How Can NASA Improve Decadal Surveys Without Compromising Scientific Independence?

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Key Takeaways

• NASA accepted eight audit recommendations covering survey oversight, costs, and implementation tracking.
• Survey contracts totaled about $16 million, excluding roughly $76 million in identified concept studies.
• Better budget guidance and progress reporting must preserve independent scientific judgments.

An Audit of How NASA Sets Its Scientific Priorities

On October 19, 2026, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Office of Inspector General released an audit identifying weaknesses in how the agency supports and manages decadal surveys. These independent assessments help determine which scientific questions deserve priority and which observations or missions could answer them. The audit found incomplete cost accounting, inconsistent tracking of recommendations, and communication practices that sometimes left NASA confronting expensive proposals with little advance notice.

The findings concern a planning process that influences decisions involving billions of dollars. NASA commissions the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to organize scientific assessments covering approximately a decade. Committees drawn from the research community evaluate competing priorities and recommend a program of investigation. NASA then considers those recommendations alongside congressional direction and administration priorities.

The Office of Inspector General examined NASA’s participation rather than attempting to replace the scientific judgments contained in the surveys. Its audit, designated IG-27-001, assessed agency input, oversight, and the resources committed to the process. Auditors interviewed NASA personnel and NASEM representatives, examined contracting documents, and reviewed survey responses and mission concept study expenditures.

Five divisions within NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD) participated in the survey cycle examined. Their responsibilities cover astrophysics and planetary science, Earth science and heliophysics, and biological and physical sciences. Together, their latest surveys delivered 160 recommendations to NASA, spanning research strategy and mission development as well as other scientific priorities.

The audit found broad support for the surveys among NASA, Congress, and the research community. Its concern was that respect for scientific independence had contributed to an excessively detached management approach. NASA lacked consistent procedures for communicating its needs, capturing the full expense of participation, and documenting what happened after recommendations arrived.

The distinction matters because decadal surveys occupy an unusual position. They provide influential external advice, but their recommendations do not automatically authorize spending or establish a funded mission. A scientific ranking can remain persuasive even when the agency cannot implement its preferred schedule.

Independent Advice and Agency Responsibility

The decadal tradition traces its origins to a 1964 assessment of ground-based astronomy. Over subsequent decades, the approach expanded into other scientific disciplines and became an established part of federal space science planning. The Space Studies Board provides institutional continuity for much of this work, connecting scientific communities with agencies responsible for research and exploration.

Independence gives the surveys much of their authority. NASA sponsors the assessments, but it does not select the scientific conclusions it would prefer committees to reach. Researchers can compare competing proposals outside the agency’s immediate management structure, producing advice that may challenge existing priorities or identify neglected questions.

That independence also helps explain why the process takes time. Committees gather community submissions, examine technical material, and reconcile competing judgments before producing a consensus assessment. A survey must establish a credible basis for choosing among research activities whose advocates may have spent years developing their proposals.

The National Academies’ 2015 assessment of survey practices described strong community support for this approach. It also emphasized that disciplines have different needs and cannot all follow an identical model. The same assessment called for clear priorities and decision rules that remain useful when budgets or technologies change.

The 2026 audit addresses the administrative arrangements surrounding that scientific work. NASA can specify the questions it needs answered and the information required for useful planning without deciding the committee’s preferred scientific outcome. A deadline for a progress update, for example, differs from an instruction to rank a particular mission above another.

NASA’s management response acknowledged this distinction but stressed limits on agency involvement. Feedback on draft survey material, management stated, must remain tied to the agreed statement of task. The agency’s acceptance of the audit recommendations did not establish an unrestricted right to review or alter committee deliberations.

A workable relationship requires both institutions to explain where those boundaries lie. NASA needs enough information to identify factual misunderstandings and communicate resource constraints. NASEM needs sufficient independence to make scientific judgments that remain credible even when its recommendations are inconvenient for the sponsoring agency.

Long Assessments and Short Review Windows

NASA’s biological and physical sciences staff received one day to examine a 323-page prepublication survey, according to the audit. Astrophysics personnel received three days for 629 pages. These intervals illustrate the practical problem created when a lengthy assessment reaches its principal sponsor shortly before public release.

The heliophysics survey provided another example: three days for a 790-page document. Auditors reported that NASA commonly received fewer than 10 days to review surveys before publication. One division identified a significant technical error during its short preview, requiring a correction that delayed the final release.

The prepublication copy arrives near the end of a process that typically takes about two years. NASA officials told auditors that reviewing recommendations and incorporating applicable advice into strategic plans could take approximately another year. By then, roughly three years may have passed since the assessment began.

