NASA’s Artemis campaign, which seeks to return humans to the Moon by 2025 and ultimately conduct manned missions to Mars, hinges on the development of the Space Launch System (SLS). This two-stage, heavy-lift rocket will launch the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle into space, powered by solid rocket boosters and RS-25 engines adapted from Space Shuttle-era technology. Despite the promise of leveraging proven systems, NASA has faced substantial challenges in managing the contracts for these crucial components of the SLS, leading to significant cost increases and schedule delays. This article explores the intricacies of NASA’s management of the SLS booster and engine contracts, delving into the factors contributing to cost overruns, delays, and efforts to improve affordability.
Background
The Artemis campaign is built upon the foundation of NASA’s earlier Constellation Program, which aimed to develop the necessary infrastructure for manned missions to the Moon and Mars. After the cancellation of Constellation, Congress directed NASA to repurpose existing contracts and technologies from the Space Shuttle and Constellation programs to develop the SLS. This decision was driven by the belief that using heritage technologies would save time and reduce costs.
To meet its ambitious goals, NASA adapted solid rocket boosters and RS-25 engines from the Shuttle era for the Artemis missions. From fiscal years 2012 through 2025, NASA’s investment in Artemis is projected to reach $93 billion, with the SLS program accounting for $23.8 billion of that amount. NASA awarded two booster contracts to Northrop Grumman and two RS-25 engine contracts to Aerojet Rocketdyne to support the SLS launches. However, despite the perceived benefits of using heritage hardware, NASA has encountered significant challenges in managing these contracts, resulting in cost increases and schedule delays.
Long-Standing Management Issues
Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
NASA’s management of the SLS booster and engine contracts has been marked by long-standing issues that have contributed to approximately $6 billion in cost increases and over six years of schedule delays. These issues are rooted in the complexity of adapting and integrating heritage technologies with new systems, as well as the challenges associated with concurrent development and production.
The boosters contract with Northrop Grumman, initially valued at $1.8 billion under the Constellation Program, grew to $4.4 billion as a result of added scope and unexpected technical challenges. Similarly, the RS-25 engine adaptation contract with Aerojet Rocketdyne expanded from $1.1 billion to $2.1 billion due to the complexity of retrofitting and upgrading the engines for the SLS. These cost increases are indicative of the broader challenges NASA has faced in managing the development and production of key components for the Artemis campaign.
Complexity of Heritage Technologies
NASA’s decision to use heritage hardware from the Shuttle era was based on the assumption that it would reduce costs and expedite development. However, the complexity of integrating these older technologies with new systems has proven to be a significant challenge. The RS-25 engines, while mature and well-understood, required substantial upgrades to meet the technical requirements of the SLS. These upgrades included new insulation, modifications to the engine controller unit, and changes to interface conditions. The complexity of these changes was underestimated, leading to cost overruns and delays in the engine adaptation process.
Similarly, the solid rocket boosters, which were modified from a four-segment to a five-segment design to increase thrust, presented unexpected technical challenges. The redesign of the propellant liner and insulation (PLI) for the boosters, which was necessary to replace asbestos-based materials used in the Shuttle era, resulted in $365 million in cost overruns and a one-year schedule delay. These issues highlight the difficulties of adapting legacy systems for new applications and underscore the risks associated with relying on heritage technologies.
Concurrent Development and Production
One of the key factors contributing to the cost increases and delays in the SLS program is NASA’s decision to proceed with concurrent development and production of the boosters and engines. NASA’s own requirements and best practices emphasize that technology development and design work should be completed before production begins. However, in the case of the SLS, development and production activities have been conducted simultaneously, leading to rework and additional costs as designs were finalized.
For example, the RS-25 Restart and Production contract with Aerojet Rocketdyne, which was intended to produce 24 new RS-25 engines for future Artemis missions, has experienced significant cost growth due to the concurrent development of the new engine controller unit and production of the engines. Similarly, the Boosters Production and Operations Contract (BPOC) with Northrop Grumman, which covers the production of boosters for Artemis IV through VIII, has been affected by the concurrent development of the new composite booster design for Artemis IX. This concurrency has increased the risk of cost and schedule overruns as technical issues are discovered during production.
