What Does Jammertest Reveal About Europe’s Satellite Navigationience?

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Key Takeaways

• Norway’s Jammertest examined navigation equipment under deliberate jamming and spoofing conditions.
• Galileo authentication and Celeste address different weaknesses in satellite navigation systems.
• Successful demonstrations still require further validation, compatible receivers, and operational testing.

Jammertest Turns Interference Into a Controlled Experiment

Norway hosted Jammertest near Bleik on Andøya from September 14 to 18, 2026, bringing satellite-navigation equipment into an environment deliberately exposed to radio interference. The Norwegian Communications Authority’s event description identifies a coordinated effort involving communications regulators, transport authorities, and research organizations. Their purpose was to discover how positioning technology behaves when its usual assumptions about trustworthy reception no longer hold.

The European Space Agency (ESA) published its account of the campaign on October 2, 2026. That publication describes September experiments, rather than a new test conducted on the publication date. It brings together work on Galileo authentication, experimental low-orbit navigation satellites, and equipment intended to support more dependable navigation services.

Jammertest addresses positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). Positioning establishes location; navigation supports movement; timing provides the shared clock references used by connected systems. A receiver can lose access to a trustworthy input even when the satellite transmitting it remains healthy.

That makes the Norwegian campaign relevant well beyond spacecraft engineering. The consequences of navigation outages extend into transport operations and infrastructure management. A useful assessment must examine how equipment recognizes a problem, what information it continues to provide, and how operators respond.

Field exercises also expose the gap between a technology’s stated purpose and its behavior in a complete system. An antenna, receiver, and application may each perform adequately in isolation yet interact poorly during disruption. Bringing them together under controlled interference gives developers evidence for changing their designs before customers must depend on them.

A False Position Creates a Different Problem From No Position

Jamming and spoofing can both disrupt global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), but they attack trust in different ways. Jamming introduces interference that makes legitimate broadcasts harder to receive. Spoofing supplies deceptive signals that can persuade equipment to calculate an incorrect position or time.

The distinction changes the engineering objective. A receiver that announces an outage gives its user a recognizable problem. A receiver that confidently supplies a false answer can pass that error into another system before anyone notices. New Space Economy’s explanation of GPS spoofing and its reach discusses why interpreting apparently valid positioning information requires care.

Satellite navigation depends on both transmitted information and measurements of signal travel time. The information helps describe where a satellite is and how its clock behaves. Travel-time measurements help establish the receiver’s distance from satellites. Protecting one part of that process does not automatically protect every other part.

The European GNSS Service Centre makes this distinction in its explanation of data and range authentication. Authentication at the data level checks the broadcast navigation message. Authentication at the ranging level addresses the measurements used to establish distance. Combining the two can provide stronger grounds for trusting the calculated position.

A useful interpretation of Jammertest is that different failures require different defenses. Authenticating information does not remove an interfering transmitter. Receiving stronger broadcasts does not, by itself, establish that all accepted information is authentic. Equipment also needs a defined response when its inputs disagree or when a check cannot be completed.

These distinctions matter when buying navigation equipment. A claim of interference resistance needs to identify the threat tested, the conditions used, and the behavior observed. A successful position fix is informative, but so are false alarms, rejected measurements, and the time needed to recover after disruption.

Galileo Adds Authentication to the Ranging Measurement

During a two-hour experiment on September 16, 2026, five operational Galileo satellites transmitted an encrypted test signal. Receivers in Norway and at ESA’s navigation laboratory in the Netherlands established their positions using those broadcasts. ESA described the result as the first real-world positioning demonstration using Galileo’s forthcoming Signal Authentication Service (SAS).

The September demonstration tested a capability intended to complement Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA), which entered initial operational service on July 24, 2025. As of October 3, 2026, SAS remained under development, with validation and accreditation activities planned for 2027 before an operational declaration. The field result did not itself make the service operational.

The existing OSNMA service allows compatible equipment to check that Galileo navigation messages originated in the system and were not modified. Receivers need the appropriate processing functions and cryptographic information. Compatibility with ordinary Galileo positioning alone does not establish that a device performs these checks.

SAS extends the approach to encrypted ranging signals. The European Union Agency for the Space Programme’s description explains that supporting code information will be distributed through an internet service. Its design allows users to obtain ranging measurements from the encrypted Galileo component without storing confidential cryptographic material in their receivers.

For manufacturers, that creates work across receiver software and service integration. They must implement authentication correctly and handle the supporting data. Users, in turn, need to understand what an authentication result means for the application relying on it.

The broader significance of Galileo signal authentication lies in making trust an explicit part of the navigation process. The next evidence to watch is service validation and implementation guidance, followed by documented performance in equipment that customers can actually deploy.