During survey development, NASA responds to technical questions and requests for information. However, the audit found that routine reporting generally did not provide specific interim information about potential recommendations. Agency personnel could supply data without gaining a corresponding understanding of whether the developing advice remained consistent with operational or financial assumptions.

This timing places pressure on the agency after publication. Scientific communities expect a response to recommendations that may contain substantial new commitments. NASA must determine what it can accept, what requires additional resources, and what cannot proceed under existing conditions.

The statement of task, which defines the agreed work, becomes particularly important under these arrangements. Auditors found that only two of the five statements examined explicitly identified a published report as a deliverable. None contained performance standards or metrics, and only one included a deadline.

Those findings do not mean every survey lacked scheduling arrangements elsewhere. They show that the documents intended to communicate NASA’s requirements did not consistently specify the expected products and review opportunities. Clearer agreements could establish when NASA receives factual updates and how much time it has to check a completed assessment without granting the agency control over scientific rankings.

Scientific Ambition Meets Budget Constraints

The biological and physical sciences survey recommended two research campaigns whose proposed scale exceeded the division’s existing resources. One concerned Bioregenerative Life Support Systems, research into sustaining living environments through processes such as food production and waste recycling. The other, Manufacturing Materials and Processes for Sustainability in Space, addressed materials and production processes relevant to sustained activity beyond Earth.

According to the audit, each campaign required an estimated $100 million to $400 million annually for 10 years. NASA’s Biological and Physical Sciences Division had an $85 million budget in fiscal year 2023. Even the lower annual estimate for either campaign exceeded that entire division budget.

NASA had requested research campaigns, so the issue was not that the survey introduced an unrelated subject. The problem was the scale of the recommendations and the absence of communication that might have clarified expectations earlier. Agency personnel told auditors that they were surprised and chose to pursue the campaigns through smaller components.

The biological and physical sciences survey addresses research with direct relevance to sustained exploration. Scientific importance does not establish the availability of funding. A strategy that depends on a large budget increase needs a clear explanation of what can proceed if that increase does not occur.

The audit identified a related problem in the planetary science survey’s treatment of Mars Sample Return. The survey recommended seeking additional funding if program costs rose beyond specified thresholds or consumed too much of the planetary science budget. Auditors criticized reliance on obtaining more money as insufficiently realistic guidance for NASA’s constrained planning environment.

There is a legitimate distinction between recommending national investment and describing an executable agency program. A survey can conclude that a scientific objective deserves greater resources. NASA still needs priorities that remain usable under the appropriation it actually receives, including guidance on what should be deferred or reduced.

Early mission estimates add another complication. The audit cited the James Webb Space Telescope, whose 2001 decadal recommendation anticipated a cost of about $1 billion and launch in 2008. The observatory eventually launched in December 2021 at an overall cost of approximately $10 billion.

Those figures describe different stages of a changing project, not a controlled comparison of identical designs. The audit acknowledged that Webb underwent substantial design changes. Its broader point was that early estimates can become public expectations long before engineering work provides a sufficiently mature basis for a formal commitment.

The planetary science decadal strategy and subsequent Mars Sample Return review illustrate why scientific priority and implementation feasibility require separate examination. A compelling scientific case does not remove the need to reassess affordability as designs become more specific.

Survey Contracts Reveal Only Part of the Cost

NASA spent approximately $16 million on the five survey task orders examined by auditors. The exact combined contract amount was $16,027,635, covering the most recent survey for each division. Individual contract costs ranged from approximately $2.4 million to $3.6 million.

That amount did not represent the full cost of preparing for and responding to the surveys. NASA separately funded mission concept studies, which examine possible spacecraft designs and the technical work required to achieve particular scientific objectives. Such studies help committees assess feasibility before recommending investments that may require many years of development.

Three divisions supplied cost records for 28 mission concept studies totaling approximately $76 million during their latest survey cycle. These were the Astrophysics, Heliophysics, and Planetary Science divisions. The identified study spending was nearly five times the combined survey contract amount.

The records were incomplete across the directorate. Earth Science had conducted concept studies but could not provide their costs when auditors requested them. Biological and Physical Sciences had not conducted a mission concept study, although division personnel expressed interest in doing so.

Adding the reported contract and concept study figures produces approximately $92 million in identified expenditures associated with the assessed planning effort. That arithmetic does not establish a complete cost total. It excludes unreported study expenditures and staff resources that NASA did not separately capture.

Nor does the audit establish that the concept study spending was unnecessary. These studies can support engineering work beyond the survey itself, improving understanding of technology readiness and possible mission designs. The management problem is that NASA cannot evaluate the resources devoted to planning comprehensively if it counts only the contract that produces the final assessment.

