air Base in Israel and high-value aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base, including Boeing E-3 AWACS aircraft. According to reporting that quoted the company’s 27 February post, MizarVision stated that the United States was continuously transporting supplies to Ovda via C-17 aircraft, and the operation began about 24 hours later.

Several facilities and assets documented by MizarVision were subsequently targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Whether Tehran used MizarVision’s imagery directly to inform targeting decisions has not been confirmed. What’s clear is that the information was available, accurate, and timely – and that there is no international legal framework that would have prevented MizarVision from publishing it.

MizarVision only joined X in January 2026, and while it operates as a private firm it is subject to Chinese Communist Party directives. The episode illustrated a structural challenge with no easy solution: the same commercial satellite infrastructure that serves Western militaries, intelligence agencies, news organizations, and researchers also serves state-linked companies that operate under different institutional obligations and face no restrictions on what they publish. Cold War reconnaissance satellites were large, expensive, and operated by governments that could keep their products classified. The Jilin-1 constellation runs on smaller, cheaper hardware with near-continuous global coverage. There’s no classification system that limits who builds analytical pipelines from its imagery.

The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies had been examining this issue through its broader work on China’s military modernization, and at the 2026 Air & Space Forces Warfare Symposium in the Denver area, senior fellow J. Michael Dahm demonstrated how commercially available imagery from Planet Labs could be used to estimate the annual output capacity of China’s military aerospace industry without relying on classified information. Dahm was showing how much can now be learned from unclassified commercial imagery, including aircraft production growth, airfield activity, and major exercises. The same commercial imaging market that allows Western analysts to monitor Chinese facilities can also allow Chinese firms and other non-Western actors to monitor American military movements and publish those observations under different legal, political, and commercial constraints.

The Paradox of Starlink in Iranian Government Hands

One of the more paradoxical developments in the early phase of the war was reporting that Iranian-linked hackers, including the group Handala, were observed using Starlink IP ranges during Iran’s communications blackout to maintain command-and-control infrastructure. That sat in obvious tension with the fact that the Iranian government had banned Starlink, attempted to jam and spoof its signals, and imposed penalties on citizens who used or distributed the terminals.

Ashley Deeks of the University of Virginia School of Law, an expert in national security law and author of The Double Black Box, identified some of this ambiguity in commentary published during the pre-war protest period. A Starlink terminal enabling civilian communication during a blackout could, depending on how it is used, also support military communications. International humanitarian law requires parties to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives, but the heavy reliance on dual-use space systems makes that analysis unusually difficult rather than placing such systems in a wholly undefined legal zone. The broader legal question of when GPS jamming, spoofing, or cyber interference with satellite infrastructure amounts to a prohibited use of force under the UN Charter remains unsettled in important respects, even though manuals and expert projects such as the Woomera Manual have clarified parts of the debate. States have continued to jam and interfere with space-based systems while often treating those actions as falling below the threshold of armed attack or unlawful force. The 2026 Iran crisis added fresh examples of that ambiguity, but it did not resolve it.

Satellite-Based Propaganda and Fabricated Imagery

The information dimension of the war didn’t stop at imagery distribution. In an early Hudson Institute assessment of the conflict, analyst Can Kasapoğlu wrote that IRGC cyber-information operatives appeared to be circulating fabricated satellite imagery to exaggerate U.S. losses and shape perceptions inside Iran. That allegation is consistent with broader reporting from the Associated Press and others that the conflict produced a wave of AI-generated and manipulated war imagery, including fake satellite-style images. The conflict showed how easily satellite-image aesthetics can be imitated or manipulated with widely available AI editing tools, complicating open-source assessment in real time.

The problem for analysts and journalists is that authenticating satellite imagery is not a simple task. The metadata embedded in commercial imagery files can be checked, but files can be obtained legitimately and then manipulated. The proliferation of AI-generated synthetic imagery, combined with the proliferation of legitimate commercial satellite imagery, creates an environment where both circulate simultaneously and distinguishing them requires tools and expertise that most consumers of the information don’t have.

