Should the U.S. Accept Limits in Space?

Key Takeaways

• Selective limits can protect U.S. access, alliances, markets, and freedom to operate.
• Broad bans on military capabilities could constrain deterrence without reliable reciprocity.
• Washington should pursue verifiable rules on debris, interference, transparency, and crisis contact.

Why Space Norms and Treaties Can Serve U.S. Strategy

On April 18, 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the United States (U.S.) would stop conducting destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests. The decision offers a useful test for space norms and treaties: a self-imposed limit can reduce a capability in exchange for a safer operating environment, stronger diplomatic standing, and lower risk to American spacecraft.

That exchange makes strategic sense when the restricted action creates costs for the United States that exceed its military benefit. A destructive ASAT test can demonstrate that a country can attack a satellite, but it also produces debris that may threaten unrelated satellites, crewed spacecraft, commercial networks, and national systems. The United States already operates a large and valuable space infrastructure, so the consequences of orbital debris fall heavily on American interests.

The logic is similar in other shared environments. A navy may accept navigation rules because unrestricted maneuvering would increase collisions. Airlines accept air-traffic procedures because predictable separation allows more flights. Space norms can provide comparable benefits if they preserve access and reduce uncertainty without preventing lawful defense, exploration, commercial activity, or emergency action.

The United States also gains influence when it helps establish rules that other governments can accept. Washington has greater diplomatic reach when it can present a proposed norm as a reciprocal safety measure rather than as an attempt to preserve a unilateral advantage. A rule against debris-generating missile tests, for example, can be framed around a physical consequence that affects every operator, regardless of political system.

The commercial effect matters. Satellite broadband, Earth observation, positioning services, weather forecasting, launch, insurance, ground stations, and data processing all depend on predictable access to orbit and spectrum. New Space Economy’s analysis of NGSO orbit management and optical communications shows how orbital congestion, radiofrequency interference, debris, and data-sharing obligations are becoming operating constraints for both commercial and government systems.

A U.S. company deciding whether to finance a constellation must consider more than launch price and satellite design. It must assess the probability of harmful interference, collision, cyber disruption, licensing delays, and sudden political restrictions. Clear operating expectations can reduce those risks and make private capital more willing to support long-lived infrastructure.

Norms can also strengthen alliances. The United States rarely operates in space alone. American military networks depend on allied ground stations, shared intelligence, foreign launch locations, partner spacecraft, and commercial suppliers. Civil exploration programs rely on international contributions involving spacecraft, robotics, communications, science instruments, and surface infrastructure.

A partner government is more likely to share sensitive capabilities when it understands the circumstances under which those capabilities will be used. Common rules for notification, proximity operations, debris prevention, and emergency assistance can make cooperation less dependent on personal trust or temporary political alignment.

This does not mean every restriction benefits the United States. The strategic question is more precise: does the proposed rule reduce risks that threaten American interests, and can the rule be monitored well enough to prevent competitors from exploiting U.S. restraint?

What Existing Space Law Already Requires of Washington

The United States is already bound by a substantial body of international space law. The Outer Space Treaty, which entered into force in 1967, establishes that outer space is open to exploration and use by all states, prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies, and bars the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in orbit or on celestial bodies.

The treaty also prohibits military bases, weapons testing, and military maneuvers on the Moon and other celestial bodies. It does not prohibit every military activity in space. Military personnel may support peaceful missions, military satellites may provide communications or navigation, and the treaty does not establish a general ban on conventional weapons in Earth orbit.

That distinction matters for U.S. strategy. American defense policy depends on satellites used for missile warning, communications, navigation, intelligence, weather data, targeting support, and command functions. Many of these systems have both civil and military applications. A broad legal prohibition on military use would be difficult to define and could threaten capabilities that support civilian life as well as national defense.

The treaty assigns responsibility to states for national space activities conducted by government agencies and private entities. That provision gives Washington an international obligation to supervise American companies operating in space. It also gives the United States a legal basis for asking other governments to accept responsibility for companies and agencies under their jurisdiction.

Article IX requires states to conduct activities with due regard for the corresponding interests of other states and to avoid harmful contamination of space and celestial bodies. It also provides for international consultation when a planned activity could cause potentially harmful interference with another state’s activities.

