How the US Trade Policies Reshaped Global Space Ambitions

Broken Trust

The post-Cold War era ushered in a period of unprecedented international cooperation in space, a domain once defined by superpower rivalry. The International Space Station stands as the most prominent symbol of this epoch, a collaborative marvel that brought together the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, and Canada in a shared scientific endeavor. This partnership endured through terrestrial political shifts and was widely regarded as a model for global collaboration, suggesting that the cosmos could remain a sanctuary from earthly disputes. Yet, this cooperative spirit existed alongside a managed, but ever-present, geopolitical competition. The landscape of space exploration was not one of pure harmony but of a delicate balance, where shared scientific goals often overshadowed underlying national interests.

This equilibrium was fundamentally disrupted in the late 2010s. The initiation of a trade war by the United States signaled more than just a series of economic disagreements over import duties and market access. It marked a significant strategic pivot in American foreign policy. This new approach weaponized economic and regulatory power to contest the technological ascent of geopolitical competitors, with a primary focus on China. The strategy was not limited to the blunt instrument of tariffs; it involved the aggressive application of a sophisticated and powerful suite of pre-existing regulatory tools designed to control the flow of sensitive technology. These measures, once used with surgical precision, were now deployed with broad strategic intent.

The US trade war and its associated technology control measures acted as a powerful catalyst, sending shockwaves through the deeply interconnected global space industry. The immediate effects were economic, disrupting supply chains and inflating costs. The long-term consequences have been geopolitical. The pressure campaign forced a significant strategic reassessment among all space-faring nations, accelerating a geopolitical bifurcation of space exploration. It compelled countries to pursue technological self-sufficiency, forge new and sometimes unexpected alliances, and develop competing visions for the future of space governance. The era of broad, unified international cooperation in the cosmos has effectively ended, replaced by a new reality of fractured ambitions and competing blocs on the final frontier.

The Instruments of Influence: Understanding US Trade and Technology Controls

To comprehend the global realignment in space policy, one must first understand the specific policy instruments the United States deployed. These tools were not new, but their application became more expansive and strategically coordinated. They function both individually and collectively, creating a multi-layered system of influence that controls access to critical technology, imposes economic costs on rivals, and forces strategic choices upon allies and partners. This system is composed of three primary pillars: economic pressure through tariffs, structural regulatory barriers through export controls, and targeted sanctions through entity lists.

Tariffs and the Disruption of Global Supply Chains

The most visible component of the US strategy was the imposition of substantial tariffs on a wide range of goods. For the space industry, these were not abstract economic measures but direct operational challenges. Tariffs, some reaching as high as 25%, were levied on essential space-grade components, including advanced semiconductors, specialized aluminum and steel alloys, and high-precision sensors. Many of these critical inputs were sourced from a globalized supply chain that included China, making them immediate targets.

The economic impact was swift and cascaded through the entire industry. The increased cost of components directly translated into higher manufacturing costs for satellites, rockets, and ground-based antennas. Satellite manufacturers and operators, faced with these new expenses, had little choice but to pass them down the value chain. This meant that the end-users of space-based services—from agricultural conglomerates relying on satellite imagery for crop monitoring to logistics companies using geospatial data for supply chain tracking—saw prices for data and services rise. For smaller businesses and research institutions, this made previously accessible data prohibitively expensive, pausing a decade-long trend toward the democratization of space-based information.

Beyond the immediate price hikes, the tariffs and the retaliatory measures they provoked from other nations created significant supply chain disruptions. The space industry is a web of intricate, cross-border dependencies. A single satellite can contain components sourced from dozens of countries. A US military satellite, for instance, might rely on specialized antennas from Canada or laser cross-links from Germany. This interconnectedness, once a source of efficiency, became a critical vulnerability. Manufacturers faced delays as they scrambled to find alternative, non-tariffed suppliers, which were often more expensive or required lengthy and costly requalification processes. The uncertainty surrounding trade negotiations made long-term planning difficult and discouraged private investment, particularly in startups that lacked the capital reserves and negotiating power of larger, established aerospace firms. This environment created what many in the industry described as a “lose-lose situation,” where American companies faced higher input costs and potential exclusion from foreign markets due to retaliatory tariffs, while international companies found it more difficult and expensive to access the lucrative US market.

