What Are Key Space Industry Policy Issues and Best Practices?

Space has Evolved

Space is no longer a distant frontier explored only by a few superpowers. It has become a foundational element of the modern global economy, a critical domain for national security, and an indispensable tool for addressing societal challenges like climate change. For policymakers, this shift presents a complex new environment. The rules and strategies of the 20th century are insufficient for the realities of the 21st, which are defined by a proliferation of actors, a surge in commercial investment, and a dramatic increase in orbital congestion.

This article provides a guide to the key policy issues confronting governments today. It is designed for a non-technical audience, focusing on the “why” behind the technical challenges and outlining the policy levers available to national leaders. It covers the pressing need for space traffic management, the challenges of domestic regulation, the evolving landscape of international law, the methods for fostering a national space economy, the new realities of space-based defense, the competition for spectrum, and the governance of emerging frontiers like lunar mining.

Understanding these interconnected issues is essential for any nation that hopes to secure its interests, promote its economy, and act as a responsible leader in this new era of space activity.

Core Policy Pillar: Space Traffic Management (STM)

One of the most immediate and tangible challenges in space policy is managing the growing congestion in Earth’s orbit. This isn’t just about preventing satellite collisions; it’s about preserving the utility of orbit for future generations. For policymakers, this domain, known as Space Traffic Management (STM), is a complex mix of environmental protection, safety regulation, and international diplomacy.

Understanding the Challenge: Orbital Debris

Orbits around Earth, particularly LEO and GEO, are finite resources. For decades, every launch has left behind “space junk” – defunct satellites, spent rocket bodies, and fragments from accidental collisions or deliberate anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon tests.

This debris travels at hyper-velocity, often faster than 17,000 miles per hour. At that speed, even a paint fleck can cause catastrophic damage to an operational satellite. A bolt or small piece of metal can destroy one entirely.

The central problem is that debris begets more debris. A collision between two satellites, or between a satellite and a large piece of junk, creates a cloud of thousands of new fragments. Each of these new fragments increases the probability of further collisions. This cascading effect is famously known as the Kessler Syndrome, a scenario where certain orbits become so dense with debris that they are rendered unusable for decades, effectively creating a blockade to space.

This is a classic “tragedy of the commons” problem. The orbital environment is a shared global resource. Any single actor – a nation or a company – can pollute it with little immediate consequence to themselves, but the cumulative effect of everyone doing so threatens the resource for all. This makes it a difficult problem to solve with purely national policies, as it demands a high degree of international cooperation.

The Need for “Rules of the Road”

Currently, there is no global “air traffic controller” for space. The system is managed by a patchwork of national and military organizations that track objects and occasionally share data.

It’s helpful to distinguish between two key concepts:

• Space Situational Awareness (SSA): This is the act of “seeing.” It involves using ground-based radar and optical telescopes, as well as space-based sensors, to find, track, and catalog objects in orbit. You can’t avoid what you can’t see.
• Space Traffic Management (STM): This is the act of “doing.” It involves using SSA data to create actionable “rules of the road” and coordinate satellite operators to prevent collisions. This includes setting standards for data sharing, coordinating maneuvers, and managing the active “flew” of satellites.

The primary source of public SSA data has historically been the U.S. Space Command, which maintains a public catalog of objects larger than a softball. While this service is invaluable, it’s no longer sufficient. The catalog is incomplete, its data can have delays, and it was designed for a Cold War-era military mission, not for managing tens of thousands of active commercial satellites.

Private companies like LeoLabs and COMSPOC have entered the market, building their own sensor networks to provide high-fidelity, paid SSA data. This privatization of data creates a new policy challenge: who is the authoritative source? Should safety data be a public good or a private commodity?

Policy Levers and Best Practices

Policymakers have several tools to address the debris and traffic management problem, ranging from domestic rules to international diplomacy.

Domestic Regulation: This is the most direct lever. National governments can set licensing conditions for any satellite operator under their jurisdiction. These “rules of the book” are a nation’s primary tool for promoting responsible behavior. Best practices include:

• Mandatory Debris Mitigation: Requiring all new satellites to be able to safely deorbit at the end of their useful life. The international standard has long been the “25-year rule” (deorbiting within 25 years), but this is now widely seen as insufficient for LEO. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has moved to a 5-year rule for new LEO satellites, a best-practice policy other nations are examining.
• Collision Avoidance Capability: Mandating that all satellites above a certain size have propulsion systems, allowing them to maneuver out of the way of potential collisions.
• Indemnity and Insurance: Requiring operators to carry insurance or post bonds to cover potential damages, though the Liability Convention ultimately holds the launching state responsible.

