Counterspace Weapons in Orbit

The Contested High Ground

The vast, silent expanse of outer space, once the exclusive domain of scientific exploration and national prestige, has fundamentally transformed. It is now an indispensable theater for global commerce, communication, and modern warfare. The satellites orbiting Earth are no longer just tools for discovery; they are the central nervous system of 21st-century life. They provide the precise timing signals that underpin global financial markets, the navigation data that guides everything from commercial airliners to ride-sharing apps, and the communications backbone that connects the world. For military forces, this reliance is even more acute. Satellites offer unparalleled capabilities for intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnaissance, secure communications, and precision-guided munitions. This deep dependence has, in turn, rendered these orbital assets high-value strategic targets. The ability to control space—or, more pointedly, to deny its use to an adversary—is now widely seen as a prerequisite for victory in any future terrestrial conflict.

This new reality has given rise to a new category of military hardware: counterspace weapons. These are systems designed to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy an adversary’s space-based capabilities. While many of these systems are based on the ground—from direct-ascent missiles that can shoot down satellites to powerful jammers that can block their signals—a new and more unsettling class of weapon is now being quietly deployed in orbit. These on-orbit, or co-orbital, systems are satellites designed to interact with other satellites, and their purposes range from benign inspection to outright destruction. The primary nations developing and demonstrating these on-orbit capabilities are Russia, China, and the United States, with other spacefaring nations like India also having demonstrated the kinetic ability to destroy a satellite.

The development of these on-orbit systems is not happening in a vacuum. It is a symptom of a significant shift in strategic thinking among the world’s major powers. The establishment of dedicated military branches, such as the United States Space Force in 2019, and the reorganization of military structures, like China’s People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, signal that space is no longer merely a support domain for conflicts on Earth. It is now officially recognized as a warfighting domain in its own right. This institutionalization is accompanied by the publication of explicit military doctrines that call for achieving “space superiority.” This doctrinal evolution marks the normalization of space as a potential battlefield, a place where future wars may not only be enabled but actively fought. The weapons now being placed in orbit are the tangible evidence of this new and contested era, turning the silent high ground into a silent battlefield.

Understanding the Arena: Orbits and Operations

To comprehend the nature of on-orbit counterspace weapons, one must first understand the environment in which they operate. Space is not a uniform void; it is a complex landscape of distinct orbital regions, each with unique physical properties that dictate its strategic value. This orbital “terrain” shapes the design, function, and purpose of every satellite, whether it’s a commercial communications platform or a clandestine military weapon. Two of these regions are of paramount importance: Low Earth Orbit and Geosynchronous Orbit.

A Primer on Key Orbits

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) can be thought of as the planet’s bustling coastal waters. Extending from about 160 to 2,000 kilometers above the surface, LEO is a high-traffic, high-speed environment. Satellites here, including vast constellations for internet service, Earth observation platforms, and reconnaissance satellites, must travel at tremendous velocities—around 28,000 kilometers per hour—to counteract Earth’s strong gravitational pull and maintain their orbit. This proximity to the planet allows for high-resolution imagery and low-latency communications, making it the ideal location for spy satellites and systems that require a detailed view of the ground. The International Space Station also resides in LEO. the sheer number of objects and the high speeds make this region crowded and kinetically hazardous.

Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), in contrast, is the strategic high ground. Located at a precise altitude of 35,786 kilometers directly above the equator, this orbit is analogous to a series of invaluable mountain passes overlooking a continent. At this specific altitude, a satellite’s orbital period perfectly matches the Earth’s 24-hour rotation. The result is that a satellite in GEO appears to hang motionless over a fixed point on the surface. This unique property is exceptionally valuable. It allows a single satellite to provide continuous coverage over a vast geographic area—roughly one-third of the planet’s surface. GEO is the home of critical strategic assets: missile-warning satellites that provide the first indication of a nuclear launch, vital military and commercial communications relays, and broadcast satellites. The number of available “slots” in this orbit is finite, making access to GEO a matter of intense strategic competition.

