Can the Department of Defense Make Better Use of Commercial Space Data?

Key Takeaways

• The Pentagon buys commercial space data, but access barriers limit operational use.
• Licensing, fragmented procurement, and weak user awareness reduce value from existing purchases.
• Shared contracts and clearer data rights could turn commercial information into routine capability.

A $76.8 Million Marketplace Reveals an Adoption Problem

Between January 27, 2023, and September 30, 2025, the U.S. Space Force’s Joint Commercial Operations Cell spent $76.8 million through the Global Data Marketplace. Those purchases supplied unclassified commercial information and analytic services for missions such as tracking objects in orbit, locating radio-frequency interference, monitoring threats to navigation signals, and supporting military commands during discrete events.

The figure comes from an August 27, 2026, Government Accountability Office review of how the Department of Defense purchases and uses commercial space data. GAO examined activity by the Joint Commercial Operations Cell, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from fiscal years 2021 through 2025.

The audit found a problem that reaches beyond spending. Some defense personnel remained hesitant to use commercial information because of licensing costs, perceived restrictions, uncertainty about long-term access, and limited awareness of data that other government organizations had already purchased. The department could acquire an image or analytic product without ensuring that every authorized user knew it existed, understood its license, or could retrieve it.

This is a different problem from a shortage of satellites. Commercial operators collect optical imagery, synthetic aperture radar observations, radio-frequency detections, hyperspectral measurements, and information about objects in orbit. Service companies convert those inputs into maps, alerts, reports, behavioral assessments, and three-dimensional visualizations. In many cases, the supply already exists.

The missing element is institutional adoption. A military user who cannot identify an applicable contract, locate the data, interpret the usage rights, or trust continued availability may return to a familiar government system. That decision can occur even when the commercial product is faster, easier to share, or already paid for.

The distinction between acquisition and use carries economic implications. Government contracts can provide revenue to satellite operators and analytics companies, but sustained market development requires recurring operational demand. A company cannot plan a constellation or maintain an analytic workforce from occasional pilot projects whose users never incorporate the output into normal procedures.

GAO issued one recommendation. It called on the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that the Space Force informs current and potential users about the Cross-Government Commercial Data Sharing Working Group and explains how they can access commercial data and services purchased by government organizations. The Department of Defense agreed and said it planned to work through contracting officers and publish more access information.

The recommendation appears modest compared with the scale of national security space procurement. Its importance lies in what it reveals: the Pentagon’s commercial-space problem is partly organizational. More spending will not resolve a system in which users cannot find or confidently employ what has already been bought.

What the Government Is Buying From Commercial Providers

Commercial space data includes information gathered by privately operated satellites and ground-based sensors. Electro-optical satellites record reflected visible or infrared light. Synthetic aperture radar systems transmit radio waves and measure their return, permitting observations at night and through clouds. Radio-frequency sensors detect and locate emissions. Hyperspectral instruments separate reflected energy into numerous wavelength bands that can help identify materials or environmental conditions.

Ground-based radars and telescopes contribute another category. They observe satellites, rocket bodies, debris, and other objects in orbit. Their measurements support space domain awareness, which gives military operators information about an object’s location, motion, behavior, and possible threat.

Commercial services add interpretation. A defense organization may purchase a processed map, vessel-detection alert, interference-location estimate, change analysis, tactical report, or visualization rather than raw sensor files. The value comes from converting observations into information that can support a decision within an operational deadline.

GAO confined its review to commercial space data and associated analytic services. It excluded satellite communications, launch services, commercial spacecraft hardware, academic data funded by government, integration contracts, and in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing. That boundary prevented the audit from becoming a survey of every commercial space purchase made by the department.

Three organizations formed the center of the review. The Joint Commercial Operations Cell, or JCO, buys unclassified information for Space Force missions and combatant-command requests. The National Reconnaissance Office, or NRO, serves as the principal acquirer of commercial imagery for the Department of Defense and intelligence community. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or NGA, purchases commercial geospatial analytic products and distributes intelligence derived from imagery and location-based information.

Their roles follow a rough chain. NRO acquires much of the imagery. NGA buys or produces analytic products that place imagery inside geographic and intelligence frameworks. JCO acquires data and services for operational missions through mechanisms designed to respond more quickly to specific demands.