International Cooperation: No nation can solve this alone. Debris created by one country threatens satellites from all countries. The primary venue for these discussions is the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). While progress there is slow and consensus-based, it has produced foundational debris mitigation guidelines. A more agile approach involves “like-minded” nations forming groups to establish best practices and norms of behavior, which can then be presented to the wider international community.

Data Sharing: A global STM system requires a global, trusted, and transparent data-sharing platform. Policymakers can support the creation of open data-sharing architectures, blending public data from military and civil agencies with verified data from commercial providers. The goal is to create a single, authoritative “common operating picture” for satellite operators so everyone is working from the same information.

Investing in Technology: Policy can also spur innovation. Governments can fund research and offer grants or contracts for companies developing Active Debris Removal (ADR) technologies – missions that can actively track, capture, and deorbit large, dangerous pieces of legacy debris. The European Space Agency (ESA) and the Japanese company Astroscale are leaders in this field.

For a policymaker, STM is an issue of long-term infrastructure protection. Failing to act is a choice that will, with near certainty, lead to the loss of valuable orbits, costing economies billions and crippling services that citizens rely on every day.

Core Policy Pillar: National Regulation and Licensing

While international treaties provide a high-level framework, the “business end” of space policy happens at the national level through regulation and licensing. Every single space mission, from a small university satellite to a massive commercial launch, must be authorized and continuously supervised by a national government. This responsibility is mandated by Article VI of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

This requirement places national regulators in a difficult position: they must balance fostering a high-speed, innovative commercial industry against their legal duty to ensure public safety, protect national security, and uphold the nation’s international obligations.

Authorizing the New Space Race

The 20th-century model of space activity was simple: government agencies did everything. The 21st-century model is a complex ecosystem of private companies – launch providers, satellite manufacturers, data analysts, and service operators.

National governments typically manage this through several distinct licensing “silos”:

1. Launch and Re-entry Licensing: This is perhaps the most high-stakes approval. It involves assessing the safety and financial responsibility of a company launching a rocket. The primary concern is public safety – ensuring the rocket doesn’t harm people or property on the ground. In the U.S., this is managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
2. Spectrum Licensing: All satellites use radiofrequency spectrum to communicate with the ground (telemetry, command, and control) or to provide services (broadband, television). This spectrum is a finite resource. A national communications regulator (like the FCC in the U.S. or Ofcom in the UK) must grant a license for these frequencies, coordinating internationally through the ITU.
3. Remote Sensing Licensing: Satellites that take pictures of Earth are subject to special scrutiny. A high-resolution image that is valuable to a farmer checking crops is also valuable to a foreign intelligence service. This creates a national security concern. Agencies (like NOAA in the U.S.) license these systems, often placing “shutter control” restrictions that allow the government to limit data collection over sensitive areas during a crisis.

The challenge for policymakers is that these licensing processes are often slow, bureaucratic, and siloed in different agencies. A company may need approvals from the FAA, FCC, and NOAA, all with different timelines and requirements. This regulatory friction can stifle innovation and drive capital to other, more nimble countries.

The “Mission Authorization” Gap

The most significant regulatory challenge today is the “mission authorization” gap. Existing licensing frameworks were designed for launch, communications, and remote sensing. They were not designed for the novel activities that are now on the horizon.

These new activities include:

• On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OOSAM): A company that plans to refuel another company’s satellite.
• Active Debris Removal (ADR): A mission to rendezvous with and capture a piece of space junk.
• Lunar Mining: A mission to extract water ice from the Moon’s south pole.
• Private Space Stations: A commercial habitat in LEO.

From a regulatory perspective, these missions raise difficult questions. What happens if a refueling mission goes wrong and damages a multi-billion dollar satellite? Who is liable? How does a government provide “continuing supervision” for a mission that is actively interacting with another nation’s space object? What “shutter control” equivalent exists for a mining operation on the Moon?

Because these activities don’t fit in the old regulatory boxes, they exist in a “grey zone.” Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty still applies – the government is still responsible – but the agencies often lack the explicit legal authority or technical expertise to provide supervision. This creates enormous uncertainty for investors and operators, who cannot get a clear “yes” or “no” from the government.

Best Practices in Licensing

Governments are now scrambling to fill this gap and modernize their existing processes. The goal is to create a regulatory environment that is “innovation-friendly” but still robust.