Planet Labs’ imagery of the war was distributed through news organizations including AFP and NPR, through think tank publications, and through social media. Each transmission increased the chain of custody and created opportunities for modification. Iran’s state media was simultaneously broadcasting claims about the extent of damage to U.S. positions, backed by imagery that open-source analysts struggled to verify or refute. Hudson Institute analysts specifically warned that the highly contested information environment was complicating any open-source intelligence battle-damage assessment, and that firm conclusions about the extent of damage on either side required careful verification that couldn’t always be conducted in real time.

The Direct-to-Cell Debate and Future Satellite Access

One of the most practically consequential satellite policy debates triggered by the January protests and the subsequent war centers on Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell capability. Unlike standard Starlink service, which requires a separate terminal roughly the size of a pizza box, Direct-to-Cell functions differently: satellites operating at 550 kilometers altitude function as mobile phone towers in space, and ordinary cell phones connect to them directly without additional hardware. A person in Iran with nothing but a standard smartphone could theoretically access satellite connectivity through this mechanism, eliminating the hardware identification and confiscation problem that made ordinary Starlink so vulnerable to Iranian enforcement.

The catch is regulatory. Because Starlink is an American company and Iran is subject to comprehensive U.S. sanctions, American firms require Federal Communications Commission authorization to transmit cellular signals into the country. The Treasury Department must also confirm that providing such services complies with sanctions regulations. Iranian activists lobbied the Trump administration heavily throughout January and February to authorize Direct-to-Cell access, and FCC officials acknowledged that emergency or special temporary licenses could theoretically be issued under circumstances that justified them. No such authorization had been publicly confirmed as of the war’s opening on February 28.

The policy debate has real dimensions beyond Iran. Direct-to-Cell makes it far harder for any government to suppress satellite connectivity within its territory. The standard Starlink terminal emits a distinctive microwave signal that radar and direction-finding equipment can detect and locate, which is why Iran was able to physically confiscate terminals once it knew where they were being used. A person’s standard cell phone emits similar radio frequency signals in normal use – but the idea that every cell phone becomes a potential satellite ground station changes the scale of the identification problem dramatically. Iranian authorities can’t confiscate every smartphone in the country.

The technology’s availability in Iran was also constrained as of March 9, 2026 by the fact that Direct-to-Cell connectivity depends on a sufficient number of Starlink satellites carrying the cellular payload, and the density of that coverage over Iran had not reached the level required for reliable service. SpaceX has been expanding its Direct-to-Cell constellation, but the deployment timeline means the technology that would have been most useful to Iranian protesters during January’s blackout wasn’t yet available at adequate coverage. The war has accelerated policy discussions about whether the U.S. government should fast-track regulatory approval for Direct-to-Cell over countries under authoritarian internet suppression, treating it as a foreign policy tool rather than purely a commercial regulatory question.

The debate also extends to competing commercial providers. AST SpaceMobile , which had received a $30 million Space Development Agency contract in February 2026 to demonstrate tactical communications capability, is building a direct-to-cell constellation that could complement or compete with Starlink’s service. Amazon’s Project Kuiper was cited by Space Force planners as a potential diversification of the military’s low-Earth-orbit satellite communications architecture, reducing dependence on any single provider. The lesson of SpaceX’s Starlink/Ukraine experience – that a single private company’s CEO can restrict a military-critical service based on his personal risk assessment – drove institutional pressure toward provider diversification that the Iran conflict has reinforced.

The Iran War and Open-Source Intelligence

A secondary effect of satellite imagery proliferation in the 2026 conflict is what it’s done to open-source intelligence as a discipline and to the organizations that practice it. CSIS, Hudson Institute, Bellingcat, and dozens of smaller organizations have been producing real-time battle damage assessments, force tracking analyses, and weapons inventory estimates from publicly available commercial satellite imagery and social media throughout the conflict. Some of this analysis has been published within hours of strikes, providing the public with information that would have required classified access during any conflict before the commercial imagery era.