Those provisions are broad enough to support further norms, but they leave many practical questions unresolved. The treaty does not specify how much notice a government must provide before a close approach. It does not establish a universal definition of threatening behavior. It does not create a standing enforcement body that can investigate an incident or impose penalties.

The United States has also ratified the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration Convention. Together, these agreements address assistance to astronauts, responsibility for damage caused by space objects, and the registration of launched objects. Washington has not ratified the 1979 Moon Agreement, which contains a more restrictive approach to lunar resources and proposed international management of exploitation.

The existing framework has allowed the United States to pursue commercial space activities, lunar exploration, and military space operations at the same time. Its flexibility has been useful. Yet flexibility can become uncertainty when new technologies create circumstances that the treaty negotiators of the 1960s could not have anticipated.

Autonomous spacecraft, large satellite constellations, cyber operations, on-orbit servicing, active debris removal, lunar resource extraction, space-based computing, and commercial human transportation all create questions that older agreements address only indirectly. New Space Economy’s discussion of who should control the orbital economy illustrates the tension between open access, commercial property interests, national jurisdiction, and shared environmental risks.

The United States should preserve the useful general principles of existing space law. It should pursue additional rules only when the new language improves predictability without creating legal ambiguity that adversaries could use against American missions.

When Limits on U.S. Freedom of Action Become a Strategic Liability

The strongest argument against new space restrictions is that the United States faces competitors who may sign agreements without intending to follow them. A treaty can create legal obligations, but it cannot guarantee compliance when verification is weak and penalties are uncertain.

Space systems are difficult to inspect from the ground. A spacecraft may carry communications equipment, scientific instruments, military sensors, propulsion systems, or technologies that could support several missions. The same robotic arm may repair a satellite, remove debris, inspect another spacecraft, or interfere with it. A satellite that changes orbit may be performing routine station-keeping, avoiding a collision, gathering intelligence, or preparing for an attack.

A rule that prohibits a capability by design may be easier to evade than a rule that prohibits a specific harmful behavior. The distinction between a weapon and a servicing spacecraft may depend on software, mission planning, command authority, and intended use. Those features are difficult to verify continuously.

Broad language creates another danger. Terms such as “militarization,” “weaponization,” “peaceful use,” and “threatening activity” can carry different meanings for different governments. The United States could interpret a rule as allowing defensive preparations, but another government could characterize those preparations as prohibited military activity.

That ambiguity would have real consequences during a crisis. If an American spacecraft approaches another satellite to inspect or repair it, the other government may describe the operation as an attack preparation. If U.S. forces reposition satellites to protect them from interference, an adversary may call the maneuver escalatory. Unclear language increases the chance that an ordinary defensive action will be interpreted as hostile.

The United States also has a larger commercial and military space presence than most other states. A numerical restriction that appears equal on paper may have unequal effects in practice. Limiting the number of satellites, the types of orbital maneuvers, or the use of certain sensors could impose higher costs on Washington because its national economy and defense system depend on more space services.

A treaty can also lock in technological assumptions. A rule negotiated before commercial servicing becomes mature may prevent the United States from using future spacecraft to refuel, repair, relocate, or deorbit satellites. A restriction written before lunar infrastructure develops may obstruct American activities that later become necessary for crew safety or resource use.

The danger is greatest when a restriction prevents the United States from responding to an attack. Any arms-control arrangement must distinguish between peacetime behavior and lawful self-defense. A government that has agreed not to conduct certain tests or deployments may still need the ability to protect its spacecraft, restore communications, rescue crews, or disable a dangerous object.

Washington must also consider the bargaining position of countries that have less commercial exposure to orbital congestion. A government with a small satellite fleet may suffer less from debris than the United States. It may support restrictions that constrain American systems without imposing an equivalent economic burden on itself.

The United States therefore should resist proposals that prohibit broad categories of space activity without a reliable verification system, a clear enforcement process, and an exception for self-defense. A rule that makes American systems safer and more predictable can strengthen national power. A rule that leaves U.S. forces blind, slow, or unable to respond could weaken deterrence.

Which Targeted Norms Could Strengthen American Power

The strongest candidates for new space rules are specific, behavior-based, and connected to measurable harm. They should describe what an actor must do or avoid, rather than attempt to classify every spacecraft as peaceful or military.