Policy Levers and Best Practices:

• Streamlining and “One-Stop-Shop”: Many nations are trying to create a single point of entry, or “one-stop-shop,” for space operators. This doesn’t necessarily mean a single new agency, but rather a clear, inter-agency process that shepherds an applicant through all necessary approvals. The goal is to provide clarity, predictability, and a reasonable timeline.
• Adaptive and Performance-Based Regulation: Traditional regulation is “prescriptive” – it tells a company how to achieve safety (e.g., “you must use this specific component”). This fails quickly when technology is new. A “performance-based” approach is better: it tells the company what outcome to achieve (e.g., “you must demonstrate a 99.9% probability of mission success”) and leaves it to the company to innovate on the “how,” subject to government approval.
• Filling the Authorization Gap: Policymakers must act to provide clear authority to a specific agency (or agencies) to license these novel “non-traditional” missions. In the U.S., this has been a subject of intense debate between the Department of Commerce and the Department of Transportation. A nation that provides this legal clarity first will attract a significant amount of “new space” investment.
• Inter-agency Coordination: A successful national space policy is not just for the space agency. It requires a “whole-of-government” approach. The commerce department, transport ministry, defense ministry, foreign ministry, and communications regulator must have a formal process for coordinating. This ensures that a license granted by one agency doesn’t inadvertently harm the mission of another (e.g., a communications license that interferes with military spectrum).

For policymakers, national regulation is a tool of strategic competition. A country with a clear, efficient, and forward-looking regulatory system will become a “flag of choice” for the global space industry, attracting talent, capital, and high-tech jobs.

Core Policy Pillar: International Law and Norms of Behavior

Space is an inherently global domain. What one nation does in orbit can have direct physical and economic consequences for all others. As a result, space activity has been governed by international law since its inception. However, the foundational legal framework, developed during the Cold War, is struggling to address the complexities of a multi-polar, commercially-driven, and contested space environment.

The Foundation: The Outer Space Treaty

The cornerstone of international space law is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST). This remarkable document, negotiated at the height of the Space Race, established the core principles that still govern space today. For policymakers, understanding its key articles is essential:

• Article I: The “Province of all Mankind”: Space is free for exploration and use by all states.
• Article II: Non-Appropriation: “Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” This is the single most debated article today. No one can “own” the Moon.
• Article IV: No WMDs: Prohibits placing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in orbit. It does not ban conventional weapons or ground-based weapons that target space.
• Article VI: State Responsibility: As discussed, nations are responsible for all space activities originating from their territory, whether governmental or private. This makes space companies an instrument of national policy in a way that ground-based industries are not.
• Article VII: Liability: The launching state is “internationally liable for damage” caused by its space object. This was further detailed in the 1972 Space Liability Convention.
• Article IX: “Due Regard”: States must conduct their activities with “due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States.” This is a vague, diplomatic term that is now at the center of conflicts over satellite operations.

Modern Challenges to the Treaty

The OST was brilliant, but it is a product of its time. It is silent or ambiguous on the 21st century’s most pressing issues.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons: The treaty does not explicitly ban ASATs. In recent years, China, India, Russia, and the United States have all demonstrated kinetic ASAT capabilities that destroy satellites by colliding with them. These tests are widely condemned, not just for their escalatory nature, but because they create massive, long-lived debris fields that threaten all operators.

“Grey Zone” Threats: The greater challenge comes from non-kinetic or ambiguous threats.

• Non-Kinetic: Jamming (blocking signals), spoofing (sending false signals), laser dazzling (blinding sensors), and cyber-attacks. These are hard to attribute and don’t create debris, making them a more likely “first shot” in a conflict.
• Ambiguous Operations: A satellite designed for “on-orbit servicing” (repair) has the same capabilities (robotics, rendezvous) as a satellite designed to “disable” an opponent’s asset. How can one distinguish a “repair-bot” from a “space weapon”? This ambiguity creates deep suspicion and instability.

Space Resource Utilization (SRU): The non-appropriation clause (Article II) is on a collision course with commercial reality. If a company spends billions to go to the Moon and extract water ice (to make rocket fuel), can it own and sell that ice? The U.S. and its partners argue “yes” – that Article II prevents claiming sovereignty (like planting a flag and claiming land) but does not prevent the extraction and use of resources. Others fear this is a “first-come, first-served” model that will benefit only a few space-faring nations.

Policy Levers and Best Practices

Given that a new, binding, global treaty is politically impossible in the current geopolitical climate, policymakers are pursuing a more agile, multi-pronged approach.

Leading with National Policy: The first step is often domestic. By passing national laws, a country can signal its interpretation of the treaty. The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 did just this. It explicitly granted U.S. companies the right to own and sell resources they extract, effectively planting a flag for a property-rights-based interpretation of the OST.

Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements: Instead of trying to get all ~200 UN members to agree, nations are forming smaller coalitions. The most prominent example is the Artemis Accords. Led by NASA, this is a non-binding political commitment signed by dozens of nations that sets out principles for cooperation in lunar exploration. It builds on the OST and includes provisions for transparency, interoperability, and “safety zones” (areas where one actor’s operations won’t be interfered with). It also explicitly endorses the U.S. view on space resources. It is a powerful tool for building a U.S.-led coalition.