The distinct physics of these orbits directly influences military strategy. A counterspace weapon designed for LEO must be agile and capable of rapid, high-energy maneuvers to intercept targets moving at incredible speeds. Its purpose is likely tactical—to disrupt an adversary’s reconnaissance or battlefield communications during a regional conflict. A counterspace system in GEO is a different kind of asset. Its movements are often slow and deliberate, measured in weeks or months. Its purpose is not tactical surprise but strategic positioning. By placing a weapon in GEO, a nation can persistently monitor, signal, or hold at risk the most critical components of another nation’s space infrastructure, such as its nuclear command and control satellites. The choice of orbit is a direct reflection of strategic intent. LEO systems address tactical concerns, while GEO systems are instruments of great-power competition.

Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO)

The foundational capability for nearly all co-orbital counterspace systems is Rendezvous and Proximity Operations, or RPO. In simple terms, RPO is the set of complex orbital maneuvers a spacecraft performs to get very close to another space object in a controlled, predictable way. It is the art of matching another satellite’s speed, altitude, and trajectory with extreme precision.

An effective analogy is to imagine two cars traveling on a multi-lane highway. For one car to inspect or interact with the other, its driver can’t simply speed up. Speeding up would cause it to switch to a “higher” lane (a higher orbit), which paradoxically would make it travel slower relative to the Earth and fall behind. Instead, the driver must perform a series of carefully calculated maneuvers—slowing down to drop to a lower, faster lane to catch up, then speeding up at the right moment to rise back into the target’s lane, perfectly matching its speed and position.

This is the essence of RPO. It is a non-intuitive dance governed by the laws of orbital mechanics. This capability is fundamentally dual-use. It is essential for peaceful and beneficial activities like docking with the International Space Station, servicing and refueling friendly satellites, or removing hazardous space debris. At the same time, it is the exact same skill set required for more aggressive actions. A satellite that can perform RPO can approach an adversary’s satellite to conduct detailed surveillance, jam its signals at close range, interfere with its sensors, or use a robotic arm or projectile to disable or destroy it. The ability to perform RPO is the core competency that transforms a simple satellite into a potential on-orbit weapon.

The On-Orbit Counterspace Toolkit

The systems being developed and deployed for on-orbit operations fall into several distinct categories, defined by the effects they are designed to produce. These range from physical, kinetic interactions to more subtle, non-kinetic attacks. Understanding this toolkit is complicated by the pervasive nature of dual-use technology, which often makes it impossible to distinguish a weapon from a tool based on its appearance or basic capabilities alone.

Co-Orbital Kinetic Systems

These are systems designed to physically interact with or strike a target satellite. They represent the most direct and unambiguous form of on-orbit counterspace capability. The simplest form is a “space mine” or a kinetic-kill vehicle, a satellite designed to maneuver into the path of a target and either collide with it or detonate a shrapnel warhead nearby.

More sophisticated systems are often described as “inspector” satellites. These spacecraft are equipped with advanced sensors and high maneuverability, allowing them to perform close-up RPO to image and characterize a target satellite. While this can be a legitimate intelligence-gathering function, the ability to get within meters of another satellite inherently provides the capability to interfere with it physically.

A growing area of development involves satellites equipped with robotic arms. These systems, often publicly framed as tools for on-orbit servicing or “active debris removal,” possess the ability to grapple and physically manipulate other objects in space. A robotic arm designed to capture a piece of space junk can just as easily be used to grab an adversary’s satellite, bend its antennas, cover its sensors, or push it into a useless orbit.

Finally, some systems are designed as “motherships” that can release smaller, independent sub-satellites. These sub-satellites can be simple projectiles fired at high velocity or highly maneuverable vehicles of their own, capable of conducting coordinated operations or attacking multiple targets.

Directed Energy and Non-Kinetic Systems

Non-kinetic systems are designed to damage or disrupt a satellite without making physical contact. These effects are often delivered at the speed of light and can be more difficult to detect and attribute than a kinetic attack.

One category is directed-energy weapons, primarily high-powered lasers and microwave devices. A space-based laser could be used to “dazzle” a satellite’s optical sensors, temporarily blinding it, or to deliver enough energy to permanently burn out its sensitive imaging components. High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons are designed to target a satellite’s electronics. A “front-door” attack uses the satellite’s own antennas to funnel damaging microwave energy into its systems, while a “back-door” attack seeks to penetrate the electronics through seams or gaps in its shielding. A successful HPM attack could disrupt, degrade, or completely destroy a satellite’s internal circuitry.

