The World’s Operational ICBMs: A 2026 Assessment

Key Takeaways

• Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat has failed five tests since 2022, leaving its deployment timeline unresolved as of early 2026.
• China has loaded over 100 DF-31-class ICBMs into new silo fields, marking its fastest nuclear expansion since the Cold War.
• The U.S. Minuteman III will serve well into the 2030s after delays pushed the LGM-35A Sentinel’s IOC to the early 2030s.

The Missile That Governs All Others

A single intercontinental ballistic missile launched from an underground silo in the American plains can strike Moscow in roughly 30 minutes. That arithmetic has defined every major power’s foreign policy since the 1960s, and as of March 2026, the arithmetic has not changed. What has changed is the roster of nations holding this capability, the specific hardware each deploys, and the degree to which decades-old arms control frameworks still constrain those arsenals.

New START, the last arms control treaty capping U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warhead deployments at 1,550 each, expired on February 5, 2026, without a replacement. Neither Washington nor Moscow had negotiated a successor. The lapse did not immediately alter any missile’s status, but it removed the formal verification mechanisms that allowed both sides to monitor deployment numbers and satellite imagery alone cannot substitute for treaty-mandated data exchanges and on-site inspections. The world’s two largest nuclear forces now operate outside any agreed ceiling for the first time since 1972.

Against that backdrop, a detailed accounting of every operational ICBM force carries more than academic weight.

What Makes an ICBM

An intercontinental ballistic missile is defined by range, not warhead type or delivery platform. The accepted threshold is 5,500 kilometers, sufficient to span an ocean and strike targets on a distant continent. Most modern ICBMs actually reach 10,000 to 15,000 kilometers, enabling them to strike virtually any point on Earth depending on launch location and trajectory.

The mechanics are straightforward. A propulsion stack, burning solid or liquid propellant, accelerates the missile through the atmosphere into a suborbital arc. The warhead section, carrying one or more reentry vehicles, separates and follows a ballistic free-fall path back through the atmosphere, reaching speeds that can exceed Mach 20 on descent. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, known as MIRVs, allow a single missile to place separate warheads on geographically distinct targets, multiplying the strategic value of each launcher.

Deployment options fall into three basic categories: fixed silos hardened against nuclear blast, road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers that can move and hide across vast territories, and submarine-launched systems fired from underwater. Each approach offers different tradeoffs between readiness, survivability, and first-strike vulnerability. Many major powers maintain more than one type, and the submarine-launched systems fielded by the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom are sometimes excluded from narrow definitions of “ICBMs” because they launch from sea. This article covers all land-based ICBMs plus submarine-launched systems of intercontinental range where they serve as the primary or sole nuclear delivery mechanism, since excluding them would give a misleading picture of any nation’s deterrent posture.

The Russian Federation’s Land-Based Force

Russia operates the world’s largest ICBM force, structured around the Strategic Rocket Forces, or RVSN in the Russian abbreviation. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated in its most recent nuclear notebook that Russia deployed approximately 870 warheads on ICBMs as of early 2025, though exact numbers are now unverifiable without New START data exchanges.

RS-24 Yars

The backbone of Russia’s land-based deterrent is the RS-24 Yars, known under the NATO reporting name SS-27 Mod 2. Developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and first deployed in 2010, the Yars is a solid-fueled missile capable of operating from both road-mobile launchers mounted on large MZKT cross-country vehicles and from hardened silos. Its range sits at approximately 11,000 to 12,000 kilometers, and it carries up to four MIRVed warheads, though the number actually loaded on any given missile under New START constraints was typically lower.

Russia deployed roughly 204 Yars missiles across multiple divisions by early 2025. Regiments were still transitioning to the system in some locations, with the Kozelsk missile division in the final stages of rearmament. The Bulletin noted that as of early 2025, some silos at Kozelsk had not yet begun construction, and the completion deadline claimed by Russian defense officials for 2025 appeared uncertain.