The Regulatory Wall: ITAR and EAR

Beneath the surface of the tariff disputes lies a more permanent and complex system of control: US export regulations. These rules are not temporary measures but a structural feature of the global technology landscape, designed to safeguard US national security by controlling who can access sensitive American technology. Two sets of regulations are paramount: the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

The ITAR, administered by the Department of State, is the more stringent of the two. It governs technologies and services designated as defense-related, which are cataloged on the United States Munitions List (USML). A pivotal moment for the space industry occurred in 1999, when congressional legislation transferred jurisdiction for all satellite technology to the State Department, effectively placing nearly all satellites and their constituent parts on the USML. This decision meant that commercial communication satellites were regulated with the same severity as fighter jets and guided missiles. Under ITAR, the simple act of sharing technical data, having a conversation about a specific design, or allowing a non-US citizen to view a controlled component is considered an “export” and requires an explicit license from the State Department.

The EAR, managed by the Department of Commerce, governs “dual-use” items—technologies that have both commercial and potential military applications. These items are listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL). While generally less restrictive than ITAR, the EAR still imposes significant licensing requirements for exporting controlled technologies to certain countries or end-users.

The collective weight of these regulations creates a formidable barrier to international collaboration. Compliance is notoriously complex, ambiguous, and expensive, with the US space industry spending tens of millions of dollars annually on legal services, training, and monitoring to navigate the rules. For companies operating on tight budgets, these costs can be debilitating. The process for obtaining an export license can be lengthy and unpredictable, introducing significant delays into projects. The regulations extend to personnel as well; hiring a foreign national to work on a project involving ITAR-controlled technology requires a specific license, a detailed technology control plan, physical modifications to facilities to restrict access, and constant monitoring of the employee.

This regulatory framework is more than just a bureaucratic hurdle; it is a system of technological containment. While tariffs create immediate economic pain and supply chain friction, ITAR and EAR establish a permanent, structural barrier to deep technological collaboration and the free movement of talent. The synergy between these tools creates an environment of pervasive risk for any nation or company that relies on US technology. It forces a stark strategic choice: either align completely with the United States and accept its stringent rules, or undertake the difficult and expensive process of decoupling to build an independent technological ecosystem. This dynamic reveals that the conflict was never merely a trade dispute; it was the execution of a grand strategy to manage the technological rise of a peer competitor and maintain American primacy in a critical high-tech domain.

The intricate and often overlapping nature of these regulations presents a significant challenge for any entity involved in the space sector. The following table provides a comparative breakdown of the two main regulatory pillars.

The rigidity of these export controls, particularly ITAR, had a significant and perhaps unintended consequence. The policy was designed to lock down US technology and prevent its transfer to potential adversaries. the immense compliance costs, operational delays, and restrictions on collaboration created a powerful business opportunity for non-US companies. As early as 2002, European firms like France’s Alcatel Space (now Thales Alenia Space) recognized a growing market demand for satellites and components that were completely free of US parts. They began to market these products as “ITAR-free.” This designation became a significant competitive advantage. It allowed them to sell to a global customer base without the bureaucratic entanglements of the US system and, critically, enabled their customers to use non-US launch providers, such as China’s Long March rocket, which was forbidden for any satellite containing US components. The US policy, intended to control the flow of technology, directly incentivized the creation and growth of alternative, non-US supply chains. It was a classic case of a control strategy inadvertently seeding the growth of strategic competitors.

The Entity List as a Strategic Tool

The third instrument in the US arsenal is the Entity List, a powerful and precise tool of economic statecraft. Maintained by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the list functions as a blacklist of foreign companies, research institutions, government organizations, and individuals that the US government has determined are acting contrary to American national security or foreign policy interests.

Placement on the Entity List is a severe sanction. It effectively severs the designated entity’s access to the American technology ecosystem. US companies are banned from exporting, re-exporting, or transferring any commodities, software, or technology subject to the EAR to a listed party unless they first obtain a specific license from BIS. These license applications are reviewed with a “presumption of denial,” meaning they are almost never granted.

While the Entity List has existed for decades, its use intensified dramatically as a key component of the trade and technology war. The US government began adding hundreds of Chinese entities to the list, with a particular focus on those in high-tech sectors like aerospace, artificial intelligence, supercomputing, and telecommunications. The stated justification for these listings was often tied to the entities’ alleged support for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military modernization efforts and its “military-civil fusion” program, a national strategy that seeks to break down barriers between China’s commercial and defense industrial bases.