Staff time presents another gap. Personnel prepare survey inputs, respond to technical questions, and assess published recommendations. NASA’s timekeeping arrangements did not separately identify the decadal survey work discussed in the audit, preventing an accessible accounting of the labor involved.

Complete accounting would help distinguish the expense of producing advice from the expense of developing potential missions. It would also allow management to compare preparation practices across divisions and identify where additional early work produces more useful recommendations.

Recommendations Need a Record After Publication

The latest survey cycle delivered 160 recommendations to NASA, but the audit found that most divisions did not comprehensively track their implementation. Astrophysics was the exception identified by auditors. Its personnel reported maintaining recommendation status information and making that information publicly available.

Other divisions pointed to existing reporting activities rather than a complete recommendation record. These included presentations to National Academies committees and information prepared through NASA’s budget process. Some personnel also relied on the survey itself or institutional memory.

These activities provide useful information, but they do not necessarily answer the same question. Reporting the development status of a spacecraft does not establish whether NASA has acted on a recommendation about research funding or the frequency of future mission competitions. Surveys contain advice beyond individual flight projects.

The five-year midterm assessment cannot substitute for continuous agency tracking. That review examines progress after a substantial portion of the planning period has elapsed. NASEM representatives told auditors that they did not regard themselves as NASA’s accountability managers.

A recommendation record also needs more than a completed-or-incomplete label. NASA may accept an objective but defer implementation because funding is unavailable. It may pursue the intended scientific outcome through a different mission design, or decide that changed circumstances make the original approach unsuitable.

Those distinctions are analytical implications of the audit’s findings rather than a prescribed database design. They explain why a documented decision can be useful even when a recommendation has not been implemented. Without the rationale, subsequent reviewers may struggle to distinguish an overlooked commitment from a deliberate change in strategy.

Management’s response emphasized that survey advice does not carry the binding authority of congressional direction. NASA said its divisions report on mission formulation and development to standing committees twice yearly and provide material for midterm assessments. It agreed to refine internal guidance so personnel working on surveys have better information about implementation.

The resulting record could also improve the next survey. Committees would have a clearer account of which earlier recommendations advanced, which encountered funding constraints, and which required different technical approaches.

Institutional Knowledge Is Too Dependent on Individuals

Six of the eight division officials interviewed about their survey responsibilities had not previously served as the primary contact for a decadal survey. These employees were managing a process with long intervals between cycles and substantial expectations attached to its results. Many depended on colleagues and old files to understand how the work should proceed.

Auditors found no consistent directorate-wide guidance for preparing statements of task or responding to completed surveys. Staff expectations differed even on whether a formal response policy existed. NASA eventually located an expired 2007 directive addressing responses to National Academies recommendations.

The absence of current guidance created avoidable duplication. Three interviewed officials had developed their own tools, including templates and spreadsheets, but these materials were not shared throughout the directorate. Experience gained in one division could remain inaccessible to another preparing its next assessment.

Records management compounded the problem. The existence of files on agency servers did not guarantee that another employee could locate them, obtain access, or determine whether their contents remained applicable. The audit found no central repository serving the shared survey-management need it described.

A 2023 assessment commissioned from Booz Allen Hamilton had already recommended improvements such as a handbook and opportunities for staff to share practices. The 2026 audit found related weaknesses still unresolved. Directorate leadership identified staffing constraints as an obstacle to implementing those changes.

The timing of mission concept studies showed why shared experience matters. One division described benefits from preparing studies early enough to inform committee work. Another reported that studies initiated too late could not receive meaningful consideration during the survey.

These findings concern routine management tasks, but their effects extend into scientific planning. A poorly prepared statement of task can leave budget assumptions ambiguous. Missing records can prevent a new team from understanding why an earlier approach failed, and duplicated preparation work consumes time that could support technical review.

Written procedures cannot replace scientific judgment or experienced personnel. They can preserve the administrative knowledge needed to organize independent assessments without requiring each new survey team to reconstruct the process.

Science Priorities Affect More Than Spacecraft Selection

The audit also identifies a tension between recommending scientific objectives and prescribing particular mission designs. NASA officials expressed concern that some surveys moved beyond defining the knowledge sought and became highly specific about how the agency should obtain it. Detailed concepts can attract committed scientific and industrial constituencies before NASA has completed its own implementation analysis.

Some technical definition is necessary for meaningful comparison. Committees cannot judge affordability without understanding what a proposed mission requires. Excessively fixed designs can make it harder to consider a different instrument configuration or a revised approach that addresses the same scientific question.