The most indiscriminate and devastating non-kinetic weapon would be a nuclear device detonated in space. The explosion would not create a traditional blast wave, but it would unleash a powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could instantly disable the electronics of unhardened satellites over a vast region. The detonation would also inject massive amounts of radiation into the space environment, creating new, long-lasting radiation belts that would accelerate the degradation of any satellite passing through them. Such an attack would be largely indiscriminate, affecting civilian, commercial, and military satellites alike.

The Dual-Use Dilemma

The central challenge in assessing the on-orbit counterspace threat is the dual-use dilemma. An estimated 95% of all space technology can be used for both civilian and military applications. This inherent ambiguity makes it exceedingly difficult to verify intent based on observable capabilities. A satellite launched for the stated purpose of refueling other spacecraft must be able to perform sophisticated RPO, dock with another satellite, and transfer fluid—capabilities that could be repurposed to inject a corrosive substance or otherwise interfere with a non-cooperative target.

This dilemma creates a self-perpetuating cycle of mistrust and escalation. Nation A may develop a satellite with a robotic arm for the genuinely peaceful purpose of clearing orbital debris. Its strategic competitor, Nation B, cannot verify this benign intent. It sees only a new capability that could be used to grapple and disable its own critical satellites. This is perceived as a direct threat. In response, Nation B develops its own “inspector” satellite, ostensibly for “space domain awareness,” to monitor Nation A’s activities. This inspector satellite, by necessity, must also be highly maneuverable and capable of RPO. Nation A now sees this new satellite shadowing its assets as an explicit threat, confirming its initial fears and justifying further development of its own “defensive” capabilities.

This action-reaction cycle, fueled by the impossibility of discerning intent from capability, drives a quiet but persistent arms race in orbit. It also renders traditional arms control treaties, which typically focus on banning specific categories of weapons, largely ineffective. It is difficult to ban a “weapon” that is technologically indistinguishable from a tool designed for satellite repair or debris removal. Consequently, behavior and intent, rather than hardware, have become the focus of efforts to establish stability in space, but these are far more subjective and difficult to regulate.

Major Powers and Their On-Orbit Capabilities

The development and deployment of on-orbit systems with counterspace potential are currently dominated by three nations: Russia, China, and the United States. Each country is pursuing a distinct strategy, reflected in the types of systems they are fielding, the orbits they are placing them in, and the on-orbit behaviors they have demonstrated.

Russia’s Co-Orbital Chess Game: An Asymmetric Strategy

Russia’s approach to counterspace appears to be asymmetric. Recognizing that it cannot match the sheer number of U.S. space assets, its strategy focuses on developing and deploying relatively low-cost but effective systems designed to hold a small number of high-value American and allied satellites at risk. This creates a powerful deterrent by threatening the most critical nodes of Western space architecture, particularly its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

The Kosmos “Inspector” Satellites

Since 2013, Russia has launched a series of small, highly maneuverable satellites into LEO under the generic “Kosmos” designation. These spacecraft have consistently demonstrated behaviors indicative of a co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons program.

The most notable of these was the system launched in November 2019. The main satellite, Kosmos-2542, was initially described as a space surveillance platform. Days after reaching orbit, it released a smaller, independently maneuverable sub-satellite, Kosmos-2543. This “nesting doll” behavior immediately drew attention. Over the following weeks, Kosmos-2543 began a series of complex maneuvers, eventually synchronizing its orbit with USA-245, a classified American National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) reconnaissance satellite. It shadowed the American spy satellite for months, at times approaching to within a few hundred kilometers—a clear demonstration of a sophisticated RPO capability against a non-cooperative target. The demonstration became more explicit in July 2020, when Kosmos-2543 ejected a third object at high velocity. U.S. Space Command characterized this event as a non-destructive test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon. The projectile itself could act as a potent kinetic weapon.

This pattern of behavior has been repeated. In August 2022, Russia launched Kosmos-2558 into a nearly identical orbital plane as a newly launched U.S. reconnaissance satellite, USA-326. In May 2024, Kosmos-2576 was placed into a co-planar orbit with another U.S. spy satellite, USA-314. This consistent pattern suggests a strategy of pre-positioning “inspector” satellites that could act as dormant co-orbital interceptors or persistent surveillance assets, ready to be activated in a crisis.