The open-source intelligence community’s work during Epic Fury has produced concrete, verifiable contributions to public understanding of the conflict. CSIS analysts identified which Iranian nuclear facilities had been struck and which had not, providing a more accurate picture than either government’s public statements. Hudson Institute’s assessment of Iran’s declining missile launch rate – from roughly the third day of the conflict onward – was based on satellite imagery and open-source counting of launch events, and proved broadly consistent with what CENTCOM later confirmed. The before-and-after imagery sequences published by journalists and think tanks using Planet Labs and Vantor imagery gave the global public a visual record of the campaign that no government was providing through official channels.

That same open-source community has also documented evidence of strikes on civilian infrastructure that neither the American nor Israeli governments have publicly acknowledged. The elementary school strike in southern Iran, which Defense Secretary Hegseth confirmed was under investigation, was documented by satellite imagery and social media video before any official acknowledgment. Satellite imagery from Airbus and Planet Labs showed what appeared to be residential buildings struck in Niloofar Square in Tehran, where Iranian state media reported at least 20 civilian deaths on March 2. The Iranian Red Crescent Society’s March 7 report that over 6,668 civilian units had been targeted by U.S.-Israeli strikes was supported by independent damage assessment using commercial satellite imagery.

The practical effect of this open-source accountability is that the political costs of the campaign are being measured in near real time by a global audience. That’s genuinely new. The strategic calculus around military operations has always included an assessment of political and public opinion costs, but those assessments previously lagged events by days or weeks as journalists and investigators pieced together what had happened. Commercial satellite imagery has compressed that lag to hours. Whether that compression changes the conduct of military operations – whether the knowledge that damage to civilian areas will be documented in near real time by Planet Labs satellites changes targeting decisions – is something that won’t be answerable until this war ends and the full record is available.

What Neither Side Can Fully Control

The war that began on February 28 has produced an information environment that neither the United States nor Iran can manage. Commercial satellite constellations have made the battlefield partially transparent to anyone with internet access and analytic capability. American forces can destroy Iranian infrastructure, suppress Iranian missile launches, and disrupt Iranian communications – but they can’t prevent China’s Jilin-1 satellites from photographing their carrier strike groups or MizarVision from publishing those photographs publicly.

Iran can jam GPS signals across the Arabian Gulf, degrade Starlink connectivity inside its borders, and hit U.S. radar installations with ballistic missiles – but it can’t prevent American reconnaissance satellites from tracking its remaining mobile missile launchers or prevent Planet Labs from publishing imagery of destroyed Iranian naval bases to the world press.

This symmetrical transparency is genuinely new. During the 1991 Gulf War, the Pentagon controlled the visual narrative of the campaign almost entirely. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, embedded journalists provided real-time ground-level coverage but satellite imagery remained largely the province of governments and intelligence agencies. By 2026, commercial satellite imagery from multiple independent providers – American, European, and Chinese – covers every aspect of the conflict and is available to anyone with a subscription or a browser.

The consequence is that no government can fully control the factual record of what’s being destroyed, where strikes are hitting civilian infrastructure, and what damage is being inflicted on American and allied positions. That factual record has political consequences. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed that the U.S. was investigating a strike on a girls’ elementary school in southern Iran where Iranian state media reported at least 168 children were killed. Satellite imagery from multiple commercial providers documented the location before and after the strike – independently verifiable damage assessment that governments can neither control nor ignore. The Red Crescent reported on March 3 that over 600 civilians had been killed, while Human Rights Activists in Iran estimated 742 civilian deaths, figures supported by open-source analysis including satellite imagery rather than depending solely on official claims from either side.