That separation reflects expertise, security responsibilities, and established authorities. It can also produce fragmented buying. Two organizations may seek comparable data under different contracts, negotiate different rights, or remain unaware that another agency already possesses a useful product.

The commercial satellite market no longer consists mainly of spacecraft manufacturers selling hardware. Operators increasingly sell recurring access to imagery, measurements, application programming interfaces, alerts, and analytic outputs. Defense procurement must account for this service-based model because the government may never own the satellite or the underlying data outright.

The contractual question becomes more complicated than whether a product was delivered. Buyers must determine how long the government can retain the information, which organizations may view it, whether allied personnel may receive it, whether analysts can modify it, and whether machine systems may combine it with other datasets. Each right can affect price.

Commercial space data therefore occupies an unusual position. It resembles intelligence because it can reveal activities on Earth or in orbit. It resembles software because access may depend on subscriptions and user permissions. It resembles a commercial service because the provider continues operating the collection system. Procurement rules designed for delivered hardware do not always map cleanly onto that arrangement.

NRO and NGA Purchases Show a Maturing Market

NRO reported that its commercial imagery purchases included electro-optical products from Vantor, Planet Labs, and BlackSky under the Electro-Optical Commercial Layer contract. Awarded in fiscal year 2022, the arrangement carries a potential value of $4 billion over a five-year base period and five one-year options.

The suppliers do not provide identical capability. One can offer frequent returns over selected locations. Another can collect imagery across broad portions of Earth each day. Higher-resolution systems can reveal detailed features, and more frequently revisiting constellations can document changes over shorter intervals.

NRO told GAO that its annual available funding for current commercial electro-optical imagery averaged between $200 million and $300 million from fiscal years 2021 through 2025. The highest annual amount reached $438 million. Funding for legacy electro-optical imagery averaged between $100 million and $200 million, reaching a high of $354 million.

Emerging capabilities received smaller allocations. Radar funding averaged between zero and $50 million annually and reached a high of $119 million. Radio-frequency data averaged between zero and $20 million and reached $55 million at its highest point. Hyperspectral and other electro-optical categories each remained within an annual average range of zero to $2 million.

These figures describe available funding rather than complete public spending totals. NRO’s annual budget and obligations remain classified, and the agency supplied rounded information that could be released publicly. The ranges still show how commercial electro-optical imagery has moved beyond experimental procurement into a recurring intelligence input.

NRO uses commercial images for baseline collection, nighttime observation, global monitoring, and imaging objects in space. Commercial systems can address routine or high-volume requirements, leaving government-owned spacecraft available for sensitive targets and missions that require protected capabilities.

The agency has also tested emerging commercial offerings in radar, radio-frequency detection, hyperspectral sensing, thermal infrared observation, and other optical categories. Evaluation contracts allow the government to compare advertised performance with mission needs before committing to larger acquisitions.

NGA occupies the analytic side of the market. GAO found that the agency purchased foundation products, economic indicators, other data analysis, and emerging analytic technologies. Foundation products combine information about terrain, elevation, transportation, maritime features, and aeronautical conditions to support intelligence work.

NGA reported annual average obligations of $25 million to $50 million for commercial foundation products during fiscal years 2021 through 2025. Its highest annual obligation for that category fell between $50 million and $75 million. Economic indicators and other analytic categories each remained within annual average ranges of zero to $25 million.

One example involves oil storage. A commercial provider can analyze satellite observations to estimate percentage changes in storage levels. NGA can combine that product with other information to estimate volumes and assess energy conditions. The purchased output is no longer an image alone. It is an economic-intelligence input derived through processing and domain expertise.

This movement from pixels to decisions explains the growth of value-added space services. Companies compete through speed, analytic quality, interfaces, customer support, automated detection, and the ability to integrate observations from several sensor types. Satellite ownership remains relevant, but much of the customer value appears after collection.

The Global Data Marketplace Connects Buyers With Small Firms

The Global Data Marketplace, or GDM, gives government customers a digital route for requesting and purchasing commercial data and services. The General Services Administration awarded the underlying contract, and Bluestaq operates the marketplace. JCO uses it for numerous purchases below the simplified acquisition threshold, which stood at $250,000 during GAO’s review.