The Yars carries significant penetration aids, including decoys and electronic countermeasures designed to defeat missile defense intercept systems. Multiple variants exist, including the Yars-S, reportedly equipped with medium-yield warheads optimized for hardened targets. Western analysts assess the Yars as technically capable of carrying six warheads under upload conditions, meaning Russia’s deployment posture conceals considerable latent capacity.

RS-12M Topol-M

The RS-12M1 and RS-12M2, both designated Topol-M and known under the NATO name SS-27 Mod 1, are single-warhead solid-fuel ICBMs that completed deployment in 2012. Sixty are silo-based with the 60th Missile Division at Tatishchevo, and 18 operate from road-mobile launchers with the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo, totaling 78 missiles. The Topol-M uses the same basic airframe lineage as the Yars and was designed to replace the older liquid-fueled Soviet systems. Its range exceeds 10,000 kilometers. With only a single warhead, it is less efficient per launcher than the Yars under modern targeting strategies, and the system is not being expanded; the Yars has superseded it as the standard.

R-36M2 Voevoda

Approximately 34 of the Soviet-era R-36M2 Voevoda missiles, designated SS-18 Mod 5 by NATO and nicknamed Satan in Western media, remain in the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky and the 62nd Missile Division at Uzhur. This silo-based, liquid-fueled missile originally entered service in 1988 and can carry up to 10 MIRVed warheads. Under New START constraints, the warhead loadings were reduced, but even in a reduced configuration each Voevoda represents a significant throw-weight.

The Voevoda is reaching the hard limits of its service life. Its design was developed by Ukraine’s Yuzhnoye bureau and manufactured at the Yuzhmash plant in Dnipropetrovsk, now Dnipro, and Russia’s maintenance relationship with Ukrainian specialists ended with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The intergovernmental maintenance agreement was formally terminated by Kyiv in January 2023. Russia has therefore been managing these missiles without Ukrainian technical support for over a decade, increasing the reliability risks with each passing year. The Voevoda was intended to be replaced by the RS-28 Sarmat, but that program’s persistent difficulties have delayed that replacement indefinitely.

UR-100N with Avangard

A small number of silo-based UR-100N UTTKh missiles, Soviet-era systems originally retired from combat duty and redesignated SS-19 Mod 4, have been converted to carry the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. The Avangard is a maneuvering boost-glide reentry vehicle capable of sustained hypersonic flight within the atmosphere, which in theory makes it far harder to intercept than a conventional ballistic reentry vehicle. Two regiments at Dombarovsky have been equipped. The UR-100N airframe is not a new missile; it provides an existing launch platform for the new glide vehicle. Russia has claimed Avangard is deployed operationally, and there is no specific evidence disputing that limited deployment has occurred, though independent verification is impossible.

RS-28 Sarmat: The Program That Won’t Fly

No single element of Russia’s nuclear modernization effort has attracted more attention, and produced more confusion, than the RS-28 Sarmat, which Russian state media and government officials have variously called operational, nearly operational, and “coming soon” at different points between 2022 and the present.

The Sarmat is an enormous liquid-fueled missile, weighing approximately 208 tonnes at launch and measuring about 35.5 meters in length, designed by the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau as a replacement for the Voevoda. Its declared range exceeds 18,000 kilometers, and its design supports a wide range of payloads including up to 10 or more MIRVed warheads, Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles, or a combination of warheads and decoys. Uniquely, the Sarmat is designed to execute fractional orbital bombardment trajectories, allowing it to approach targets from any direction including over the South Pole, complicating radar warning networks designed around North Pole approach corridors.

The program’s test record is, to put it plainly, poor. Its sole confirmed successful full-range test occurred on April 20, 2022, when a missile flew from Plesetsk Cosmodrome to the Kura test range on Kamchatka. A subsequent test in February 2023 reportedly failed. In September 2024, a test at Plesetsk ended catastrophically when the missile appears to have destroyed its own launch silo, leaving a crater approximately 60 meters in diameter visible in commercial satellite imagery. On November 28, 2025, video that circulated widely on social media and was analyzed by multiple defense research groups showed a missile veering off course, losing thrust, and crashing to the ground shortly after launch at what analysts identified as the Dombarovsky site in Orenburg Oblast. By that date the Sarmat had experienced five publicly documented failures after its one success.