For the space sector, this meant that key players in China’s space ecosystem—including research institutes within major state-owned enterprises like the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)—were systematically targeted. These actions were designed to slow China’s military space programs by denying them access to critical US-origin components and technologies. The Entity List thus acts as a precision-guided weapon in the broader technology containment strategy, allowing the US to neutralize specific foreign entities perceived as direct threats, complementing the broader, more structural restrictions imposed by ITAR and EAR.

Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

The aggressive and often unilateral application of US trade and technology policies served as a significant shock to the European space sector. For decades, Europe had operated as a key partner in a transatlantic space ecosystem, albeit one with a significant degree of dependency on American components and policies. The trade war laid bare the vulnerabilities of this arrangement, acting as a powerful catalyst that accelerated a long-debated but slow-moving policy shift toward greater independence. This new doctrine, known as “European Strategic Autonomy,” represents a fundamental reassessment of Europe’s place in the global space order.

The Shock of Dependency

The impact of US policies on Europe was direct and systemic. Tariffs on aluminum and other materials increased the cost of manufacturing components for launchers like Ariane. More significantly, the extraterritorial reach of US export controls, particularly ITAR, created pervasive uncertainty and risk. Because so many European satellites and systems contained US-made components, their sale to third countries or their launch on non-US rockets could be subject to a de facto veto from Washington. This dependency meant that European projects became subject to delays and cancellations based on the shifting political winds in the United States.

A deeper, more existential fear began to permeate the European industry: that core European space companies, to maintain access to the world’s largest space market, might be “invited or induced to relocate to the U.S.” This scenario posed a systemic risk to the competitiveness and resilience of the entire European space industrial base, threatening to hollow out decades of investment in high-tech capabilities. The realization dawned that Europe’s critical space infrastructure—essential for telecommunications, navigation, climate monitoring, and security—was not entirely under its own control. This perceived unreliability of the United States as a partner, whose domestic political and economic agendas could override long-standing alliances, became the primary driver for a new strategic direction. Strategic Autonomy is not merely an industrial goal; it is an insurance policy against future American unilateralism.

The Rise of “ITAR-Free” Technology

The most tangible industrial response to US regulatory pressure was the accelerated development and marketing of “ITAR-free” technology. This concept, which had been developing since the early 2000s, gained new urgency and prominence. European companies made a concerted effort to design and build components, subsystems, and entire satellites that were completely devoid of US parts subject to ITAR controls.

Achieving ITAR-free status became a major competitive advantage. It allowed European manufacturers to offer their products on the global market without the burdensome and time-consuming process of securing US export licenses. This streamlined business operations, reduced project timelines, and lowered costs for customers. It also granted them and their clients greater strategic flexibility. An ITAR-free satellite could be launched on any commercially available rocket—be it European, Indian, or, at the time, Chinese—without requiring Washington’s approval. This opened up broader markets, especially in emerging space economies that were wary of becoming entangled in US regulatory frameworks. In this way, European industry turned a regulatory threat into a strategic opportunity, fostering domestic innovation and enhancing its global market accessibility. This move not only helped secure Europe’s industrial base but also positioned it as an attractive alternative for international partners seeking to avoid the complexities of US regulations.

A Coherent EU Space Strategy

The geopolitical and economic pressures crystallized the political will within the European Union to formally adopt and pursue a policy of “Strategic Autonomy” in space. This concept is more than just industrial self-sufficiency; it is a comprehensive geopolitical doctrine defined as the EU’s ability to make independent decisions and take autonomous action in critical domains, guided by its own interests and values. The shift was driven by the growing recognition that space is an increasingly contested domain, vital not only for economic prosperity but for security and defense.

This new strategic posture is built on several key pillars designed to reduce dependencies and bolster sovereign capabilities. The EU is leveraging its institutional and financial power to create a more integrated and resilient European space ecosystem.

Pillars of Autonomy

The European strategy for achieving autonomy is a multi-faceted approach that addresses the entire space value chain, from accessing space to utilizing space-based data and services.

First and foremost is the goal of independent launch capability. A core element of strategic autonomy is ensuring that Europe has its own guaranteed, independent access to space. The reliance on US rockets, and until recently, Russian Soyuz launchers, was identified as a critical vulnerability. The EU’s strategy involves creating a coherent and unified approach to launchers, reinforcing existing platforms like the Ariane and Vega rocket families, and, crucially, fostering the development of next-generation technologies, including reusability, to remain competitive in the global market.

