The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Department of Defense had not fully coordinated its approach to managing space supply chain risks across its national security programs. The November 17, 2026, report said three Space Force programs it examined had reported supply chain risks, including constraints on manufacturing capability or capacity for some satellite components. The Pentagon agreed to all three recommendations.
The audit examined how individual programs deal with supplier problems and how the government responds when those problems extend across program or agency boundaries. GAO found that the Space Force had begun to gather information across programs, but the Air Force memorandum announcing its new risk management service did not clearly assign leadership or spell out who was responsible for running it. A separate guide set out a common process, but the office that wrote it could not enforce it outside its own command.
Why Satellite Scale Changes Procurement
The Pentagon is shifting some space systems toward constellations of smaller satellites that operate together as a network. That approach requires suppliers to deliver qualified hardware in greater volumes, often on overlapping production schedules. Commercial companies building satellite networks for services such as broadband also buy from the space industrial base. GAO described growing demand from both government and private customers as a source of strain on manufacturing capacity.
The audit traced how that strain can move through the purchasing process. Government program offices typically rely on their prime contractors, the companies responsible for delivering the main system, to monitor suppliers for the work they oversee. A prime contractor can identify a delay affecting its own order without knowing how many other programs rely on the same suppliers. Likewise, a program office addressing a late delivery may not know that another office is dealing with the same production constraint. New Space Economy’s September review of U.S. space industrial base reports covered the supply chain pressures that preceded the audit.
GAO initially selected five programs for a closer look, then excluded two because they had not assessed their supply chains in depth at the time of the review. The audit drew on program risk records and interviews with defense officials. Its examples are drawn from the three programs examined in detail, rather than a count of problems across every military satellite program. GAO reported that supply chain problems contributed to delays in two of the programs it reviewed.
A Common Process With Limited Authority
In March 2026, the Space Force initiated a study of the supply chain for large constellations in low Earth orbit. The study is intended to compare existing and potential production capacity with Pentagon purchase needs and examine manufacturing lead times. GAO reported that the Pentagon expected the study to be complete in March 2027. The audit also documented investments to qualify components for spaceflight and expand domestic manufacturing capacity.
An April 28 Air Force memorandum announced a service to assess and monitor space industrial base risks across the department’s national security space programs. The memorandum called for programs to share supply chain data and reduce duplication in the services they buy from commercial providers. In October, Space Force officials told GAO they had established a central repository and were adding information from programs and supplier-mapping tools.
Space Systems Command issued its own guide in April to give national security space organizations a common way to identify and manage risks. Officials said the guide relied on cooperation rather than a chain of command. The Air Force memorandum applies within the department, and the command’s guide does not bind organizations outside the command. Those limits matter to the audit because the National Reconnaissance Office acquires satellites and participates in government efforts to manage industrial risks but is outside the Department of the Air Force.
The Pentagon’s Response
GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense have the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office establish a joint approach with written agreements on authority, support, and decision-making. The two other recommendations concern the Air Force service itself: GAO called for a leadership structure with defined responsibilities and for formal instructions that apply across the Space Force’s national security space programs.
In its written response to GAO, the Pentagon said the Department of the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office had established quarterly meetings on shared risks. Both organizations also participate in the Space Industrial Base Working Group, which identifies issues affecting multiple agencies and supports projects aimed at addressing them.
The Pentagon said the Air Force space acquisition office was reorganizing roles to delegate more authority to officials who oversee groups of acquisitions. It also pointed to a working group that reviews risks that cut across programs. On the third recommendation, the office said it was examining how to establish formal guidance. At release, GAO listed all three recommendations as open.