Luch-Olimp-K: The GEO Wanderer

In Geosynchronous Orbit, Russia operates an equally enigmatic satellite known as Luch or Olimp-K. Launched in September 2014, the spacecraft is believed to have a dual-role mission, providing secure communications for the Russian government and its intelligence services (FSB) while also conducting signals intelligence (SIGINT).

What makes Luch-Olimp-K remarkable is its behavior, which is highly unusual for a GEO satellite. Instead of maintaining a fixed station, it has spent years maneuvering across the GEO belt. It has repeatedly parked for extended periods—weeks or months at a time—in close proximity to a large number of commercial and military communications satellites. Its targets have included satellites operated by Intelsat as well as the French-Italian military communications satellite Athena-Fidus. In 2017, France’s Minister of the Armed Forces publicly condemned Luch-Olimp-K’s approach to Athena-Fidus as “an act of espionage.”

This behavior is consistent with a mission to intercept the uplink and downlink signals of other satellites, gathering intelligence on the communications passing through them. Its advanced maneuverability also gives it a latent co-orbital counterspace capability. A satellite that can park itself just kilometers away from another can also deliberately cause radio frequency interference or, in a conflict, maneuver to physically collide with its target. Luch-Olimp-K thus serves as both a strategic intelligence collector and a potential weapon, holding at risk the critical communications infrastructure of other nations in the prized GEO belt.

China’s Multifaceted Approach: Building Systemic Superiority

China’s space and counterspace programs are characterized by their comprehensive, systematic, and long-term nature. Unlike Russia’s asymmetric focus, China is developing a full spectrum of capabilities with the clear intent to rival and eventually surpass the United States as the world’s preeminent space power. Its on-orbit activities demonstrate a methodical progression, mastering basic RPO before moving on to more complex, multi-satellite operations and advanced robotic manipulations.

The Shijian (SJ) Series: Proving Ground for Advanced Capabilities

The Shijian (“Practice”) series of satellites serves as a testbed for China’s most advanced and potentially dual-use technologies. Several satellites in this series have demonstrated clear counterspace capabilities.

Shijian-17 (SJ-17), launched into GEO in 2016, was China’s first satellite equipped with a robotic arm. Its on-orbit behavior has been notable for its extensive and unusual maneuvers, far exceeding what would be expected for a typical communications or scientific satellite. It has adjusted its position across a wide swath of the GEO arc and has approached other satellites, raising concerns that its robotic arm could be used to grapple and disable adversary assets under the guise of inspection or servicing.

Shijian-21 (SJ-21) provided an even more dramatic demonstration. Launched into GEO in October 2021, its official mission was “space debris mitigation.” In January 2022, SJ-21 executed a landmark operation: it rendezvoused with a defunct Beidou navigation satellite, grappled it with a robotic arm, and then used its own engines to tow the dead satellite thousands of kilometers away into a high “graveyard” orbit. After releasing its target, SJ-21 returned to a normal GEO position. This was the first publicly observed instance of a satellite capturing and moving a large, non-cooperative object in the high-value GEO belt. While a valuable capability for debris removal, it is also a perfect demonstration of the ability to physically remove an adversary’s critical satellite from its operational orbit during a conflict.

The Tongxin Jishu Shiyan (TJS) Program: Secretive Sentinels

The TJS program is a highly classified series of satellites, likely a cover name for several distinct military space programs operating in GEO. While their exact missions are secret, analysis of their orbital positions and characteristics suggests they serve missions such as signals intelligence (the purported Qianshao-3 class) and space-based missile early warning (the purported Huoyan-1 class).

One of the most intriguing events involved TJS-3, launched in 2018. Shortly after reaching orbit, it deployed a small, unannounced sub-satellite. This sub-satellite then began conducting synchronized maneuvers with the parent TJS-3 satellite. At one point, the main satellite moved far out of its normal position while the sub-satellite took its place, a maneuver that could be used to deceive an adversary’s space surveillance network into tracking the wrong object. This demonstration of sophisticated orbital spoofing represents a non-kinetic counterspace capability designed to confuse and degrade an opponent’s space domain awareness.