Second, the EU is implementing a dedicated space-related industrial policy. Using the legal competencies granted by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is actively working to support its domestic industrial base. This includes a push for a “European preference” principle in public procurement, which would favor European companies for government contracts. By aggregating the institutional demand from the EU and its member states, this policy seeks to create a stable and predictable market that supports the long-term development of European space companies, from large system integrators to small and medium-sized enterprises.

Third, a comprehensive EU Space Law is being developed. This ambitious regulatory initiative is designed to establish a common set of European rules governing the safety, resilience, and sustainability of space activities. It aims to tackle modern challenges that were not envisioned by the original space treaties of the Cold War era. This includes creating a framework for managing the growing problem of space debris, establishing clear rules for the ownership and exploitation of space resources to avoid future conflicts, and setting standards for responsible behavior in orbit.

Finally, the strategy is anchored by flagship European space programs. Systems like the Galileo global navigation satellite system and the Copernicus Earth observation program are foundational to Europe’s autonomy. Galileo provides Europe with its own independent positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities, ending its reliance on the US-owned Global Positioning System (GPS) and Russia’s GLONASS. Copernicus provides a sovereign source of invaluable environmental and security data. These operational systems demonstrate Europe’s capacity to develop and manage complex, large-scale space infrastructure, providing essential services to its citizens and strengthening its geopolitical standing.

This comprehensive push for self-sufficiency is not a move toward isolationism. Instead, it is intended to reposition Europe as a more capable and assertive “third pole” in the global space order. As Europe develops a full suite of independent capabilities, from ITAR-free satellites to its own launch systems, it becomes a more attractive and credible partner for other nations. This allows Europe to diversify its international relationships beyond its traditional transatlantic ties. The strategy explicitly involves exploring and strengthening partnerships with other key space-faring nations like Japan, South Korea, India, and countries in the Persian Gulf. By doing so, Europe can carve out a distinct geopolitical role, leveraging its technological prowess to build a network of alliances based on a multilateral, rules-based approach. This stands in contrast to both the US-led bloc, which is perceived by some as unilateral, and the alternative coalition being formed by China and Russia.

The New Axis: The China-Russia Strategic Partnership

The United States’ strategy of applying economic and technological pressure was designed to isolate and constrain its primary geopolitical rivals. in a clear demonstration of unintended consequences, these policies instead had the opposite effect: they drove China and Russia closer together, cementing a deep and multifaceted strategic partnership in the space domain. This new axis is not merely a relationship of convenience; it is a calculated response to a shared perception of being targeted by US policy, and it has given rise to a formidable alternative vision for the future of space exploration.

China’s Mandate for Self-Reliance

China’s path toward an indigenous space program was set long before the recent trade war. US policies, dating back to the late 1990s, have effectively barred China from participating in the International Space Station and most other forms of meaningful international space cooperation, particularly with the United States. The strict enforcement of ITAR, which treats any satellite with US components as a munition, specifically prevented China from launching commercial satellites for Western companies. This long-standing policy of exclusion left Beijing with no alternative but to pursue a path of complete self-reliance.

What began as a necessity has since evolved into a core national strategic priority. The Chinese government is now executing a comprehensive plan to build an “independent and controllable” technological ecosystem across the entire space industry stack. This ambition covers everything from the design and fabrication of space-grade semiconductor chips and sensors to the development of advanced launch vehicles, satellite constellations, and deep-space exploration probes.

The results of this focused, decades-long effort have been remarkable. China has successfully developed and deployed its own global satellite navigation system, BeiDou, as a direct competitor to the American GPS. It operates a vast and growing constellation of sophisticated remote sensing and surveillance satellites, under programs like Yaogan and Gaofen, providing its military with persistent monitoring capabilities. It has achieved a string of impressive lunar exploration milestones, including the first-ever soft landing on the far side of the Moon. Most significantly, China has constructed and now operates its own modular space station, Tiangong, a feat achieved by only two other powers in history. To further accelerate this progress, the Chinese government has strategically opened its domestic space sector to private investment, fostering a dynamic commercial ecosystem of launch providers and satellite manufacturers to supplement the efforts of its massive state-owned enterprises.