Promoting Norms of Behavior: This is a diplomatic effort, pursued heavily at the United Nations, to establish “rules of the road” that are not (yet) legally binding. The idea is to build a consensus on what “responsible” and “irresponsible” behavior looks like.

• The ASAT Test Moratorium: The U.S. announced a unilateral moratorium on debris-generating kinetic ASAT tests and has successfully lobbied many other nations to join. This is a classic “bottom-up” norm. By getting a critical mass of nations to pledge not to do something, it politically isolates those who refuse, making the behavior taboo.
• Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs): These are simple, practical steps to reduce mistrust. They include things like pre-launch notifications, sharing orbital data more openly, and establishing “hotlines” between military space commands to de-escalate potential misunderstand.

For policymakers, the international-legal domain is about managing risk and shaping the future environment. The goal is to build a “coalition of the responsible” that can collectively establish precedents for behavior, creating a stable and predictable environment that protects national assets and encourages commercial investment.

Core Policy Pillar: Economic Development and the Space Economy

For most of the 20th century, space was a “cost center” for governments, driven by prestige and national security. Today, it is increasingly viewed as a “profit center” and a vital economic sector. The “space economy” encompasses a vast range of activities, from building and launching rockets to the “downstream” services that use satellite data to improve life on Earth.

For policymakers, fostering a domestic space economy is no longer optional. It’s a strategic imperative for job creation, technological leadership, and securing access to services that underpin the entire modern economy.

Fostering a National Space Industry

Many governments look at the success of companies like SpaceX and wonder how they can replicate it. That success was not an accident; it was the result of a deliberate, long-term policy shift by the U.S. government, primarily NASA.

The “secret” was the anchor tenancy model.

In the early 2000s, NASA faced a problem: the Space Shuttle was retiring, and it had no way to get its own astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS) without relying on Russia.

Instead of running a traditional “cost-plus” contract (where the government specifies every detail and pays for all costs plus a profit), NASA did something new. For its cargo (and later, crew) needs, it acted as a smart customer.

1. It set a high-level requirement: “We need to transport X kilograms of cargo to the ISS.”
2. It offered fixed-price, milestone-based payments to private companies (like SpaceX and Northrop Grumman) to develop their own systems.
3. It guaranteed it would be an “anchor tenant,” buying a certain number of flights.

This Commercial Crew Program (and its cargo predecessor) was a policy masterstroke. The government’s stable, long-term “anchor customer” commitment gave private investors the confidence to pour billions into these new companies. The fixed-price model forced the companies to innovate and control costs. The result was multiple, competing, domestic launch providers, a surge in innovation, and dramatically lower launch costs.

Policy Levers for Growth

The anchor tenancy model is just one tool. Policymakers have a full toolkit to stimulate their national space industries.

Procurement Reform: This is the most powerful tool. Governments are the largest single customer for space services. By changing how they buy, they can shape the entire market.

• Shifting from “Cost-Plus” to Fixed-Price: As described above, this moves risk from the taxpayer to the company, forcing efficiency and innovation.
• Buying Services, Not Hardware: Instead of “we want to buy a satellite,” the policy becomes “we want to buy secure communications bandwidth” or “we want to buy X-band radar imagery.” This allows the government to leverage private, multi-billion dollar commercial constellations without having to pay to build them, often at a fraction of the cost. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in the U.S. are now massive customers of commercial imagery from companies like Planet Labs and Maxar.
• “On-Ramps” for Small Business: Creating fast, simple procurement vehicles that allow small startups and non-traditional companies to win government contracts.

Direct Investment and Incentives:

• R&D Grants: Funding early-stage, high-risk research at universities and startups that could lead to breakthrough technologies.
• Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Co-funding the development of infrastructure, like new launch sites or test facilities, that can be shared by multiple commercial users.
• Loan Guarantees: Using the government’s credit to back-stop loans for capital-intensive projects (like building a satellite factory), reducing the risk for private lenders.
• Tax Incentives: Offering tax breaks for R&D investment, capital expenditures, or even for companies that choose to domicile in the country.

Regulatory “Sandboxes”: For truly novel ideas, a government can create a “regulatory sandbox” – a temporary, controlled environment where a company can test a new product or service with relaxed regulatory oversight, all under the watchful eye of the regulator. This allows rules to be written after the technology is understood, not before it’s even born.

Building the “Downstream” Market

The most significant economic value of space is not in the rockets or satellites (the “upstream” market). It’s in the data and services they provide (the “downstream” market). A successful space economy policy focuses on stimulating demand for this data.