Coordinated Operations: The “Dogfighting” Demonstration

In 2024, China demonstrated a significant leap in operational complexity. Observers tracked a group of five Chinese satellites—three from the Shiyan series (SY-24C) and two from the Shijian series (SJ-6)—conducting highly coordinated maneuvers in LEO. The satellites were observed moving in and out of formation with each other in a synchronized fashion. U.S. Space Force officials characterized this activity as practicing “tactics, techniques, and procedures” for on-orbit operations, with one general describing it as akin to “dogfighting in space.” This demonstration moves beyond simple one-on-one RPO and indicates a developing capability to conduct squadron-like operations in orbit, potentially for cooperative surveillance or coordinated attacks.

The United States’ “Neighborhood Watch” and Experimental Platforms: A Strategy of Resilience and Ambiguity

The United States’ on-orbit posture is publicly framed around the concepts of space domain awareness (SDA), resilience, and responsible behavior. Its primary operational systems are presented as defensive “neighborhood watch” platforms, while its more advanced capabilities are housed in experimental vehicles. This approach provides a high degree of operational flexibility and maintains a level of strategic ambiguity, as its most capable systems are inherently dual-use, possessing latent offensive options.

Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP)

The GSSAP is a constellation of satellites operated by the U.S. Space Force in a near-geosynchronous orbit. Their official mission is to serve as a space-based sensor for the Space Surveillance Network, providing a clear and persistent view of the objects in the vital GEO belt. The program is often described as a “neighborhood watch” for space.

The first pair of GSSAP satellites was launched in 2014, with subsequent launches building out the constellation. Unlike traditional GEO satellites that remain fixed, GSSAP satellites are designed to drift along the GEO arc, using their propulsion systems to perform Rendezvous and Proximity Operations. Their stated purpose for RPO is to conduct “enhanced surveillance” and “anomaly resolution”—getting a close-up look at other satellites to understand their function, assess damage, or investigate unexpected behavior.

This capability is fundamentally dual-use. The same technology and maneuvers required to inspect a foreign satellite are precisely those needed to conduct a co-orbital counterspace mission. While the U.S. frames GSSAP’s role as defensive and stabilizing—contributing to spaceflight safety and transparency—the satellites provide a potent and persistent on-orbit inspection and potential engagement capability in the most strategic orbital regime.

The X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle

The X-37B is one of the most advanced and enigmatic spacecraft in the U.S. inventory. Operated by the Space Force, it is an uncrewed, reusable robotic spaceplane. It launches vertically atop a conventional rocket, can operate in orbit for exceptionally long durations—one mission lasted for 908 days—and then re-enters the atmosphere to land horizontally on a runway like an airplane. Two such vehicles are known to exist.

Officially, the X-37B is a testbed for advanced, reusable space technologies. Its missions have included experiments for NASA on the effects of radiation, testing advanced materials, and demonstrating novel propulsion systems. Its payload bay can also be used to deploy smaller satellites. The secrecy surrounding many of its specific payloads and on-orbit activities, combined with its significant maneuverability and endurance, has led to its characterization as a potential platform for testing or deploying counterspace systems. Its ability to change its orbit, deploy objects, and return to Earth with a payload makes it a uniquely flexible platform for a wide range of potential military missions, both overt and clandestine.

Strategic Implications and the Future of Space Security

The deployment of these sophisticated on-orbit systems by Russia, China, and the United States carries significant implications for strategic stability and the future of security in space. The proliferation of co-orbital capabilities, particularly those shrouded in the ambiguity of dual-use technology, is fundamentally altering the security landscape, increasing the risk of miscalculation and creating powerful incentives for escalation in a crisis.

Weaponization, Stability, and the Risk of Escalation

The quiet placement of these on-orbit systems introduces a dangerous dynamic into great-power competition. The existence of “inspector” satellites that can shadow an adversary’s most sensitive assets, or “space tugs” that can physically move them, creates a constant, low-level threat. This can lead to a “first-mover advantage” dilemma. In a terrestrial crisis, a nation might feel compelled to strike first in space to disable an adversary’s “eyes and ears”—its reconnaissance and communications satellites—before they can be used against its own forces. An attack on missile-warning satellites could be even more destabilizing, as it could be interpreted as the prelude to a nuclear first strike.