The Iranian government attempted to manage its own image in the conflict through fabricated satellite imagery, but it also benefited from authentic commercial imagery documenting U.S. and Israeli strikes on civilian areas. The dynamic is genuinely bilateral. Neither government controls the record, and neither can reliably predict which images will dominate international coverage on any given day. Commercial satellites have made war simultaneously more transparent and more complex to narrate – a combination that serves accountability at the cost of clarity, and sometimes serves propaganda at the cost of accuracy.

The Global Demonstration Effect

Every conflict of consequence since the advent of precision-guided munitions has served as a demonstration for the international defense community. Operation Epic Fury is no different, and the satellite dimension of the conflict may be its most broadly instructive lesson.

The conflict demonstrated simultaneously that a modern military campaign of this scale requires satellite-based GPS for precision, satellite-based intelligence for targeting, satellite-based communications for coordination, and satellite-based early warning for defense – and that all of these systems can be attacked, degraded, or contested by a determined adversary with access to Russian-supplied jamming equipment and Chinese navigation systems. The architecture that makes American military power so lethal is also the architecture that defines its vulnerabilities.

Nations watching the conflict are drawing their own conclusions. Those relying heavily on GPS-guided weapons are assessing whether their munitions would perform as expected against an adversary with Murmansk-BN class systems. Countries considering BeiDou-3 integration are watching how that decision paid off for Iranian forces. Satellite internet providers are evaluating what Iran’s anti-Starlink campaign means for service resilience in future conflicts. Defense planners in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and throughout NATO are studying every aspect of the satellite warfare dimension with interest that extends far beyond the Iran-specific context.

China’s role as an unseen participant – providing electronic warfare systems to Iran, operating the satellite constellation whose imagery tracked American forces, and building the BeiDou-3 navigation system that gave Iranian missiles navigation redundancy – suggests a broader strategy of supporting Iranian resistance through technical means without direct military involvement. That approach has clear Cold War precedent, and it’s producing effects that are difficult for the United States to counter without escalating toward Beijing in ways that would widen the conflict far beyond the current theater.

The Space Force ‘s pre-conflict doctrine had been moving in exactly the direction this war is testing. Gen. Saltzman’s announcement of the 15-year force structure roadmap focusing on navigation warfare, space domain awareness, and satellite communications – released on February 23, five days before the war began – reads differently in retrospect. The Space Force had been anticipating a contested space environment and building doctrine and capabilities to operate within it. Operation Epic Fury is the first major test of that preparation at scale, and the early results suggest that the American system is working as designed – while simultaneously revealing that adversaries have been developing countermeasures more effectively than publicly assessed.

The Space Development Agency’s $3.5 billion in contract awards to four companies in December 2025, for 72 missile warning and tracking satellites in low Earth orbit, was the largest contract of its kind. Those satellites are precisely the type of proliferated, disaggregated constellation architecture that analysts argue is more resilient to attack than traditional few-satellite geostationary systems. Whether that resilience holds when an adversary is actively targeting the ground-based infrastructure those satellites communicate with – as Iran targeted American radar systems in Qatar and Saudi Arabia – remains to be fully tested over the coming weeks of this conflict.

The National Defense Space Architecture that the Space Development Agency has been building out is designed around exactly the kind of multi-threat environment that Epic Fury represents. Its Transport Layer provides tactical data links. Its Tracking Layer monitors missile launches. Its Battle Management Layer coordinates responses. All of it depends on satellite-to-satellite and satellite-to-ground connectivity that Iran has been trying to disrupt through a combination of jamming, cyber intrusion, and physical strikes on ground infrastructure. The war is, in effect, a live operational test of whether the architecture performs as designed under sustained adversary attack – and at ten days into the conflict, the results are mixed enough that drawing confident conclusions would be premature. The Iran conflict will inform Space Force procurement, doctrine, and alliance planning for at least a decade. Every decision about constellation size, orbital altitude, redundancy, and ground station hardening will be made in the shadow of what this war revealed about where satellite-dependent operations perform as expected and where they fail.