Earth Observation (EO): Satellites provide unparalleled data for:

• Climate Change: Monitoring ice melt, deforestation, and sea-level rise.
• Agriculture: Precision farming (data on soil moisture, crop health).
• Insurance: Assessing damage after a natural disaster.
• Finance: Monitoring activity at ports or oil storage facilities.
• Policy: A government can create programs that give its own agencies (e.g., agriculture, environment, infrastructure) vouchers to “buy” data from domestic EO companies, simultaneously solving a public need and stimulating the private market.

Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT): The global economy runs on GPS or equivalent systems (Galileo in Europe, GLONASS in Russia, BeiDou in China). PNT signals are built into every cell phone, power grid, banking transaction, and shipping network. This economic reliance also creates a vulnerability. Policy here involves ensuring the resilience of PNT services, which can include funding terrestrial backups (like eLoran) or encouraging commercial “PNT-as-a-service” from LEO constellations.

Satellite Communications: LEO mega-constellations like Starlink and OneWeb are transforming global connectivity. For policymakers, this is a tool for closing the “digital divide,” providing high-speed internet to rural, remote, and Indigenous communities. It’s also a resilience tool, as these networks can be instantly deployed to disaster zones when ground infrastructure is down.

A national space economy policy is, at its heart, a national industrial and infrastructure policy. It requires a long-term vision that coordinates regulation, procurement, and direct investment to build a self-sustaining ecosystem of high-tech companies that can compete globally.

Core Policy Pillar: National Security and Defense in Space

For decades, space was a “benign” environment, used by militaries from space to support operations on Earth. Satellites provided communications, weather data, reconnaissance (ISR), and precision navigation. This reliance has become a significant vulnerability.

Today, space is recognized as a warfighting domain in its own right, just like land, sea, air, and cyber. Potential adversaries are not just using space; they are developing sophisticated weapons to deny others the use of space in a conflict. This shift from a supportive to a contested domain is the most significant change in security policy in decades.

Space as a Warfighting Domain

The modern military is completely dependent on space. Without it, there are no:

• Precision Weapons: GPS-guided bombs and missiles.
• Global ISR: Over-the-horizon reconnaissance and “eyes-on” targets.
• Global Communications: Connecting commanders to deployed forces, including drones.
• Missile Warning: Space-based infrared sensors are the first and only way to detect a ballistic missile launch.

An adversary knows that the most efficient way to disable a modern military is not to attack it on the ground, but to “blind” it from space. This makes national space assets a tempting, high-value “Day One” target in any major conflict. This reality has led to the creation of new military branches focused entirely on this domain, such as the U.S. Space Force.

Threats to Space Assets

The threats are no longer theoretical. They are being actively developed and, in some cases, deployed. Policymakers must understand the full spectrum of threats, from the obvious to the insidious.

Kinetic Threats:

• Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Missiles: Ground-launched missiles that physically collide with and destroy a satellite. As discussed, these are politically toxic because of the massive debris fields they create, but they are a proven capability.
• Co-Orbital ASATs: A “stalker” satellite that is launched into a similar orbit as its target. It can then approach and either collide with the target or use a robotic arm or projectile to disable it. This is a very “deniable” form of attack.

Non-Kinetic Threats: These are far more likely to be used because they are difficult to attribute and their effects can be temporary and reversible, lowering the risk of escalation.

• Jamming and Spoofing: Overpowering a satellite’s signal with “noise” (jamming) or feeding it a false signal (spoofing) to make a drone, ship, or GPS receiver think it’s somewhere else. This is already common in conflict zones.
• Laser Dazzling: Pointing a ground-based laser at a satellite’s optical sensors (e.g., a spy satellite) to “dazzle” or permanently blind it.
• Cyber-Attacks: This is a major vulnerability. An attacker could target the ground station, hacking the control system to send a “suicide” command to the satellite (e.g., firing its thrusters until it runs out of fuel) or to intercept the data it’s collecting.

“Dual-Use” Technologies: This is the policy “grey zone.” The same robotic arm used for peaceful on-orbit servicing can be used to tear a solar panel off a rival’s satellite. The same satellite that can refuel an ally can “inspect” an adversary’s satellite up close, learning its capabilities. This makes “intent” the only difference between a tool and a weapon, which is a nightmare for diplomacy and deterrence.

Policy Responses and Strategy

A national space defense policy is no longer about building a few “exquisite,” expensive, and undefended “battleships” in orbit. The new strategy is about resilience, deterrence, and allied cooperation.

Resilience: “We Can Take a Punch”: The goal is to design a space architecture that can continue to provide services even when under attack. This is known as Disaggregated and Proliferated Architecture.