Because the effects of a space attack can be instantaneous and widespread, the temptation to act preemptively is high. This pressure could lead to rapid and unintended escalation, where a limited strike in space triggers a disproportionate response on Earth, or vice versa. The speed of orbital mechanics and the difficulty of definitively attributing an attack in real-time mean that leaders in a crisis would have very little time to make decisions, operating with incomplete information. The presence of on-orbit weapons dramatically shortens these decision timelines and raises the stakes of any miscalculation.

The Search for Norms

In response to these growing risks, there is a significant international push to establish “norms of responsible behavior” in space. These are voluntary, non-binding measures intended to build confidence and reduce the chances of mishaps or misinterpretations. A prominent example is the U.S.-led commitment, now adopted by dozens of nations, to refrain from destructive, debris-creating direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests.

the on-orbit systems detailed in this report pose a much more complex challenge to this approach. It is relatively straightforward to create a norm against blowing up satellites with missiles, an act that is unambiguous and creates long-lasting, hazardous debris for all spacefarers. It is far more difficult to regulate the behavior of a dual-use satellite. How does one define a “safe” separation distance? At what point does an “inspection” by a GSSAP satellite become “targeting”? When does a “debris removal” mission by SJ-21 become a hostile act?

Because the line between a peaceful tool and a potential weapon is a matter of intent, not technology, establishing clear, verifiable rules of the road is exceptionally difficult. This ambiguity is what makes these on-orbit systems so strategically appealing to the nations developing them, and so destabilizing to the space environment as a whole.

The entanglement of military and global civil infrastructure in space represents the most significant and perhaps least appreciated danger of a space conflict. Unlike in terrestrial warfare, where a meaningful distinction can often be made between a military and a civilian target, this is frequently impossible in orbit. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a prime example. It is a military system, owned and operated by the U.S. Space Force, that provides indispensable navigation and targeting data for the U.S. military and its allies. Simultaneously, it is a global public utility. The same GPS signal is used to guide munitions and to provide the timing backbone for the world’s financial transactions, synchronize global telecommunications networks, manage power grids, and enable precision agriculture.

A military commander in a future conflict might make the seemingly logical decision to attack an adversary’s satellite navigation system to gain a tactical advantage on the battlefield. Such an act would be an unavoidable and simultaneous attack on the foundations of the global economy. The collateral damage would not be confined to the conflict zone; it would be immediate and global. Financial markets could freeze, global shipping and air traffic could be thrown into chaos, and critical infrastructure could fail. The weaponization of orbit means that any major conflict there would have immediate, devastating consequences for civilians worldwide, on a scale far transcending the immediate military objectives.

Summary

The evidence is clear and incontrovertible: the era of viewing space as a peaceful sanctuary is over. The high ground of Earth orbit is now a domain of active military competition, populated by a new generation of sophisticated on-orbit systems with the potential to function as weapons.

The world’s major space powers are pursuing distinct but converging strategies. Russia is playing the role of an asymmetric spoiler, using clever and relatively inexpensive co-orbital systems to hold a few of the West’s most valuable space assets at risk, thereby creating a credible deterrent. China is executing a comprehensive, long-term strategy to build systemic superiority across all aspects of space power, methodically developing and demonstrating a full spectrum of capabilities from robotic grappling to multi-satellite “squadron” tactics. The United States is pursuing a strategy of resilience and ambiguity, publicly emphasizing space domain awareness with its GSSAP “neighborhood watch” while developing highly flexible, dual-use platforms like the X-37B that provide a latent and potent counterspace capability.

The central and most intractable challenge to security in this new environment is the dual-use dilemma. When the technology for satellite repair is indistinguishable from that of a satellite-killer, and the line between benign inspection and hostile targeting is merely a matter of intent, traditional arms control models fail. This inherent ambiguity fuels a cycle of mistrust and action-reaction that drives the quiet arms race currently underway.

The stakes of this competition are significant. A conflict that begins in or extends to space would not be a remote and sterile affair fought by robots in the void. Because of the deep entanglement of military and civilian space infrastructure, an attack on a dual-use system like a navigation satellite would be a simultaneous attack on the global economy. The weaponization of orbit threatens not just the military assets of a few nations, but the stability, prosperity, and functioning of modern global civilization.