Russia’s Pragmatic Pivot East

While China’s space program has been on a steep upward trajectory, Russia’s has been in a state of managed decline. The inheritor of the formidable Soviet space legacy, the modern Russian space program, managed by the state corporation Roscosmos, has been plagued by years of chronic underfunding, corruption scandals, and a series of high-profile technical failures, such as the crash of its Luna-25 moon lander in 2023.

This decline was dramatically accelerated by Western sanctions. The initial wave of sanctions, imposed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, began to restrict its access to advanced Western industrial equipment. The comprehensive sanctions enacted by the United States and Europe after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were a devastating blow. They crippled Roscosmos financially, severing lucrative contracts for launching Western satellites on its Soyuz rockets from the European spaceport in French Guiana and terminating high-profile scientific collaborations, such as the ExoMars mission with the European Space Agency.

Cut off from Western technology, financing, and partnerships, and with its own industrial base deteriorating, Russia was left strategically isolated. In this context, it turned to China as its only viable major partner. For Russia, the partnership is a matter of survival and continued relevance in the space domain. China offers a deep pool of financial resources, a rapidly advancing technological base that can substitute for Western components, and, most importantly, a shared geopolitical objective of challenging and counterbalancing US dominance in space and on Earth. This relationship is fundamentally asymmetric: a declining space power is providing its legacy expertise, particularly in human spaceflight, and its geopolitical weight as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to a rising space power in exchange for a technological and financial lifeline.

The International Lunar Research Station: An Alternative Vision

The cornerstone of the burgeoning Sino-Russian space partnership is the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). This ambitious joint project envisions the construction of a permanent, and eventually crewed, scientific research base near the Moon’s south pole, with a target completion date in the 2030s. The plans are comprehensive, including robotic precursor missions, heavy-lift rocket launches to deliver modules, and even a proposal to build a small nuclear power plant on the lunar surface to provide sustained energy for the base.

The ILRS is explicitly and deliberately framed as a geopolitical and technical alternative to the US-led Artemis program. Where Artemis is built around a set of US-defined principles that partners must sign, the ILRS is promoted under the banner of “co-consultation, joint construction, and shared benefits.” It is presented as a truly open and multilateral project, inviting all interested nations to participate.

This framing is central to China’s diplomatic strategy. Beijing is actively recruiting international partners for the ILRS, with a clear focus on nations in the “Global South” and those outside the traditional US alliance system. Countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America—including Pakistan, Egypt, South Africa, Venezuela, and Thailand—have signed on to the project. This represents a deliberate effort to build a competing coalition in space, offering emerging space nations a chance to participate in a flagship lunar exploration program. For many of these countries, the ILRS offers an opportunity for capacity-building and prestige that they might not otherwise have.

The US policy of isolation, intended to hobble its adversaries, has instead catalyzed the formation of its own worst-case scenario: a deep, strategic, and technologically integrated partnership between its two main competitors in a domain critical to 21st-century power. This cooperation is not limited to civil projects like the ILRS. The two nations are also deepening their military space collaboration, working on integrating their satellite navigation systems and developing joint capabilities for missile defense early warning and space situational awareness. This creates a combined challenge to US space assets and strategic stability that is significantly greater than what either nation could pose alone.

Navigating the Rivalry: Responses from Key Nations

The intensification of the US-China rivalry, supercharged by the trade war, did not create a simple, binary world. Instead, it acted as a geopolitical sorting mechanism, compelling other space-faring nations to re-evaluate their positions and make difficult strategic choices. The responses have been diverse, reflecting each nation’s unique geography, economic dependencies, security concerns, and national ambitions. The result is a complex, multipolar space environment where countries are charting new courses, ranging from deeper alignment with the United States to determined balancing acts and strategic hedging.

Japan: The Aligned Ally

For Japan, the growing competition between its primary security guarantor, the United States, and its largest trading partner, China, has forced a fundamental transformation of its space policy. Historically, Japan’s space activities were bound by a constitutional commitment to the peaceful use of space, with a focus on scientific research and civilian applications. The escalating geopolitical tensions and the explicit threat posed by China’s advancing military space capabilities, including demonstrated anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, rendered this posture untenable.

