Synopsis
The report titled “Evaluation of the DoD’s Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena” dated August 15, 2023, presents a comprehensive analysis of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts in addressing Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP). This unclassified summary, based on a more detailed classified document, was issued by the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Defense on January 24, 2024.
Historical Background
The DoD has been engaged in the task of identifying and understanding UAP since the 1940s. The initial focus was primarily from the Air Force, evidenced by initiatives like PROJECT SIGN (1947), PROJECT BLUE BOOK (1952-1969), and more recent endeavors such as the Advanced Aerospace Weapon Systems Applications program. Despite these efforts, a consistent and comprehensive approach to UAP was lacking. This led to the establishment of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) in 2022, as directed by the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act.
Objective and Background of the Report
The report’s objective was to assess the extent of DoD’s actions in detecting, reporting, analyzing, and identifying UAP. It also evaluated the integration of these efforts into intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection measures. The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act expanded the definition of UAP to include a broader range of phenomena, thus broadening the scope of what the DoD must monitor and analyze.
Findings
- Lack of Coordinated Approach: The DoD has not employed a coordinated approach in dealing with UAP. This lack of coherence extends to policy-making, data collection, analysis, and identification processes.
- Exclusion of Geographic Combatant Commands: The existing UAP processes largely overlooked the role of geographic combatant commands, responsible for detecting and preventing threats against the U.S.
- Varying Processes Across DoD Components: Different branches of the DoD developed their unique procedures for UAP detection and reporting, leading to inconsistency and potential gaps in data and analysis.
- Potential Threat to National Security and Military Forces: The absence of a comprehensive policy on UAP might pose a threat to U.S. military forces and national security, as unidentified phenomena could include unrecognized threats or advanced technologies.
Recommendations
The report makes several key recommendations:
- Policy Integration: The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with AARO, should issue a policy integrating UAP roles and responsibilities into existing structures.
- Interim Guidance by Military Departments: Each military department (Army, Navy, Air Force) should issue interim guidance on UAP while awaiting comprehensive DoD policy.
- Guidance for Combatant Commands: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide guidance to combatant commanders on UAP detection and response within their respective areas of responsibility.
Concluding Observations
The report concludes that while progress has been made in establishing structures like AARO, a coordinated and comprehensive approach across the DoD is necessary to effectively address the challenges posed by UAP. The recommendations aim to unify efforts and create a standardized response to UAP incidents, ensuring the safety of military operations and national security.