Celeste Explores a Complementary Navigation Layer

Europe’s Celeste program examines whether satellites closer to Earth can strengthen navigation alongside existing systems. Its purpose is to test a complementary layer, with Galileo remaining central to the wider European architecture. ESA’s Celeste mission description separates the demonstration effort from the longer-term possibility of an operational constellation.

The first two demonstrators launched in March 2026. Before Jammertest, one spacecraft transmitted positioning signals based on mobile-network technology on August 27, 2026. ESA reported that ground equipment received and recorded them, with analysis continuing. The 5G positioning experiment therefore established transmission and reception, rather than the availability of a complete commercial navigation service.

At Jammertest, ESA reported preliminary acquisition of Celeste broadcasts under contested conditions. Acquiring a signal means that equipment has detected it sufficiently to begin useful processing. That is a different milestone from continuously calculating an accurate position throughout an interference event.

The engineering case involves several forms of diversity. Satellites in low Earth orbit can offer stronger received signals and different viewing geometry. Celeste also investigates additional frequency bands, potentially reducing dependence on a single part of the radio spectrum. ESA’s resilience explanation describes these as capabilities to investigate, with different bands serving different types of equipment.

The industrial implications extend to antennas, clocks, and receiver processing. A new broadcast helps users only when affordable equipment can receive it and combine it with other information. Manufacturing readiness and application integration are consequently part of the program’s longer-term work.

Celeste’s initial demonstrations provide evidence for those decisions. They do not yet establish uninterrupted coverage, universal resistance to interference, or compatibility with every existing device. Those outcomes depend on the eventual system design and on results from further experiments.

Ground Networks Create Additional Commercial Work

Navigation resilience also creates work for companies that build neither launch vehicles nor navigation constellations. ESA’s Navigation Innovation and Support Programme supports projects in timing distribution and interference detection. These address the ground infrastructure that turns satellite services into useful capabilities.

Sweden’s Net Insight is developing a lower-cost timing distribution solution intended to extend precise timing farther into access networks. As of October 3, 2026, ESA listed the project as ongoing, with hardware and software deliverables. The proposed applications include telecommunications and other industries that need dependable synchronization.

Austria’s Dimetor is pursuing a different approach through telecommunications-based interference detection. The project seeks to use dense networks as distributed sensors, examining timing deviations and signal anomalies to locate interference. This is a development objective, not evidence that a completed service already protects an entire region.

These projects illustrate separate commercial functions. Timing distribution can help deliver a dependable clock reference to an end site. Interference monitoring can help explain where a disruption is occurring. Neither should be described as an automatic substitute for every navigation function.

New Space Economy’s GNSS market analysis provides context for this movement toward receivers, software, and supporting services. The value created by a space system often depends on the equipment and processes deployed close to its users.

For procurement teams, the practical implication is to define the required outcome before selecting a technology. Maintaining synchronization during an outage differs from locating a moving vessel or detecting deceptive information. A supplier’s performance evidence should address the relevant outcome, including the conditions under which its equipment stops meeting the requirement.

Recorded Interference Can Make Testing Repeatable

Norway’s Testnor is developing a service around an asset produced by field exercises: recordings of real interference. Its GNSS Interference Service project began on September 1, 2026, and is scheduled to run for 24 months. Planned outputs include recording equipment, a curated signal library, a customer web platform, and a laboratory replay service.

The intended customers include receiver developers and system integrators. Replaying a documented recording would allow them to expose equipment to the same captured conditions during successive development cycles. As of October 3, 2026, ESA listed the project as ongoing, so its planned commercial service should not be presented as fully delivered.

Repeatability has a practical advantage: developers can compare a revised design with an earlier version using a consistent input. It can also help investigate a failure after the outdoor exercise ends. A field recording does not reproduce every aspect of deployment, but it can preserve evidence that would otherwise be difficult to recreate.

The remaining challenge is deciding what a test result establishes. Buyers need to distinguish detection from successful mitigation and recovery from uninterrupted operation. A result without its conditions can invite a broader conclusion than the experiment supports.

Galileo’s in-force OSNMA documentation illustrates the additional material required around an operational capability: receiver guidance, interface specifications, and defined performance conditions. These documents turn a general promise of authentication into requirements that equipment developers can implement.

That process also matters for maritime security applications, where authenticated information must fit shipboard equipment and operating practices. The economic return from testing depends partly on whether its findings lead to better products, clearer purchasing requirements, and reliable behavior when ordinary reception fails.

Summary

Jammertest shows Europe developing navigation resilience through several complementary paths. Galileo adds ways to authenticate information and ranging measurements. Celeste investigates another orbital layer, and ground-network projects address timing distribution and interference awareness.

The evidence supports progress without establishing a universal solution. Demonstrations, preliminary measurements, and operational services represent different levels of maturity. Keeping those distinctions clear helps users understand what they can deploy and helps suppliers identify what they still need to prove.