In response, Japan has shifted its space policy to become a core component of its national security strategy. Recognizing the vulnerability of its own critical satellite infrastructure—essential for communications, intelligence gathering, and navigation—Japan has moved to deepen its security alliance with the United States in the space domain. This involves enhanced cooperation on space situational awareness to monitor threats in orbit, participation in US-led military space exercises, and a commitment to protecting shared space assets. Japan was an early and enthusiastic signatory of the Artemis Accords, signaling its firm alignment with the US-led vision for space governance. This strategic choice is a calculated one: while Japan seeks to manage its vital economic relationship with China, it has prioritized its security alliance with the United States as the ultimate guarantor of its safety in an increasingly contested region.

India: The Balancing Power

India is charting a distinctly different course, one defined by a long-standing foreign policy doctrine of “strategic autonomy.” It seeks to engage with all major powers while avoiding binding alliances that would limit its freedom of action. This balancing act is clearly reflected in its response to the new space race. On one hand, US trade policies, including tariffs on Indian goods, have created significant friction and pushed New Delhi to explore closer ties with China and Russia. India is an active participant in non-Western forums like the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral, which are seen as platforms to counterbalance US influence.

On the other hand, India views China as its primary long-term strategic competitor, with whom it shares a disputed and often tense land border. This security concern has driven India to dramatically expand its defense and space cooperation with the United States. India has signed the Artemis Accords and is a key member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), a strategic grouping with the US, Japan, and Australia that is widely seen as a democratic counterweight to China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific.

India’s own space program, led by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), is a powerful instrument of both national pride and foreign policy. India is leveraging its proven and cost-effective launch capabilities to position itself as a space-faring leader for the Global South. By offering satellite launch services and space-enabled public goods like disaster monitoring data to other developing nations, India presents itself as a non-hegemonic alternative to both the US and China. This is complemented by ambitious national goals, including the development of its own space station, the Bharatiya Antriksh Station, and a crewed lunar landing, underscoring its ambition to be recognized as a top-tier space power on its own terms.

Canada: The Intertwined Neighbor

As a close ally with a deeply integrated economy, Canada has been directly caught in the crossfire of the US-China trade conflict. US tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum, critical materials for the aerospace industry, have imposed direct economic costs. This experience has forced a strategic reassessment within Canada of its heavy dependence on the United States for nearly every aspect of its space program, from the supply of critical satellite components to access to launch services.

While Canada remains a steadfast US ally and was one of the original signatories of the Artemis Accords, the trade disputes have highlighted the vulnerability that comes with such deep integration. In response, Canada is being compelled to diversify its partnerships to build greater resilience. The most logical path for this diversification is to strengthen its long-standing but historically secondary collaboration with the European Space Agency (ESA). By increasing its involvement in ESA projects and fostering a stronger domestic space industrial base, Canada seeks to reduce its vulnerability to future US policy shifts and gain more strategic flexibility.

Australia: The Forward Base

Australia has responded to the intensifying US-China rivalry by doubling down on its security alliance with the United States. Its strategic calculus is that in a more contested Indo-Pacific, its security is best guaranteed by deeper integration with its most powerful ally. This is clearly evident in its space policy. Australia was a founding signatory of the Artemis Accords and has positioned itself as a crucial partner in US-led space initiatives.

Its role has become increasingly strategic and operational. Australia hosts critical NASA deep-space tracking stations that are essential for communication with missions across the solar system. More significantly, it has formalized a Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) with the US. This treaty-level agreement provides the legal framework for US companies to launch rockets and satellites containing sensitive American technology from Australian territory. This move aims to turn Australia into a launch hub for the southern hemisphere and deeply embeds it within the US space security architecture. This tight alignment makes Australia a vital node for projecting US influence in the region, but it also carries the risk of making its space facilities a potential target in any future conflict.

South Korea: The Hedging Ally

South Korea faces perhaps the most acute strategic dilemma of any US ally. It is caught in a precarious position between its ironclad security alliance with the United States, which guarantees its defense against North Korea, and its significant economic dependence on China, its largest trading partner. Its space policy is a direct reflection of this delicate hedging strategy.

To reinforce its security ties, South Korea has joined the Artemis Accords and is actively strengthening its space alliance with the US, with a particular focus on joint lunar exploration missions and technology development. At the same time, its official strategic posture toward China remains deliberately more ambiguous than that of Japan. South Korea has sought to avoid being drawn into a direct, overt confrontation with Beijing, wary of inviting the kind of punishing economic retaliation it has experienced in the past. Its space ambitions are therefore pursued on two parallel tracks: deep technical collaboration with its American ally, coupled with careful diplomatic maneuvering to preserve its vital economic relationship with China.