A permanent international ban on destructive direct-ascent ASAT missile testing is one such candidate. The United Nations General Assembly resolution on destructive direct-ascent ASAT testing adopted in 2022 recognized the danger of debris-producing tests. The U.S. pledge announced that year demonstrated that Washington could accept a restriction without giving up its ability to defend satellites or develop other counterspace capabilities.

The United States could seek a stronger commitment that covers testing against any target in orbit, establishes common definitions, encourages data-sharing about debris, and includes a process for identifying violations. The arrangement would need to address missile tests that do not destroy a target but still create a credible demonstration of destructive capability.

Rules against debris generation should extend beyond missile testing. Governments and companies could commit to passivation, reliable end-of-life disposal, collision avoidance, and prompt notification of spacecraft failures. National licensing systems already impose some of these requirements, and international guidance can help create a common baseline.

The United States could also pursue norms for close approaches and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). Operators should provide appropriate notice before maneuvering near another spacecraft, identify the general purpose of the operation, maintain communication channels, and avoid actions that create an unreasonable risk of collision or interference.

Such rules would not prevent inspection, repair, rescue, or defense. They would make it harder for an adversary to hide a threatening approach behind the language of routine operations. They would also protect commercial servicing companies that need predictable procedures before approaching a customer’s satellite.

Another useful area involves harmful interference. Spacecraft can disrupt other systems through physical contact, jamming, cyber intrusion, spoofing, directed energy, or deliberate manipulation of command links. A norm could require states to avoid intentional interference with safety-critical services and to consult rapidly when an incident affects another operator.

The rule should recognize that some interference is part of legitimate military activity. It should focus on proportionality, attribution, civilian effects, and the risk of causing cascading damage. A government might reserve the right to disrupt an adversary’s military communications during an armed conflict, yet accept an obligation to avoid actions that could disable unrelated civilian networks.

Crisis communications deserve greater attention. A hotline between national leaders may not be enough when an incident involves a satellite operator, a military command, a regulator, and a commercial ground station. The United States could support a space incident communication network with contact points for military, civil, commercial, and diplomatic authorities.

The arrangement could provide standard messages for conjunction alerts, unexpected proximity, loss of control, suspected cyber intrusion, harmful interference, and debris-producing events. It would not require governments to disclose sensitive technical information. It would provide a channel for reducing misinterpretation before a dispute becomes a military confrontation.

Lunar operations present another area for selective rules. The Artemis Accords, established by NASA and the Department of State in 2020, provide nonbinding principles covering peaceful purposes, transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, scientific data, heritage sites, space resources, deconfliction, and orbital debris. NASA reported that Türkiye became the 71st signatory on August 31, 2026, according to its Artemis Accords information page.

The Accords’ approach to temporary safety zones is strategically useful because it attempts to separate operational coordination from permanent territorial control. A temporary area around a landing site or construction activity can reduce harmful interference, provided that it remains proportionate, publicly described, temporary, and consistent with free access.

Washington should continue developing this model through mission-specific arrangements. It should also support consultations involving states that are outside the Artemis framework. Lunar governance will gain legitimacy if safety practices are presented as operational necessities rather than as a method for granting exclusive ownership of valuable locations.

Space resources require similar care. The United States has an interest in allowing companies to extract and use lunar or asteroid materials, but it also needs rules that prevent resource activity from becoming a source of territorial conflict. A system based on notification, consultation, temporary operational areas, environmental protection, and recognition of extracted materials could support investment without claiming sovereignty over celestial bodies.

Standards and procurement can reinforce these norms. The government can require contractors to maintain maneuver capability, share specified orbital data, protect command links, and demonstrate disposal plans. Those conditions may influence industry behavior more quickly than a new global treaty because they attach directly to contracts, licenses, and market access.

Why Treaties and Norms Have Different Strategic Value

Treaties and norms should not be treated as interchangeable. A treaty is a formal international agreement that creates legal obligations for its parties. A norm may be a voluntary commitment, a political declaration, a shared expectation, or a repeated practice that gradually influences state behavior.

Treaties offer stability when the subject is clear and the obligations can be verified. The Partial Test Ban Treaty illustrates this logic by prohibiting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water. The prohibition addressed a defined activity that could be observed through national technical means and that imposed serious risks on all parties.

Space operations often present a harder verification problem. A satellite’s external appearance does not reveal its complete mission. A spacecraft can change functions through software, receive new instructions, or operate as part of a larger network. Ground-based observation can show movement and emissions, but it may not establish intent.