The commercial opportunity extends from satellite technology to receiver implementation and repeatable testing. Its value will depend on measured performance under defined conditions and on whether customers can integrate that performance into the systems they already operate.

Appendix: Useful Books Available on Amazon

• Principles of GNSS, Inertial, and Multisensor Integrated Navigation Systems

Appendix: Top Questions Answered in This Article

What Is Jammertest?

Jammertest is a Norwegian field campaign that exposes navigation equipment to deliberately generated interference under controlled conditions. Its 2026 edition took place near Bleik on Andøya from September 14 to 18. Participants use the exercise to investigate equipment behavior and identify changes that could improve resilience.

How Do Jamming and Spoofing Differ?

Jamming interferes with reception of legitimate satellite broadcasts, potentially making positioning unavailable. Spoofing introduces deceptive signals that can cause a receiver to calculate an incorrect location or time. The distinction matters because equipment may continue supplying apparently credible outputs during spoofing, making the problem harder to recognize.

What Did Galileo Demonstrate in September 2026?

Galileo demonstrated positioning using an encrypted test signal transmitted by five operational satellites during a two-hour experiment on September 16. ESA reported successful positioning at test locations in Norway and the Netherlands. The result was a development milestone for the forthcoming Signal Authentication Service, rather than an operational-service declaration.

What Does OSNMA Authenticate?

Open Service Navigation Message Authentication checks the authenticity of Galileo navigation-message data. It allows compatible receivers to verify that the information came from Galileo and was not modified. It does not, by itself, provide complete authentication of every measurement and processing step used to calculate a position.

Was Galileo’s Signal Authentication Service Operational as of October 3, 2026?

The sources describing the September 2026 demonstration identify the Signal Authentication Service as forthcoming. ESA described validation and accreditation activities planned for 2027 before an operational declaration. Successful field positioning established a technical milestone, but users should distinguish that result from a formally available and validated service.

What Is Celeste Designed to Investigate?

Celeste investigates navigation technologies using satellites in low Earth orbit. Its demonstrations examine how additional signals and frequency bands could complement existing European navigation systems. The program is developing evidence for a possible operational layer, rather than offering a complete replacement for Galileo or an established global navigation service.

Does Receiving a Celeste Signal Prove Continuous Navigation?

No. Signal reception establishes that equipment detected or acquired a broadcast under the tested conditions. Continuous navigation requires further evidence about positioning performance and service availability. ESA’s Jammertest account described the Celeste findings as preliminary, with analysis still needed before drawing broader conclusions about performance under interference.

Why Do Telecommunications Networks Need Precise Timing?

Telecommunications infrastructure uses shared timing references to coordinate network functions. Satellite-derived time can provide one input, making interference resilience relevant even when the equipment remains in a fixed location. Timing-distribution projects address this dependency by developing ways to deliver dependable synchronization closer to customers and end sites.

What Could Recorded Interference Add to Testing?

Recorded interference can allow developers to replay a captured radio environment during laboratory testing. This supports comparisons between equipment versions and investigation of observed failures. Testnor’s project proposes a curated signal library and replay service, but its development status means those planned capabilities should not be treated as fully delivered.

What Should Buyers Look for in Resilience Claims?

Buyers should look for evidence tied to a defined threat, test environment, and required operational outcome. Detecting interference differs from maintaining accurate positioning or timing through it. Useful documentation also explains failure behavior and recovery, allowing customers to judge whether the tested capability matches their actual application.

Appendix: Glossary of Key Terms

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

A group of functions that establish location, support movement, and provide accurate time references. Transport and infrastructure systems can depend on different combinations of these functions. A fixed installation may require precise timing even when it has no need to calculate a changing position.

Jamming

Radio interference that makes legitimate signals harder or impossible for a receiver to use. In satellite navigation, it can reduce the availability of positioning or timing. The result depends on the interference conditions and on the equipment’s ability to continue operating with other inputs.

Spoofing

The use of deceptive signals to cause a receiver to calculate an incorrect position or time. Unlike an obvious outage, spoofing may leave equipment producing plausible outputs. Detecting the deception and preventing those outputs from affecting other systems are separate engineering concerns.

Authentication

A process for checking that information or a signal comes from an expected source and has the required integrity. In Galileo, navigation-message authentication and ranging authentication address different parts of positioning. Authentication does not automatically guarantee continued reception during strong radio interference.

Ranging

The process of estimating distance, including through measurements of how long a satellite signal takes to reach a receiver. Navigation systems combine measurements with information about satellites and their clocks. Errors or manipulation in these measurements can affect the resulting position estimate.

Low Earth Orbit

An orbital region relatively close to Earth used by many communications, observation, and experimental satellites. Navigation spacecraft operating there can provide different signal strengths and viewing geometry from higher constellations. A useful service still requires suitable coverage, accurate timing, and compatible user equipment.