The UAE: The Multi-Aligned Hub

The United Arab Emirates has adopted a unique and ambitious strategy of multi-alignment, positioning itself as a neutral hub that can work with all sides. It is actively pursuing and maintaining robust space partnerships with both the United States and China simultaneously, a feat few other nations have attempted.

The UAE is a signatory to the US-led Artemis Accords, signaling its alignment with Western norms of space exploration. Concurrently, it has signed agreements to participate in the China-led ILRS project, including plans to fly a UAE-built rover on a future Chinese lunar mission. This audacious balancing act allows the UAE to access the best technology and expertise from both competing blocs to rapidly advance its own ambitious national space program, which includes a successful mission to Mars and plans for further deep-space exploration. This strategy enhances its international prestige and provides it with maximum strategic flexibility. it is not without friction, as the United States has expressed serious concerns about the potential for sensitive US technology to be transferred to China through these parallel collaborations.

The varied reactions from these key nations demonstrate that the US trade war did not create a single global response. Instead, it acted as a powerful clarifying force, compelling each country to assess its own unique circumstances and chart a new strategic course in a more competitive and fractured cosmic landscape.

The Bifurcated Frontier: Competing Visions for Space Governance

The cumulative effect of US trade and technology policies and the varied international responses has been the fracturing of the global space order. The previous era, characterized by a single, dominant international platform in the ISS and a broadly shared, if imperfect, consensus on the rules of the road, has given way to a bifurcated frontier. This new reality is defined by two major, competing geopolitical blocs, each led by a superpower, each assembling its own coalition of partners, and each promoting a different vision for the future of space exploration and governance. This is the era of “astro-geopolitics,” where the rivalries of Earth are being projected into the cosmos.

The Artemis Accords Bloc

The first of these emerging blocs is centered around the United States and its Artemis Accords. Launched in 2020, the Accords are a set of non-binding, bilateral agreements that establish a framework of principles for civil space exploration. These principles are grounded in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and include commitments to peaceful purposes, transparency in operations, interoperability of systems, rendering emergency assistance to astronauts in distress, and the public release of scientific data.

The Accords function as a “normative coalition” of what the US terms “like-minded” states. The coalition has grown rapidly, attracting over 40 signatories. The list includes nearly all major traditional US allies and space partners: Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Korea, and most of the major space-faring nations of Europe, such as France, Germany, and Italy. It has also expanded to include emerging space powers like India, Brazil, and the UAE.

A key and controversial element of the Accords is their explicit endorsement of the utilization of space resources. This principle provides a framework for signatory nations and their private companies to extract and use resources found on the Moon and other celestial bodies. For critics, particularly China and Russia, this is seen as a unilateral attempt by the United States to reinterpret the Outer Space Treaty—which forbids national appropriation of celestial bodies—to favor a commercial, “first come, first served” approach that benefits the technologically advanced American private sector. They argue that such fundamental rules should be negotiated through the multilateral framework of the United Nations, not through a US-led coalition of the willing.

The ILRS Coalition

The second bloc is forming around the China-Russia partnership and their joint International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) project. The ILRS serves as the technical and geopolitical anchor for an alternative coalition. In direct contrast to the US-led model, the ILRS is promoted as a state-led, multilateral scientific endeavor open to all nations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

China’s recruitment strategy for this coalition is a clear exercise in soft power diplomacy. It is focused on attracting partners from the Global South and emerging space nations, many of whom may feel excluded from the high-tech, high-cost activities of the Artemis program. By offering participation in a flagship lunar project, China provides these countries with an opportunity for technology transfer, scientific collaboration, and national prestige. This approach allows Beijing to build a broad-based sphere of influence through partnership and access, rather than through formal alliances or shared ideology alone. While the list of national-level partners for the ILRS is currently smaller than that of the Artemis Accords, China is successfully signing up a diverse array of countries, universities, and international organizations, creating a distinct and growing coalition.

The competition between these two blocs is not just about building bases on the Moon; it is a foundational struggle to define the legal, economic, and normative rules for the entire off-world economy of the 21st century. The bloc that successfully establishes its preferred norms on the Moon—whether it be the commercial, property-rights-oriented vision of the Artemis Accords or the state-managed, multilateral approach of the ILRS—will have a significant advantage in shaping the rules for future activities like asteroid mining, in-space manufacturing, and deep-space commerce. This is a battle over the future operating system of the space economy.