In October 2025, Vladimir Putin acknowledged at a Moscow military hospital that Sarmat had not yet been deployed, directly contradicting the Roscosmos announcement from September 2023 that it had entered combat duty. Putin said it would be deployed “soon.” Days later he said it would enter “trial combat duty” before the end of 2025, with full deployment to follow in 2026. The November test failure rendered that timeline implausible. As of March 2026, Russian state media outlet Izvestia reported in January that the Sarmat was expected to complete final flight tests during 2026, ahead of formal acceptance into service. Whether that schedule will hold given the program’s history is a matter of genuine uncertainty.

The structural problem behind the Sarmat delays reflects a broader issue in Russia’s defense industry. When cooperation with Ukrainian engineers and the Yuzhmash factory ended in 2014, Russia inherited a dependency on expertise in liquid-fueled heavy ICBM design and propulsion that it had never needed to develop domestically. Rebuilding that competence from scratch while simultaneously funding a conventional war in Ukraine has proven harder and slower than the program’s original planners anticipated.

This is the most analytically defensible position on the Sarmat: the missile should not be treated as operationally deployed as of March 2026. Russia still has the R-36M2 Voevoda in silos at Dombarovsky and Uzhur. The Sarmat silos being prepared to replace them are not yet receiving operationally commissioned missiles. The gap between Russian propaganda on this point and verifiable reality is wide, and the program’s eventual deployment, if it occurs, will represent a meaningful capability addition, but the timeline remains open.

The United States

LGM-30G Minuteman III

The LGM-30G Minuteman III is America’s only operational land-based ICBM. As of March 2026, 400 missiles sit on continuous alert in hardened underground silos spread across three bases: Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, and Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Fifty additional silos are maintained in a warm reserve status, bringing the total silo count to 450.

The missile entered service in 1970. It is a three-stage, solid-fueled system with a burnout speed exceeding 15,000 miles per hour and a range above 6,000 miles. Current practice under New START was to deploy each missile with a single warhead, either a W87 or a W78, though the missile’s design accommodates up to three MIRVed reentry vehicles. Air Force Global Strike Command crews, rotating through 24-hour alert duty in hardened underground launch control centers, can execute a launch within minutes of a valid order from the National Command Authority.

The Minuteman III is, by the standards of any weapons system, ancient. First fielded 55 years ago, it has undergone successive life extensions covering propulsion, guidance, re-entry vehicles, and command and control systems. The Air Force has replaced the propellant-loaded solid-fuel motors, installed modernized inertial guidance, and upgraded communications links multiple times. A September 2025 Government Accountability Office study confirmed that Air Force officials believe the Minuteman III can be maintained in service as late as 2050, though with growing concerns about parts obsolescence in electrical subsystems including diodes, resistors, and capacitors that are aging toward or beyond their rated service limits.

On March 3, 2026, the Air Force conducted the first Minuteman III test launch of 2026, firing an unarmed missile from Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, equipped with two test reentry vehicles. Routine operational tests of this kind, known as Glory Trip evaluations, provide ongoing flight performance data and serve as visible demonstrations of the system’s continued operational validity.

LGM-35A Sentinel

The LGM-35A Sentinel is Northrop Grumman’s next-generation ICBM, intended to replace all 400 Minuteman III missiles. In February 2026, the Air Force confirmed that the Sentinel would not achieve initial operational capability until the early 2030s, with a program restructure expected to be completed by the end of 2026 and a Milestone B decision sought by that same deadline. A first test launch is planned for 2027.

The program’s cost trajectory has been steep and visible. An initial estimate of approximately $78 billion ballooned to over $125 billion as of early 2024, then rose again toward a Department of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation figure of roughly $141 billion for a “reasonably modified” configuration. A major driver was the discovery that existing Minuteman III silos, some approaching 60 years in age, could not practically be refurbished to house the Sentinel without structural challenges that would leave them near 150 years old by end of the Sentinel’s projected service life. The Air Force decided to build 450 entirely new silos instead, a choice that added cost and complexity but may ultimately prove faster since new construction can proceed without rotating alert missiles off duty.