Norms can be more adaptable. Governments can agree on expected behavior, refine the language through practice, and add technical guidance without reopening a ratification process. The U.S. anti-ASAT testing pledge demonstrated how a unilateral commitment can create diplomatic pressure for similar commitments from other states.

Norms also allow coalitions to move at different speeds. A group of states and companies can adopt standards for conjunction data, spacecraft identification, laser safety, or lunar notification before every spacefaring country agrees. Successful practice may then support a later treaty.

The weakness is that norms can be abandoned more easily. A government may claim that a voluntary pledge no longer fits its security needs. A competitor may join a declaration for diplomatic reasons and disregard it when the cost of violation appears low.

A useful U.S. strategy would combine the two instruments. Washington could use nonbinding commitments for operational practices that need frequent technical revision. It could reserve formal treaties for narrow prohibitions where the behavior is measurable and the benefit of legal permanence is high.

Treaty design also matters. The United States should avoid agreements that require every party to accept broad political language before any practical cooperation can occur. It should support modular arrangements with clear definitions, reporting procedures, consultation channels, review conferences, and withdrawal provisions that discourage sudden abandonment.

Verification should rely on multiple sources. Governments can use radar, optical sensors, radio-frequency monitoring, telemetry disclosures, commercial tracking data, and operator communications. No single method can reveal every activity, but several imperfect methods can establish whether a spacecraft performed a prohibited maneuver or generated debris.

Enforcement should be proportionate. A treaty without consequences may have little value, but automatic military penalties could make governments unwilling to join. Possible responses include public attribution, diplomatic protest, licensing restrictions, procurement consequences, financial penalties, coordinated export controls, and suspension from cooperative programs.

The United States should also preserve the distinction between legal obligation and political judgment. A violation may justify diplomatic or economic action without requiring immediate military retaliation. Maintaining that space for response can prevent an incident from becoming an uncontrolled escalation.

What the United States Should Protect and What It Should Concede

Washington should protect freedom of access, freedom of lawful maneuver, the ability to defend national and commercial spacecraft, and the right to conduct scientific, commercial, and resource-related activities consistent with existing international law.

The ability to maneuver deserves particular attention. Spacecraft may need to change orbit to avoid debris, protect themselves from hostile action, inspect another object, provide emergency assistance, or support servicing. Any rule that treats movement near another spacecraft as inherently hostile would make legitimate operations harder and could increase danger.

The United States should also protect the ability to use dual-use systems. A satellite may support disaster response, commercial communications, military logistics, and scientific research at the same time. A ban based on the presence of military users could remove services that benefit civilian populations.

The government should retain flexibility in counterspace operations. That does not require unrestricted freedom to destroy satellites. It means preserving the ability to use reversible, proportionate, and discriminating measures when necessary to protect American forces or respond to an attack.

Washington could concede restrictions on actions that generate long-lived debris, threaten crewed spacecraft without a clear military necessity, interfere with safety-critical civilian services, or create a serious risk of uncontrolled escalation. These limits would affect certain methods, not the entire U.S. security posture.

The United States should also accept greater transparency for activities that create uncertainty. It could provide advance notification of selected launches, lunar surface operations, high-risk proximity maneuvers, unusual orbital changes, and tests that might be misinterpreted by another government.

Transparency does not require disclosure of every technical detail. A government can identify the general purpose, operating area, timing, and responsible contact without revealing sensitive capabilities. That level of information may be enough to reduce false assumptions.

The United States should support rules that protect scientific observations and radio astronomy from avoidable interference. Commercial and defense systems depend on electromagnetic access, but scientific facilities also require protected conditions. Coordinated planning can reduce conflict among research, commercial, and security users.

American companies may resist additional obligations if they increase paperwork or reveal proprietary information. The government can address that concern through standardized digital filings, confidential data channels, clear response deadlines, and risk-based requirements that distinguish a small research spacecraft from a large constellation.

The U.S. space industrial base also affects the treaty question. A rule that requires new equipment, testing, or reporting may be manageable for large contractors but expensive for smaller suppliers. If compliance costs reduce competition, the United States could lose industrial capacity even as it gains a formal international commitment.

Norms should be designed with supply chains, insurance, financing, and workforce capacity in mind. Requirements for secure command systems, propulsion, data-sharing, and disposal should be accompanied by technical standards, testing facilities, and government procurement practices that help companies comply.