The Commercial Impact of Bifurcation

This geopolitical split has significant implications for the commercial space sector. The once-globalized “NewSpace” economy is becoming increasingly fragmented along geopolitical lines. Venture capital investors and startups must now navigate a much more complex landscape where geopolitical risk is a primary consideration. A company’s choice of suppliers, investors, or strategic partners can determine its market access. A startup that integrates critical Chinese components may find itself locked out of the US government market, while one that adheres strictly to US supply chains may be unable to compete on cost in markets aligned with China.

This fragmentation is creating inefficiencies and driving up costs. The global supply chains that allowed for rapid innovation and cost reduction are being reconfigured, forcing a duplication of effort as each bloc seeks to secure its own independent industrial base. Despite these challenges, investment in the commercial space sector remains robust, but its character is changing. National-level investment is surging, particularly in China, where a mix of state-led industrial funds and government-guided venture capital is pouring billions into the domestic commercial space industry. This is not just about fostering a market; it’s about achieving national strategic goals, from deploying a massive satellite internet constellation to developing reusable rockets to rival those of SpaceX.

Long-Term Implications for Governance

The emergence of two powerful, competing blocs, each operating with its own set of partners and promoting its own preferred norms, makes the prospect of a universal, comprehensive space governance regime negotiated through the UN seem increasingly remote. The existing international space law, forged during the Cold War, is ill-equipped to handle the complexities of a multipolar world with numerous state and commercial actors.

This governance gap creates significant long-term risks. Without a shared framework for space traffic management, the rapidly growing number of satellites in orbit increases the probability of collisions, which could generate massive clouds of space debris and render certain orbits unusable for generations. Without agreed-upon rules for resource extraction, the race for lunar ice or valuable minerals could lead to disputes and conflict. And without established channels for communication and de-escalation between the competing blocs, a technical malfunction or strategic miscalculation by one side could be misinterpreted by the other, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

The bifurcation of space may, paradoxically, accelerate innovation in the short term as intense competition drives technological advancement in both camps. this progress comes at the cost of long-term systemic risk. The duplication of infrastructure and the fragmentation of technical standards are inefficient and unsustainable. The absence of a shared governance framework makes the entire space environment less safe, less stable, and more prone to conflict for everyone. The cosmos is no longer a sanctuary above terrestrial politics; it has become a central arena for them.

Summary

The US trade war was far more than a series of economic disputes; it was a strategic policy that served as the primary catalyst for a fundamental and likely irreversible realignment of the global space order. By systematically leveraging a powerful suite of economic and regulatory instruments—tariffs that disrupted supply chains, export controls like ITAR that created structural barriers to collaboration, and the Entity List that targeted specific competitors—the United States forced nations across the globe to confront their technological dependencies and make foundational choices about their future in space.

This intense pressure did not produce a uniform outcome. Instead, it acted as a geopolitical centrifuge, sorting the world’s space powers into distinct strategic camps based on their unique national interests and threat perceptions. Europe, shocked by its vulnerability to the policy whims of an unpredictable ally, accelerated its decades-long quest for “strategic autonomy,” seeking to build an independent and resilient space ecosystem. China and Russia, pushed together by a shared sense of isolation and a common adversary, solidified a deep strategic partnership, with the ambitious International Lunar Research Station as its flagship project and the anchor of a new coalition. Other key nations performed a nuanced strategic calculus: Japan and Australia doubled down on their security alliances with the US; India masterfully balanced its relationships to maintain its strategic autonomy; Canada sought diversification through Europe; and the UAE pursued a bold strategy of multi-alignment.

The era of a single, broadly cooperative international space order, epitomized by the International Space Station, is over. The new reality is a fractured and multipolar cosmos, defined by the emergence of two major, competing blocs: the US-led Artemis Accords coalition and the China-led ILRS partnership. These blocs are not merely building separate hardware for separate missions; they are actively promoting competing norms, values, and visions for the governance of all future activities in space. This new era of “astro-geopolitics” will be characterized by intense competition. While this rivalry may spur rapid technological innovation in the short term, it unfolds in a dangerous governance vacuum. The duplication of effort, the lack of interoperability, and the absence of a shared global framework for managing traffic and de-escalating disputes introduce significant long-term risks of strategic miscalculation and conflict on the final frontier.