The National Academies’ strategic mission assessment provides a complementary perspective. Its discussion treats large missions as scientific programs whose value extends beyond an individual spacecraft, including their contribution to research communities and technical capability. Assessing them solely by development cost would leave out important parts of their purpose.

The 2026 audit does not reject ambitious missions. It asks whether NASA has the information and management arrangements needed to translate scientific priorities into decisions about resources. That distinction is relevant to contractors and universities whose work depends on the progression from scientific recommendation to funded activity.

A decadal endorsement is evidence of scientific support, not a procurement commitment. Companies considering technology development still need to examine whether NASA has funded the relevant work and whether the proposed implementation remains under consideration. A recommended mission may change substantially before an agency purchases hardware or services.

The same issue applies to international cooperation. A scientific priority can encourage discussions with partner agencies, but each participant operates through its own approval and funding processes. The National Academies’ 2015 assessment identified earlier communication with international groups as a way to improve coordination around shared research interests.

Earth Science illustrates another planning approach described in the audit. Its personnel discussed movement toward prioritizing designated observables, meaning the measurements needed to answer scientific questions, rather than fixing the strategy entirely around named missions. That approach can leave room to assess more than one means of obtaining the required observations.

Clear separation between scientific goals and implementation decisions can preserve that flexibility. It also makes subsequent changes easier to explain: NASA can identify whether it is changing the method, reducing the scientific scope, or abandoning the objective itself.

NASA’s Accepted Reforms Extend Into 2028

NASA concurred with all eight audit recommendations. The inspector general considered management’s responses sufficient to resolve the recommendations, but closure requires completion and verification of the corrective actions. Agreement on a plan is a different stage from demonstrating that new practices operate consistently.

The recommendations addressing NASA’s relationship with NASEM cover clearer performance expectations and deliverables. They also seek interim reporting and more time for prepublication review. Another recommendation calls for examining ways to shorten survey development without compromising the process, and a separate action addresses routine joint reviews of lessons learned.

NASA assigned June 30, 2027, as the estimated completion date for work on performance requirements, interim reporting, and development timelines. Management said it would consult Space Studies Board staff and leadership. It also stressed that the needs of individual disciplines require tailored requirements rather than a uniform set of survey metrics.

For joint lessons learned, NASA proposed requesting a workshop in spring 2027 and publishing the results. The estimated completion date was October 31, 2027. This would build on earlier work, including the 2012 workshop that contributed to the National Academies’ 2015 assessment.

The internal recommendations address cost accounting and recommendation tracking. They also call for directorate-wide guidance and a formal process for retaining knowledge after each survey. These actions place responsibility on NASA for weaknesses that do not depend entirely on negotiations with an external institution.

Management committed to updating and reissuing its expired guidance for responding to surveys. NASA also planned to convert existing lessons-learned material into preparation guidance and require participation in post-survey learning activities. The estimated completion date for these internal guidance and knowledge-management actions was October 31, 2027.

Cost accounting had the latest target date, May 31, 2028. NASA agreed to examine practical ways to track survey-related costs, including staff time, and incorporate suitable methods if identified. That response is narrower than a commitment to establish a particular accounting system by that date.

Implementation will need to demonstrate more than the publication of new procedures. Evidence could include statements of task with explicit deliverables, records showing adequate review periods, and accessible information about the disposition of earlier recommendations. Cost records would need to identify what they include and which resources remain outside their scope.

None of these measures guarantees that Congress will fund a recommended mission or that an early estimate will match its eventual cost. They would provide a better documented basis for explaining NASA’s decisions and for preparing the next generation of independent scientific assessments.

Summary

The October 2026 audit identifies a practical weakness in long-term science planning: responsibility becomes difficult to follow when independent advice, agency implementation, and funding decisions are treated as one continuous commitment. Each stage has a different decision-maker and a different standard of evidence.

NASA’s proposed reforms offer a way to document those transitions. A survey can establish scientific priorities; the agency can record its response and resource assumptions; subsequent reviews can assess what changed and why. The test will be whether that record remains usable through staff turnover and budget changes, allowing future committees to learn from prior decisions without surrendering their independence.

Appendix: Useful Books Available on Amazon

• The Space Science Decadal Surveys: Lessons Learned and Best Practices
• A Midterm Assessment of Implementation of the Decadal Survey on Life and Physical Sciences Research at NASA
• Solar and Space Physics: A Science for a Technological Society
• Vision and Voyages for Planetary Science in the Decade 2013-2022
• The Sun to the Earth – and Beyond: A Decadal Research Strategy in Solar and Space Physics

Appendix: Top Questions Answered in This Article

What is a NASA decadal survey?