• Old Model: One or two “exquisite” multi-billion dollar satellites. If you lose one, you lose the entire capability (e.g., all missile warning for a region).
• New Model: A “proliferated” constellation of dozens or hundreds of smaller, cheaper, and simpler satellites. If an adversary takes out one, or even ten, the constellation as a whole can absorb the loss and “heal,” with other satellites picking up the slack. This makes the system an unattractive target because the cost to the attacker (in missiles) is higher than the damage inflicted.

Deterrence: “Don’t Even Think About It”: How do you deter an attack in space?

• Deterrence by Resilience: The proliferated architecture is a form of deterrence. It signals to an adversary that an attack would be costly and ultimately ineffective.
• Deterrence by Punishment: This is classic deterrence: “If you attack our assets, we will respond at a time and place of our choosing.” This requires attribution – the ability to know who attacked, how, and what was damaged. This is why SSA (Space Situational Awareness) is a top national security priority.
• Norms of Behavior: As discussed, this is a diplomatic form of deterrence. By publicly calling out irresponsible behavior (like debris-generating tests) and building coalitions to condemn it, policymakers can attach a high political cost to such actions.

Allied and Commercial Cooperation:

• “Combined Space Operations”: No democratic nation can afford to build a resilient architecture alone. The new model involves “plug-and-play” systems where allies share data and “host payloads” on each other’s satellites. A nation’s security is enhanced by being part of a larger, interconnected, allied network.
• Leveraging the Commercial Sector: This is the most significant shift. Defense agencies are now among the biggest customers of commercial space. Why build your own expensive global communications constellation when you can securely lease bandwidth from a commercial one? Why build your own imagery satellite when you can get 24/7 imagery from a commercial provider like Planet Labs? This “Commercial Augmentation” model allows the military to benefit from private-sector innovation, save money, and add to its resilience (e.g., hiding its signals within a massive commercial network).

For policymakers, the security landscape has changed. The key is to shift resources and thinking from the old model (a few exquisite, vulnerable “golden eggs”) to the new (a resilient, multi-layered, and commercially-integrated “web” of assets).

Core Policy Pillar: Spectrum and Orbital Slot Allocation

Among the most contentious and economically vital resources in space are the ones that are completely invisible: radiofrequency (RF) spectrum and geostationary orbital slots. These are finite natural resources. The competition for them is a high-stakes battle that pits nations and corporations against each other in a complex, multilateral arena.

For policymakers, managing these resources is a balancing act between national needs, commercial demands, and the physics-based rules of international coordination.

The Invisible, Finite Resources

Radiofrequency (RF) Spectrum: This is the range of electromagnetic frequencies used to transmit information wirelessly. It’s not just for space; it’s the same “stuff” used by your Wi-Fi, your cell phone, and your local TV broadcaster. Specific “bands” of spectrum are uniquely suited for space communications, as they can pass through Earth’s atmosphere with little interference.

Because spectrum is a shared resource, any two operators using the same frequency in the same area will interfere with each other. This is why it must be meticulously managed.

Geostationary Orbit (GEO): This is a specific orbital “ring” 35,786 kilometers (about 22,236 miles) directly above the Earth’s equator. An object in this orbit moves at the exact same speed as the Earth’s rotation. From the ground, a GEO satellite appears “parked” in a fixed spot in the sky.

This “parking spot” is invaluable for:

• Broadcasting: A TV provider can point a single satellite at a whole continent, and users on the ground can use a simple, fixed satellite dish.
• Weather Monitoring: NOAA’s GOES satellites stare at the same hemisphere 24/7, providing constant weather updates.
• Military Communications: Secure, high-bandwidth “bent pipes” for command and control.

Because these “orbital slots” are highly desirable, they are a finite commodity.

The Governance Challenge

The global coordination of these two resources is the job of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the United Nations based in Geneva. The ITU’s mission is not to grant rights, but to record them and prevent “harmful interference.”

The process works roughly like this:

1. A nation (on behalf of a company or agency) “files” its intention to use a certain frequency or orbital slot with the ITU.
2. The ITU publishes this filing, and other nations have a chance to object if it would interfere with their existing, registered systems.
3. If there are no objections, the filing is recorded in the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR). This gives it “priority” status.