A customer identifies a need, supplies funding information, and works with contracting officials to define requirements. Vendors can respond to a request for proposals through the marketplace. The government then reviews the submissions, documents its selection, and determines whether the proposed price is fair and reasonable.

Some tactical surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking services can be purchased under preapproved pricing limits. That arrangement allows a command to request support for a developing event without completing a lengthy pricing analysis each time. Speed matters because commercial observations can lose operational value within hours.

After a purchase, data and services can move through the Unified Data Library, a cloud-based repository developed to bring together commercial, government, academic, and international information. Access controls restrict commercially acquired material to users and groups authorized under the negotiated license.

GDM originated through the Small Business Innovation Research program. The marketplace can give newer suppliers a channel into government procurement without requiring each company to establish a separate contract vehicle. It can also give defense users access to providers that collect specialized data or supply focused analytic services.

GAO’s review found that JCO and other organizations spent $76.8 million through GDM between January 2023 and September 2025. JCO accounted for most of that activity. Purchases served space domain awareness and tactical surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking, together with monitoring of navigation interference and satellite-communications conditions.

The marketplace addresses one commercial barrier but leaves others intact. A digital purchasing system can connect buyers and sellers, yet it cannot by itself settle data-rights questions, maintain program funding, train users, or ensure that products are integrated into military workflows.

A small purchase may answer a single operational request without creating repeat demand. The provider receives revenue, but military personnel may never receive enough training to incorporate the service into exercises or plans. If access expires after the event, analysts may lack historical information needed for comparison.

Marketplaces can also fragment demand when customers buy isolated datasets with different terms. One office may negotiate permission to share information with allies, and another may acquire similar material under a narrower license. A third office may assume that both products are restricted and decline to use either.

The next stage of GDM development should treat the marketplace as part of a broader data-management structure. Product listings need clear license summaries. Users need searchable records of existing government purchases. Contracting officers need reusable terms for common missions. Program managers need evidence showing which products reached operators and influenced decisions.

As of April 2026, the General Services Administration planned a 12-month extension of the existing contract through July 31, 2027. GSA and JCO were also developing a follow-on Small Business Innovation Research Phase III contract. The Unified Data Library was expected to become a separate Space Systems Command effort. Those transitions create an opening to correct access and coordination problems before they carry into the next contractual structure.

Licensing Determines Whether Purchased Data Can Be Used

A commercial license defines what a customer may do with data. It can limit the number of users, permitted organizations, geographic areas, storage period, derivative products, redistribution, publication, automated processing, and release to allies. These terms protect the provider’s business model and help prevent unrestricted resale.

Defense operations place unusual demands on such agreements. An image purchased by one Space Force office may need to reach U.S. Space Command, an intelligence agency, a combatant command, another military service, a federal civilian agency, or an allied government. Contractors may assist with analysis, and automated systems may combine the image with government data.

A license designed for one organization can become an operational barrier when a mission involves many participants. Users may hesitate if they cannot determine whether a proposed use is authorized. Their concern can be justified, yet GAO found that some reported restrictions reflected perception rather than confirmed contractual limits.

That distinction matters. A restrictive license can require renegotiation or a different purchase. An incorrectly assumed restriction can be addressed through legal guidance, training, or a plain-language summary. Treating both situations as the same problem can lead the government to buy additional access it already holds.

Licensing costs also influence behavior. Broader government-purpose rights generally cost more because they reduce a supplier’s ability to charge each agency or user separately. Unlimited retention and allied sharing can add further expense. The government must decide when broad rights justify the price and when a mission-specific license provides adequate access.

Buying the least expensive license can create later costs. A narrow agreement may save money at purchase but prevent redistribution during an emergency. Another agency may then buy the same information again, or operators may wait for a government-owned sensor. Conversely, buying expansive rights for data with limited use can waste funds and weaken commercial incentives.

A mature buying strategy would connect rights to expected use. Products intended for enterprise distribution need broad terms from the outset. Experimental acquisitions can carry narrower rights, provided users understand the limitation. Time-sensitive tactical purchases need prearranged rules for sharing across commands and, where appropriate, coalition partners.