A NASA decadal survey is an independent assessment of scientific priorities for approximately the next 10 years. The National Academies organize committees that evaluate community input and recommend research directions. NASA considers the resulting advice when planning investments, but the assessment itself does not provide funding or authorize a mission.

What did the October 2026 audit examine?

The audit examined NASA’s input into and oversight of the decadal survey process. It assessed communication with the National Academies, the resources devoted to survey work, and the tracking of recommendations. Its focus was agency management of the process rather than an independent ranking of the scientific proposals.

Did the audit recommend ending decadal surveys?

The audit recognized broad support for decadal surveys and recommended improvements to NASA’s participation. Its eight recommendations addressed communication, accounting, and internal management. NASA accepted all eight, proposing corrective actions that preserve independent scientific assessment and introduce clearer requirements for supporting and responding to that work.

How much did the surveys cost?

The five survey task orders examined totaled approximately $16 million. Auditors separately identified approximately $76 million in 28 mission concept studies from three NASA divisions. Those amounts do not establish a complete total because some study expenditures were unavailable and staff time was not separately captured.

Why are mission concept studies conducted before surveys?

Mission concept studies examine how proposed scientific investigations might be implemented. They help identify technical requirements and support early estimates of cost and schedule. Committees can use them when comparing possible investments, although conducting a study does not guarantee that its mission will receive a recommendation or funding.

Does NASA have to implement every recommendation?

Survey recommendations do not automatically impose binding direction on NASA. The agency must consider them alongside congressional requirements and administration priorities. NASA can accept, modify, defer, or decline advice, although a recommendation may acquire a different status if Congress subsequently directs the agency to act on it.

Why did auditors criticize the review periods?

NASA divisions reported receiving only short periods to examine lengthy surveys before publication. Biological and Physical Sciences received one day for a 323-page assessment. Such intervals make it difficult to identify technical mistakes and prepare an informed response before the scientific community begins evaluating NASA’s reaction.

How can oversight improve without reducing independence?

NASA and the National Academies can agree on deliverables, reporting intervals, and factual review opportunities before a survey begins. These requirements can clarify the process without determining scientific rankings. The boundary matters because independent committees must retain authority over their scientific conclusions rather than seek agency approval for preferred outcomes.

Why are five-year midterm assessments insufficient for tracking progress?

A midterm assessment provides an independent review after a substantial portion of the planning period has passed. NASA also needs current information for decisions made between those reviews. Continuous tracking can record whether recommendations were accepted or deferred and explain how funding constraints or technical developments affected implementation.

When are NASA’s corrective actions expected to finish?

NASA identified estimated completion dates ranging from June 2027 to May 2028. Several guidance and lessons-learned actions were scheduled for October 2027, with cost-tracking work extending to May 2028. The inspector general will close recommendations only after the agreed corrective actions have been completed and verified.

Appendix: Glossary of Key Terms

Decadal Survey

An independent assessment that recommends scientific priorities for roughly a decade. Committees evaluate research questions and possible approaches to answering them, producing advice that helps agencies plan investments without directly authorizing expenditure or guaranteeing that particular missions will proceed.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Independent institutions that provide scientific and technical advice on public questions. In the decadal process, they organize expert committees and review procedures that produce recommendations separate from NASA’s internal management decisions, even though NASA helps fund the assessments.

Science Mission Directorate

The part of NASA responsible for its science portfolio across five divisions discussed in the audit. Those divisions manage research and missions in their respective disciplines and consider decadal recommendations when developing strategies and proposed investments.

Statement of Task

The agreed description of the work a study is expected to perform. For a decadal survey, it establishes the questions and scope of the assessment and can specify deliverables, budget assumptions, reporting expectations, and scheduling requirements.

Decision Rules

Guidance for adjusting a recommended program when circumstances differ from the assumptions used to develop it. Rules can identify which activities should be delayed or reduced if funding falls short, helping preserve scientific priorities under changing conditions.

Mission Concept Study

An early examination of a possible mission and the technical approach required to achieve its scientific objectives. It provides information for assessing feasibility and estimating resources, but it does not constitute approval to build or launch the mission.

Midterm Assessment

An independent review conducted approximately halfway through a decadal planning period. It examines progress and relevant developments, providing an opportunity to evaluate implementation without replacing the agency’s need to maintain current records between formal external assessments.

Designated Observable

A measurement or set of measurements prioritized because it addresses an important scientific question. Focusing on the observation rather than a fixed spacecraft design can allow NASA to evaluate different technical approaches for obtaining the required information.