Summary

The 2026 war between the United States and Iran is, among other things, the most space-intensive conventional conflict in history. Every significant military capability deployed in Operation Epic Fury depends on satellite services: the GPS guidance making American bombs precise, the communications linking aircraft carriers to command networks across two ocean bodies, the intelligence platforms that located Iranian leadership, and the early-warning sensors tracking incoming Iranian missiles and drones. U.S. Space Command’s role as a first mover was not incidental – it was structural, embedded in how American forces fight. Remove satellite services from the equation and the campaign doesn’t look like Operation Epic Fury. It looks like something far more limited and far less precise.

Iran’s response has been to contest those space-based advantages using Russian-supplied electronic warfare systems, a Chinese-backed navigation alternative in BeiDou-3, and a GPS jamming campaign that disabled more than 1,100 commercial ships and effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to routine tanker traffic. These aren’t peripheral tactical measures. They’re the core of an Iranian strategy built around degrading American military effectiveness without matching American capability system by system – a doctrine of asymmetric space contestation that this war has given Iran its most sustained and large-scale opportunity to test in practice.

The commercial satellite layer – Planet Labs, Vantor, Airbus, and China’s Jilin-1 constellation processed by MizarVision – has produced a conflict more transparent than any previous war, in ways that serve multiple actors simultaneously and that no government can fully control. The same imagery that helps American analysts assess battle damage helps Iranian information operators establish evidence, helps journalists document civilian casualties, and helps Chinese intelligence analysts track American carrier movements. Space-based information has become ambient in this conflict, as pervasive and as ungovernable as the electromagnetic spectrum itself.

One dynamic that the conflict has not resolved – and may actually deepen – is the legal vacuum around commercial satellite services in wartime. There’s no binding international agreement that specifies when states can jam each other’s satellite signals, when commercial providers can be compelled to restrict their services, or what obligations private companies like SpaceX have when their products serve both civilian protesters and military command networks in the same conflict. The 2026 Iran war has generated more concrete examples of that vacuum than any prior conflict – without generating any framework for addressing it. That’s the gap that will matter most when the next conflict starts.

The 2026 U.S.-Iran war offered a clear demonstration of how deeply satellite services now shape modern conflict. Military satellite architectures supported command, control, navigation, and targeting. Commercial imagery made parts of the battlefield visible to the world. Starlink became part of both civilian resistance and state suppression inside Iran. Navigation interference in the Gulf showed how space-dependent civilian systems can be destabilized during a regional war.

Appendix: Top 10 Questions Answered in This Article

What role did U.S. Space Command play in Operation Epic Fury?

U.S. Space Command described itself as a “first mover” in the operation, providing real-time targeting intelligence from the moment the first strikes were launched on February 28, 2026. The Space Force’s Mission Delta 3 operated electromagnetic warfare systems to suppress Iranian satellite communications and protect American aircraft. Space-based navigation, missile warning, and surveillance capabilities underpinned the entire American strike campaign across 24 of Iran’s 31 provinces in the first 48 hours.

How did Starlink become a factor in the US-Iran conflict before the war began?

Between 50,000 and 100,000 Starlink terminals had been smuggled into Iran by January 2026, providing a communications channel during the government’s internet blackout imposed to suppress nationwide protests. SpaceX waived subscription fees and activated service over Iran on January 14, 2026, prompting the Iranian government to deploy military-grade electronic warfare systems. Iranian jamming reduced Starlink connectivity by up to 80 percent in major cities, marking the first verified national-scale degradation of the service in history.

What electronic warfare systems did Iran deploy against Starlink and GPS?

Iran deployed the Russian-made Murmansk-BN mobile jammer, with a radius of roughly 185 miles, and the Krasukha-4 broadband jammer targeting the Ku and Ka bands that Starlink uses. Iranian forces also conducted GPS spoofing attacks that prevented Starlink terminals from locating satellites and displaced the navigation systems of more than 1,100 commercial ships in the Arabian Gulf. Russian and Chinese specialists reportedly assisted in deploying and operating these systems against Iranian territory.