Commercial imagery offers a military benefit because it is generally unclassified. Authorized officials can often share it more readily than information collected by protected national systems. That advantage disappears when contractual uncertainty creates a different barrier.

The problem becomes sharper during coalition operations. Allies may need a common picture, but a license can restrict foreign access or require provider approval. Negotiating those permissions during a crisis reduces the speed that made the commercial source attractive.

The growth of dual-use space technologies adds another complication. The same radar image can support disaster response, maritime enforcement, insurance analysis, and military reconnaissance. Providers must balance commercial availability against export rules, national-security obligations, contractual commitments, and customer trust.

Standard license categories could reduce confusion. The Department of Defense could establish reusable definitions for single-office access, department-wide use, federal sharing, allied sharing, archival retention, machine processing, and public release. Vendors could price each category, and users could see the applicable rights without interpreting lengthy contract language during operations.

The Working Group Exists but Remains Poorly Known

Since 2024, JCO has led the Cross-Government Commercial Data Sharing Working Group. Participants include the Space Force, U.S. Space Command, Department of the Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Department of Commerce, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity.

The group meets monthly to discuss present and planned commercial data purchases. Its activities include coordinating acquisitions, considering shared costs, and seeking broader rights for selected products. It has no formal memorandum of understanding, according to GAO.

The arrangement gives agencies a venue for comparing requirements before making separate purchases. One organization may discover that another already holds suitable data. Several agencies may combine funds to acquire broader access. Contracting specialists can explain available purchasing routes, and legal personnel can clarify rights.

GAO found that many concerns reported by Space Force officials could have been addressed through these discussions. Yet some of those officials did not participate in the working group, and information about the group was not widely available.

The finding shows how administrative visibility can affect military capability. A coordination mechanism can exist, meet regularly, and include senior organizations without reaching personnel who need its help. The barrier may be an absent directory entry, unfamiliar name, unclear membership process, or weak communication through command channels.

GAO’s recommendation focuses on correcting that gap. It asks the Space Force to tell current and prospective users about the group and explain how to access products purchased by government entities. DOD agreed, stating that JCO would engage contracting officers and publish additional information.

Awareness alone will not solve every issue. A working group without documented authority may depend on personal relationships. Membership can change, institutional knowledge can leave with personnel, and recommendations may lack an accountable owner.

Formalization could provide continuity. A charter could define membership, responsibilities, security procedures, decision routes, and reporting. A maintained catalog could record product categories, purchasing organizations, access points, license summaries, retention periods, and contacts. Sensitive details could remain inside classified or controlled systems.

The group should also collect user feedback. Procurement data show what was purchased, but they do not establish whether the information arrived in time, supported a decision, or became part of an operational process. Mission users can identify latency, format, accuracy, interface, training, and licensing problems that spending reports do not reveal.

Coordination must extend beyond Washington offices. Combatant commands and operational units generate many time-sensitive needs. Their personnel require accessible contacts and procedures. A centralized group that cannot support distributed users will remain a policy forum rather than an adoption mechanism.

Commercial Data Changes the Economics of Military Space

Government-owned satellites require development, launch, ground infrastructure, operations, maintenance, and periodic replacement. They can provide protected performance and assured access, but their acquisition cycles can extend for years. Commercial services offer another model: the government buys observations or analytic output from systems financed and operated by companies.

The model can reduce the need for government ownership of every sensor. It can also provide more frequent observations because several commercial constellations may cover the same location. Commercial radar, optical, radio-frequency, weather, and space-monitoring systems can fill collection gaps or relieve pressure on national assets.

NRO told GAO that commercial electro-optical imagery allows government spacecraft to concentrate on more demanding or sensitive missions. That division of labor can make classified systems more effective without requiring commercial satellites to duplicate them.

Commercial data can also support information sharing. Unclassified images helped governments and independent analysts document military movements during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Such material can inform allies, public communications, humanitarian planning, and open-source analysis without exposing protected collection methods.

Defense demand supports the military space market through recurring purchases of imagery, analytics, monitoring, software, and ground services. Contracts give providers revenue that can fund new satellites, processing systems, and staff. Civil customers may later benefit from the expanded capacity.