The United States should reject the idea that strategic freedom means the absence of all external constraints. Every space power already operates within physical, legal, economic, and alliance limits. The relevant issue is whether those limits are chosen by Washington, imposed by events, or created by competitors.

How Washington Could Build a Selective Space Rules Strategy

A selective strategy would begin with a clear hierarchy of interests. The United States should identify actions that threaten the safety and availability of space services, actions that support deterrence, and actions that remain uncertain because technology or doctrine is still developing.

The government could then separate proposed rules into three groups. The first group would contain commitments that Washington can adopt immediately, such as debris-producing ASAT test restrictions, emergency communications procedures, and basic notification practices. The second would contain standards that require negotiation with allies and commercial operators. The third would contain treaty proposals that should proceed only after technical definitions and verification methods mature.

This process should involve NASA, the Space Force, the State Department, the Commerce Department, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration, private operators, insurers, universities, and allied governments. Space activity crosses civil, commercial, defense, regulatory, scientific, and industrial boundaries. A rule designed by one institution may create problems for another.

Washington should also use existing institutions more effectively. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space can support civil-space guidelines and long-term sustainability practices. The International Telecommunication Union can continue coordinating radiofrequency use. Standards organizations can develop technical procedures for spacecraft identification, data exchange, optical communications, and servicing.

Procurement can provide a practical enforcement mechanism. Federal contracts can favor suppliers that meet recognized debris, cybersecurity, maneuver, and communications standards. Government customers can require contractors to report incidents and maintain contact procedures. Those conditions would influence commercial behavior without waiting for universal treaty ratification.

The United States should also coordinate closely with allies that share American security interests. A coalition of governments representing substantial launch, satellite, financial, and scientific capacity could create a meaningful operating standard. Participation would become attractive if compliance provided access to government markets, shared data, launch partnerships, and lunar projects.

Diplomacy with competitors remains necessary even when agreement is unlikely. Communication channels can reduce the risk that an incident becomes a crisis. The United States should maintain discussions with China and Russia on debris, proximity operations, nuclear weapons in space, and emergency contacts, even when wider political relations remain hostile.

The current U.S. policy direction creates an opening for this approach. Executive Order 14369 calls for American leadership in exploration, commercial growth, national security, space traffic management, debris mitigation, standards, and allied contributions. Those objectives are compatible with targeted constraints that protect the operating environment.

The order also emphasizes a responsive national-security architecture and the ability to detect and counter threats through cislunar space, meaning the region extending from Earth to the Moon and its surrounding orbits. That emphasis suggests that Washington is unlikely to support broad restrictions that prevent defense planning. It may still support rules that make military competition more predictable and reduce accidental escalation.

A review mechanism should accompany any new commitment. Governments should assess whether the rule remains useful as spacecraft, propulsion, sensors, and commercial services change. A norm that protects safety in 2026 may need technical revision in 2032. Review should refine the commitment rather than weaken its central purpose.

The best U.S. policy would combine restraint with preparedness. Washington should restrict actions that damage the shared orbital environment or create unnecessary escalation risks. It should preserve the means to defend its interests, support allies, protect commercial services, and respond to attacks.

Summary

It is strategically useful for the United States to pursue selected space norms and treaties that limit particular actions. The benefit comes from reducing risks to American spacecraft, protecting commercial markets, strengthening alliances, improving crisis communication, and shaping the rules that future space powers will follow.

The most promising subjects are specific and measurable. Debris-generating ASAT tests, unsafe proximity operations, intentional harmful interference, inadequate spacecraft disposal, and failure to communicate during dangerous incidents all create shared costs that can exceed their short-term military benefit.

Broad restrictions on space weapons or military activity present a different calculation. Many spacecraft and technologies have both civilian and military uses. A sweeping prohibition could limit American defense capabilities without providing reliable evidence that competitors would accept or follow the same constraints.

Treaties should be reserved for narrow activities that can be defined and monitored. Norms, technical standards, procurement requirements, and coalition agreements can handle practices that need flexibility or frequent revision.

The United States does not need unlimited freedom of action in space. It needs reliable freedom to access, operate, defend, repair, explore, and provide services through space. Carefully chosen limits can protect that freedom by making the operating environment safer and more predictable. Poorly designed limits could have the opposite effect.