This “first-come, first-served” system creates enormous geopolitical friction:

• “Paper Satellites”: Some nations file for thousands of orbital slots and spectrum bands they have no intention or capability of actually using. They do this to “warehouse” the resource, either to block rivals or to “lease” the slot to another country later.
• The Developing World’s Dilemma: Developing nations argue that by the time they have the economic and technical ability to launch their own satellites, all the “good” slots and frequencies will have been “parked on” by developed nations. They advocate for a more equitable “a priori” system where every nation is guaranteed a slot, regardless of present capability.
• The WRC Battles: Every four years, the ITU holds a World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC). This is a month-long, marathon negotiating session where the world’s governments battle, line by line, over the ITU Radio Regulations – the 2,000-page rulebook that governs spectrum use. This is where national economic and security interests collide directly. A nation’s delegation (often hundreds of engineers, lawyers, and diplomats) will fight to get new spectrum allocated for 5G, for satellite broadband, or for military radar.

Policy Best Practices

A nation’s success in this domain depends on a strong, coordinated national policy.

Domestic Allocation: Before a nation can even go to the ITU, it must have a clear plan for its own national spectrum. How does it decide between a mobile phone company, a TV broadcaster, or a new satellite startup?

• Auctions: Many governments (like the FCC) auction off exclusive licenses to the highest bidder. This is efficient and generates revenue but can price out new, innovative services.
• “Beauty Contests”: Regulators can grant licenses based on which applicant promises the greatest “public good,” though this can be subjective.
• Shared Use: The modern approach is to find ways for multiple users to “share” spectrum dynamically using smart radios and databases.

The LEO Mega-Constellation Challenge: The ITU’s rules were designed for a few large GEO satellites. They are breaking down in the LEO era. Mega-constellations like Starlink and OneWeb involve thousands of satellites, none of which stay in one “slot.” They create a new problem: aggregate interference. A single LEO satellite isn’t a problem, but 40,000 of them operating on the same frequencies can create a “noise floor” that drowns out other services, including sensitive radio astronomy.

The ITU is now struggling to write new rules for this new reality, balancing the immense public good of global broadband against the need to protect incumbent services.

Policy Levers:

• A Strong National Regulator: A country needs a technically competent, well-funded, and empowered national regulator (like the FCC) that can manage domestic spectrum and lead its WRC delegation.
• A “Whole-of-Government” WRC Strategy: A successful WRC delegation is not just the regulator. It involves the Ministry of Commerce (for 5G), the Ministry of Defence (for radar bands), the Space Agency (for science bands), and the Foreign Ministry (for diplomatic support). These actors must have a unified national position years in advance.
• Fighting “Paper Satellites”: Policymakers can support ITU reforms that impose stricter “milestone” (use-it-or-lose-it) requirements, forcing nations to prove they are actually building the satellite they filed for.

For policymakers, spectrum and orbital policy is an invisible but high-stakes economic and strategic game. Success means securing the “invisible infrastructure” that national industries need to compete. Failure means being “boxed out” of the digital future.

Core Policy Pillar: Emerging Frontiers

The final set of policy challenges relates to activities that are just now moving from science fiction to engineering reality. These “emerging frontiers” force policymakers to grapple with the most fundamental questions of all: who gets to own resources in space? What is the legal framework for a permanent lunar base? How do we manage industrial activity in orbit?

Nations that develop clear, forward-thinking policies for these activities will establish the precedents that define the 21st-century space environment.

On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OOSAM)

OOSAM (sometimes shortened to OSAM) refers to a broad category of “in-space” activities:

• Servicing: Refueling, inspecting, or repairing existing satellites. This could extend the life of a billion-dollar national asset.
• Assembly: Building large structures in orbit (like a space station or interplanetary-mission-vehicle) that would be too big to launch on a single rocket.
• Manufacturing: Using the unique properties of space (like microgravity and vacuum) to manufacture materials (e.g., fiber optics, ZBLAN) or medical products (e.g., 3D-bioprinted organs) that are impossible to make on Earth.

Policy Implications:

• The “Mission Authorization” Gap: As discussed, this is the prime example of an activity that traditional licensing bodies are not equipped to handle.
• Liability: What happens if a “servicer” robot from Company A accidentally damages a satellite owned by Company B (and launched by Nation C)? The Liability Convention is unclear on these complex, multi-party scenarios.
• The “Dual-Use” Problem: The same robotic arm that can repair a satellite can disable one. This makes OOSAM technology highly sensitive from a national security perspective, creating friction between a commerce-led desire for innovation and a defense-led desire for secrecy and control.

Best Practices: A policy best practice is to invest in standards. Governments, in partnership with industry, can develop technical standards for “cooperative” satellites (e.g., standard grappling fixtures, common refueling ports). By making its own national satellites “serviceable,” a government can create a stable “anchor” market for a domestic servicing industry, just as NASA did for launch.

Space Resource Utilization (SRU)

This is arguably the most legally contentious and economically significant emerging issue. SRU refers to the extraction and use of off-world resources, starting with the Moon.