How did commercial satellite imagery shape coverage of Operation Epic Fury?

Planet Labs, Vantor (formerly Maxar Intelligence), and Airbus Defence and Space provided near-real-time satellite photographs of destroyed Iranian military facilities, burning naval vessels, and damaged nuclear sites. Planet Labs imposed a 96-hour publication delay on imagery of Gulf states after its images revealed Iranian strike damage to U.S. military installations, while China’s MizarVision published satellite imagery of American carrier groups and air bases – several of which were subsequently targeted by Iranian strikes.

What is BeiDou-3 and why did Iran integrate it into its military navigation?

BeiDou-3 is China’s satellite navigation system, completed in 2020 with 35 satellites providing global coverage and hardened signal architecture designed for contested electromagnetic environments. Iran began integrating BeiDou-3 into its military navigation infrastructure around 2022, specifically to reduce dependence on GPS signals that American and Israeli electronic warfare could jam. The system’s navigation redundancy preserved Iranian drone and missile operational effectiveness during Epic Fury despite American jamming efforts.

How did China’s MizarVision use satellite imagery during the conflict?

MizarVision, a Shanghai-headquartered geospatial intelligence firm that used AI-based analysis and annotation on commercial satellite imagery that may have included data associated with the Jilin-1 constellation, publicly posted imagery of American military movements during Operation Epic Fury, including F-22 fighters at Ovda Air Base and the positions of U.S. carrier strike groups in the Arabian Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The company’s X account shows that it joined the platform on January 25, 2026, and reporting on Chinese firms and data-control laws indicates that such companies operate under a legal and political environment in which the Chinese state can compel access to data and corporate cooperation. Reporting also states that several of the facilities and assets it catalogued were later struck by Iran.

What happened to maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz during the war?

Iranian GPS jamming operations displaced the navigation systems of more than 1,100 commercial vessels in the Arabian Gulf on February 28, 2026, according to the shipping intelligence firm Windward. Ships were erroneously positioned at airports, on land, and near nuclear facilities. The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil and gas exports transit, saw tanker traffic effectively halt as shipping lines rerouted and insurance underwriters suspended coverage for transiting vessels.

Did Iran successfully strike American satellite or space-related infrastructure?

Satellite imagery from Planet Labs confirmed that an Iranian strike significantly damaged the U.S. Space Force’s AN/FPS-132 Block 5 ballistic missile early-warning radar in Qatar. Iranian forces also targeted AN/TPY-2 radar systems at U.S. bases in Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia – all sensor systems that integrate satellite data into the overall missile defense picture. U.S. Space Command confirmed that American forces struck Iranian infrastructure enabling space operations in response, without specifying what was destroyed.

What is Starshield and how does it differ from commercial Starlink?

Starshield is SpaceX’s militarized satellite communications and reconnaissance program developed under classified contracts with the National Reconnaissance Office and U.S. Space Force. Unlike commercial Starlink, Starshield incorporates high-assurance cryptographic encryption and anti-jam capabilities suitable for military operations. A $1.8 billion NRO contract for hundreds of spy satellites began operational deployment in May 2024, and a Space Force contract provides satellite communications to 54 military mission partners. The U.S. government, not SpaceX, controls access and operational decisions for Starshield satellites.

What are the long-term implications of the 2026 conflict for satellite services in warfare?

The conflict demonstrated that GPS-guided precision weapons can be degraded by Russian-supplied jamming equipment, that commercial satellite imagery now provides near-real-time battlefield transparency to all parties including adversarial intelligence services, and that satellite internet services are vulnerable to determined state-level jamming despite their distributed architecture. The legal framework governing satellite services in conflict – covering jamming, restrictions on commercial imagery, and the dual-use status of services like Starlink – remains entirely undeveloped, a gap the 2026 war has made impossible to ignore.