NASA’s Efforts to Improve Affordability
In response to the rising costs and delays associated with the SLS program, NASA has undertaken several initiatives to improve the affordability of the Artemis campaign. These efforts include moving towards fixed-price contracts for booster production and establishing cost reduction targets for the production of new RS-25 engines. However, despite these efforts, challenges remain that may limit the effectiveness of NASA’s affordability initiatives.
Fixed-Price Contracts for Booster Production
Under the BPOC, NASA has transitioned to a fixed-price-incentive-fee contract structure for the production of boosters for Artemis IV through VIII. This contract structure is intended to transfer more risk to the contractor and provide greater cost control by establishing a set price for the work. However, the complexity of the booster design and the concurrent development of new composite boosters for Artemis IX raise concerns about the potential for additional cost increases under this contract. NASA will need to carefully manage the BPOC to ensure that it delivers the desired cost savings without compromising performance or schedule.
Cost Reduction Targets for RS-25 Engine Production
NASA has also established cost reduction targets for the production of new RS-25 engines under the RS-25 Restart and Production contract. Specifically, NASA and Aerojet Rocketdyne have set a target of reducing manufacturing costs by 33% starting with the completion of the seventh engine. These cost savings are expected to be achieved through design changes, process improvements, and the use of modern materials and manufacturing techniques. However, these savings do not account for overhead and other costs, which are estimated at $2.3 billion. Moreover, NASA currently lacks the ability to track per-engine costs, which may hinder its ability to assess whether the cost reduction targets are being met.
Challenges with Contract Management and Oversight
NASA’s management of the SLS booster and engine contracts has been further complicated by challenges related to contract management and oversight. These challenges include inadequate staffing, underutilization of available resources, and issues with procurement processes and documentation. Addressing these challenges will be critical to improving the effectiveness of NASA’s contract management efforts and ensuring the success of the Artemis campaign.
Staffing Shortages and Underutilization of Resources
The SLS procurement offices at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, which oversee the booster and engine contracts, have faced significant staffing shortages. Despite the complexity and size of the contracts, the procurement offices have been understaffed, with only nine employees managing approximately $900 million in contracts annually. This shortage of staff has limited NASA’s ability to effectively manage the contracts and ensure compliance with federal requirements.
NASA has sought to address these staffing challenges through its Mission Support Future Architecture Program (MAP), which provides shared procurement resources across the Agency. However, the Marshall procurement office has not fully utilized these resources, and staffing shortfalls continue to impact contract management efforts. NASA will need to increase its procurement workforce and better leverage available resources to improve oversight of the SLS contracts.
Issues with Procurement Processes and Documentation
NASA’s management of the SLS booster and engine contracts has also been hampered by issues with procurement processes and documentation. For example, the Boosters Element procurement office encountered significant challenges in managing Northrop Grumman’s request for equitable adjustment (REA) related to cost overruns on the PLI redesign. Despite repeated denials of the REA, NASA ultimately settled with Northrop Grumman for $24.5 million, raising concerns about the effectiveness of NASA’s procurement management practices.
Additionally, the BPOC, which was initially awarded as a letter contract with undefined terms, took 499 days to be definitized—well beyond the 180-day federal guideline. The delay in definitizing the contract, along with the lack of detailed scope and omitted key contract clauses, underscores the need for improvements in NASA’s procurement processes to ensure timely and effective contract management.
Summary
NASA’s management of the Space Launch System booster and engine contracts has been characterized by significant challenges, including cost increases, schedule delays, and contract management issues. These challenges are rooted in the complexity of adapting heritage technologies, the risks associated with concurrent development and production, and the limitations of NASA’s procurement workforce and processes. While NASA has undertaken efforts to improve affordability and contract management, ongoing challenges may continue to impact the success of the Artemis campaign.
Moving forward, NASA will need to carefully manage its booster and engine contracts to ensure that cost, schedule, and performance goals are met. This will require addressing the underlying management issues that have contributed to cost overruns and delays, as well as enhancing oversight and accountability within the procurement offices. By taking these steps, NASA can better position itself to achieve its long-term goals of returning humans to the Moon and exploring Mars.