The most valuable resource on the Moon is not a precious metal; it’s water ice. This ice, found in permanently-shadowed craters at the lunar poles, can be mined and “cracked” (using electrolysis) into its component parts: liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. These are the two primary ingredients in high-performance rocket fuel.

The vision is not to bring this back to Earth. The vision is to create an in-space “gas station.” A satellite launching from Earth could use a smaller rocket to get to LEO, then “top up” its tank with lunar-derived propellant to travel to GEO or Mars. This would revolutionize space logistics.

The Legal Question: As mentioned, this runs straight into Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: “non-appropriation.”

• The U.S./Artemis View: The U.S. and its Artemis Accords partners (including Canada, Japan, Australia, and many European nations) have advanced the interpretation that “non-appropriation” applies to claims of sovereignty (territory), not to the extraction and use of resources. They compare it to fishing on the high seas: no one owns the ocean, but a fishing boat can catch fish and own them.
• The Counter-View: Nations like Russia and China (who are not part of the Accords) have expressed concern that this is a unilateral, U.S.-led interpretation of the treaty. Other nations, particularly in the developing world, look to the failed 1979 Moon Agreement (which did try to establish a “common heritage of mankind” regime, where resources would be shared) as a more equitable model, even though no major space-faring nation ever ratified it.

Policy Levers:

• National Legislation: The first step, taken by the U.S. (Space Act 2015), Luxembourg, and Japan, is to pass a national law confirming that private companies have the right to the resources they extract. This provides the legal certainty needed to attract private investment.
• The “Artemis Accords” Model: This is the primary diplomatic tool. By signing the Accords, a nation aligns itself with this legal interpretation and a U.S.-led framework for lunar operations.
• Bilateral Negotiations: The next step will be to negotiate “bi-lateral recognition” of these property rights (e.g., Nation A agrees to recognize the resource rights of Nation B’s company, and vice-versa), creating a “bubble” of law that investors can trust.

Lunar Governance

Beyond mining, the simple act of being on the Moon creates policy challenges. The Artemis Accords attempt to solve these by proposing:

• “Safety Zones”: This is a key concept. A nation (or company) planning a lunar mission could announce a “safety zone” around its operations. This is not a claim of territory (which Article II forbids). It is a “keep-out” zone to prevent “harmful interference” (which Article IX requires). For example, “We are landing here; to prevent our lander from being sprayed with rocket exhaust and dust, please land at least 2 kilometers away.”
• Heritage Sites: The Accords also call for the protection of sites of human heritage, such as the Apollo program landing sites, preserving them from future disturbance.

This “safety zone” concept is a pragmatic attempt to solve the land-use problem without violating the “non-appropriation” treaty. How these zones are negotiated, respected, and enforced by rival powers (like the U.S. and the joint Sino-Russian lunar effort) will be a major test of space diplomacy in the coming decade.

For policymakers, these emerging frontiers represent a “constitutional moment” in space. The policies, laws, and norms established in the next 10-15 years will set the precedents for how humanity operates off-world for the next century.

Summary

The domain of space policy has evolved from a niche, technical subject into a core component of national economic, security, and industrial strategy. The challenges are significant and interconnected.

The orbital “commons” is being threatened by space debris, demanding a solution for Space Traffic Management that blends domestic regulation, international diplomacy, and new data-sharing models.

The speed of commercial innovation is out-pacing 20th-century National Regulation, forcing governments to streamline their licensing processes and close the “mission authorization” gap for novel activities like debris removal and satellite servicing.

The foundational International Law of the Outer Space Treaty is being tested by ASAT weapons, “grey zone” threats, and the prospect of lunar mining. In response, nations are turning to more agile diplomatic tools like the Artemis Accords and the promotion of behavioral norms.

Governments are no longer just participants in space; they are shapers of a new Space Economy. Through smart procurement, “anchor tenancy,” and downstream data utilization, policy can be used to foster a vibrant, self-sustaining national industry.

This new economy exists in a Contested Domain. National Security policy is rapidly shifting from a few “exquisite” assets to a new model of resilience, based on proliferated commercial-hybrid constellations and strong allied partnerships.

Underpinning all of this is a fierce, “invisible” competition for Spectrum and Orbital Slots, where success is determined in the technical negotiating rooms of the ITU.

Finally, Emerging Frontiers like lunar mining and on-orbit manufacturing are forcing a “constitutional” debate on resource rights and off-world governance.

For the modern policymaker, a “whole-of-government” approach is the only viable path. Space is no longer a separate portfolio; it is an integrated layer of modern power and prosperity, touching everything from agriculture to banking to national defense. The nations that act decisively and intelligently to shape the rules of this new domain will secure their interests and lead the 21st century.