Dependence introduces risks. A commercial provider serves shareholders and customers outside government. Its satellites may lack the protection of dedicated military systems. An adversary could attack, jam, deceive, or intimidate the operator. Insurance exclusions and contractual limits may affect service during conflict.

Commercial data may also be available to opposing forces. A capability once restricted to a small number of governments can enter a market open to numerous buyers. Providers can screen customers and comply with sanctions, but information may move through intermediaries or public channels.

The government must avoid assuming that commercial availability equals assured wartime access. Contracts should address service continuity, priority, cybersecurity, surge demand, personnel support, data custody, and conditions under which the provider may suspend delivery. Exercises should test those arrangements before conflict.

A related risk concerns market concentration. If defense organizations depend heavily on one operator or analytic platform, commercial procurement can reproduce the single-source weakness associated with custom government programs. Buying from several suppliers may improve resilience, but interoperability and common data formats become more important.

The economics also depend on how contracts allocate rights. If every agency buys the same image separately, commercial acquisition may cost more than expected. If the government demands unlimited rights at prices that undermine supplier revenue, companies may reduce investment. Procurement must balance public value with a viable provider market.

The role of defense spending extends beyond immediate purchases. Military contracts can influence sensor design, collection priorities, cybersecurity standards, workforce demand, and investor expectations. They can accelerate capacity, but they can also pull firms away from civil customers or make companies dependent on appropriations.

Adoption Requires Training, Integration, and Stable Funding

Commercial data becomes operational capability only when people can obtain it, understand it, and act on it. A successful purchase that ends in an unused repository represents administrative completion without mission adoption.

Training is one barrier. Military personnel may know how to request support from established intelligence channels but lack familiarity with commercial providers, GDM, or the Unified Data Library. They may not understand what radar imagery can reveal, how radio-frequency geolocation differs from optical observation, or which analytic service fits a mission.

Education should begin before an operational request. Exercises and professional courses can expose personnel to commercial products, their strengths, and their limitations. Repeated use builds confidence and gives providers feedback about military requirements.

Technical integration presents another barrier. Data may arrive in a format that local systems cannot ingest. Security controls can prevent connections between repositories. Identity-management systems may deny access to authorized users, and bandwidth limits can slow delivery to deployed locations.

Common application programming interfaces, metadata standards, and authentication methods can reduce these obstacles. The Unified Data Library offers a possible distribution hub, but a central repository must connect to the tools operators already use. Requiring personnel to leave their normal workflow and search an unfamiliar platform can suppress adoption.

Analytic integration matters as much as file transfer. Operators may receive several commercial observations that disagree because of collection time, sensor characteristics, or processing methods. Government analysts need procedures for validation, fusion, uncertainty, and comparison with protected sources.

Stable funding influences whether commands build those procedures. A one-year experiment may demonstrate technical value but leave no budget line for continuing access. Personnel will resist depending on a service that could disappear at the end of the fiscal year.

Subscription contracts can improve continuity, though they require careful demand estimates. An enterprise license may lower per-user cost when usage is broad. Usage-based pricing may fit emerging products whose demand remains uncertain. Hybrid arrangements can provide baseline access plus surge capacity.

Program offices should distinguish experimentation from operational service. Experimental purchases test whether a product can satisfy a mission. Once evidence supports adoption, the department should establish funding, performance standards, support arrangements, and accountable ownership.

GAO’s report also exposes a measurement gap. Spending records can document contracts and orders, but they reveal little about outcomes. The department needs measures such as delivery time, active users, missions supported, duplicate purchases avoided, allied-sharing events, analytic accuracy, and renewals based on demonstrated demand.

Those measures should not become burdensome reporting exercises. They should answer whether the product reached the intended user and improved the mission. Without that evidence, procurement can reward purchasing activity rather than usable capability.

A Better Commercial Data System Would Treat Information as Shared Infrastructure

The Department of Defense does not need one centralized contract for every type of commercial space information. Mission requirements differ, and specialized organizations should retain the ability to buy products suited to their responsibilities. The department does need a common framework that makes those purchases visible and usable across authorized communities.

A government-wide catalog would provide a starting point. It could identify the data category, provider, purchasing organization, geographic or orbital coverage, service period, permitted users, redistribution rights, storage rules, access route, and responsible contact. Classified values and mission details could remain protected.

License summaries should use standardized language. Users need a quick answer about whether they can share a product with another service, contractor, agency, or ally. Legal teams would still interpret unusual cases, but routine usage should not require repeated research.

The Cross-Government Commercial Data Sharing Working Group could maintain this framework. Its role should include coordinating planned purchases, identifying overlapping demand, recommending common rights, resolving access questions, and collecting operational feedback.

Contracts should support continuity during crises. Pre-negotiated terms can address priority access, surge capacity, cyber incidents, provider notification, loss of satellites, government direction, and allied distribution. Services intended for wartime use should appear in exercises under realistic conditions.

DOD should also preserve competition. Smaller companies can contribute specialized sensors, novel analytics, and responsive services, but they may struggle with complex acquisition procedures. GDM and similar mechanisms can lower entry barriers if contracting timelines, pricing reviews, security requirements, and data-delivery standards remain understandable.

Open interfaces can reduce dependence on any one supplier. The government should be able to replace or combine providers without rebuilding the entire analytic chain. Data provenance must remain visible so users know which sensor and processing method produced an output.

Security requirements should match the sensitivity of the service. Unclassified commercial data may still reveal operational interests, collection priorities, user identities, and government decision patterns. Providers need suitable cybersecurity, access control, incident reporting, and supply-chain practices.

The government must also prepare for denial or degradation. Commercial constellations can add resilience through numbers and geographic distribution, but they are not invulnerable. Alternative providers, archived data, government sensors, allied systems, and terrestrial sources should remain available.

Commercial acquisition works best as part of a hybrid architecture. Government-owned systems protect sensitive missions and offer controlled performance. Allied assets broaden coverage. Commercial providers supply volume, speed, specialized sensing, and unclassified products. Ground-based systems contribute observations and verification.

The policy objective should be dependable access to information rather than ownership of every collection platform. That change requires acquisition officers, intelligence professionals, operators, lawyers, technologists, and commercial providers to work from a common understanding of rights and mission needs.

Summary

The GAO review presents a defense organization that already purchases substantial amounts of commercial space information but does not consistently convert those purchases into operational use. The central barriers include licensing expense, assumed restrictions, concern about continued access, fragmented awareness, and limited knowledge of coordination mechanisms.

JCO’s $76.8 million in Global Data Marketplace expenditures from January 2023 through September 2025 demonstrates real demand. NRO’s commercial imagery funding and NGA’s analytic purchases show that private-sector data has entered established intelligence processes. Commercial electro-optical imagery now supports recurring collection, and radar, radio-frequency, hyperspectral, and thermal products are progressing through evaluation and adoption.

The remaining problem concerns how information moves after purchase. An image, detection, or analytic product has limited military value if authorized personnel cannot find it or determine whether they may use it. Duplicate purchases can follow. Commands may avoid commercial products and return to scarce government systems.

GAO’s recommendation directs attention to the Cross-Government Commercial Data Sharing Working Group and the methods for accessing existing purchases. Implementing that recommendation should improve awareness, but the department can go further by formalizing coordination, standardizing license categories, publishing searchable acquisition records, and measuring operational use.

Commercial data can relieve government satellites, fill coverage gaps, support faster decisions, and produce unclassified information suitable for allied sharing. It can also broaden the defense supplier base and create recurring revenue for imagery and analytics companies.

The model carries limits. Commercial providers may face interference, cyberattack, financial pressure, capacity constraints, or conflicting customer obligations. Adversaries can purchase some of the same products. Narrow licenses can obstruct coalition use, and dependence on one supplier can introduce concentration risk.

A hybrid system offers the strongest answer. Government spacecraft can handle protected missions. Commercial constellations can supply capacity, speed, and specialized observations. Allied sensors can extend geographic and technical coverage. Common data systems can connect each source to authorized users.

The next measure of progress should not be contract value alone. It should be whether personnel can discover the available information, understand its rights, receive it on time, integrate it with other sources, and use it during training and operations.

Commercial space data has already become part of U.S. national security activity. The GAO audit shows that procurement has advanced faster than institutional adoption. Closing that gap could create more military value from money already spent and provide space companies with a clearer route from demonstration contracts to recurring operational demand.