The controversy around the program deepened in 2025 when Air Force Secretary Troy Meink disclosed to members of Congress that funds had been diverted from the Sentinel development account. The New York Times reported in July 2025 on an unexplained transfer of $934 million from the program associated with the refitting of a Qatari aircraft to serve temporarily as Air Force One. The disclosure added political scrutiny to a program already under sustained legislative oversight.

Sentinel will carry the W87-1 thermonuclear warhead, replacing the W78 currently deployed on Minuteman III. The National Nuclear Security Administration announced the completion of a first plutonium pit for the W87-1 in October 2024. The Air Force plans to procure 634 missiles total, with 400 deployed operationally and the remainder supporting testing and development. Under the restructured program, the first Sentinel base will be F.E. Warren.

UGM-133A Trident II D5

The United States Navy operates 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, each loaded with 20 UGM-133A Trident IID5 missiles for a total arsenal of 280 SLBMs. Two boats are generally in long-term refit at any given time, so approximately 240 missiles are deployed across 12 active submarines at the operational level. Nine are assigned to the Pacific Fleet based at Naval Submarine Base Kitsap in Washington state, and five to the Atlantic Fleet at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia.

The Trident II entered service in 1990 and has been subject to successive life extension programs. Its range, commonly cited at approximately 12,000 kilometers, and its stellar-inertial guidance system giving a circular error probable near 90 meters, made it the first sea-based missile in American service with accuracy comparable to land-based systems and sufficient to hold hardened targets at risk. The missile carries up to eight MIRV warheads, a mix of W76 100-kiloton and W88 475-kiloton devices.

In 2026, the U.S. and UK navies are beginning a navigation system modernization under the Increment 8 program, contracted to Lockheed Martin. The work refreshes navigation sensors and interfaces with the fire control system to maintain alignment accuracy on aging Ohio-class hulls and provide a common baseline for the eventual Columbia-class submarines that will replace the Ohios beginning in the early 2030s. A Trident D5 Life Extension configuration was validated in an at-sea test event off Florida in September 2025.

China’s Expanding Arsenal

China’s nuclear expansion between 2020 and 2026 represents the largest and fastest growth in any nation’s ICBM-capable forces since the Cold War. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has moved from a posture of minimum deterrence, historically characterized by modest numbers of missiles kept at low readiness with warheads stored separately from launchers, toward a much larger and more operationally ready force.

DF-5 Family

The Dongfeng-5, or DF-5, is China’s oldest operational ICBM, a silo-based, liquid-fueled system with a range of 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers. The original DF-5 carried a single large warhead. The DF-5A retained single-warhead configuration. The DF-5B introduced MIRV capability, reportedly carrying three to eight warheads. A newer DF-5C variant was publicly displayed at a Chinese military parade on September 3, 2025, marking the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan, and Pentagon analysis suggests China is expanding its DF-5 silo infrastructure toward approximately 50 silos, with at least 30 new silos planned to receive the DF-5C. The missile requires liquid propellant loading before launch, which takes time and makes it more vulnerable to preemptive attack than solid-fueled alternatives. China maintains it in service because of its large throw-weight capacity, which suits MIRV configurations.

DF-31 Family

The Dongfeng-31 family, known under NATO designations CSS-10 Mod 1, Mod 2, and the road-mobile DF-31AG, is a three-stage, solid-fueled ICBM with a range in excess of 11,000 kilometers. First deployed in 2006, the DF-31A and DF-31AG variants improved range and mobility. The DF-31AG uses an all-terrain wheeled launcher and dispenses with the need for prepared launch pads. Its primary warhead configuration is a single reentry vehicle, estimated at approximately 200 to 300 kilotons. Whether any DF-31 variants can carry MIRVs remains disputed among U.S. intelligence agencies, with conflicting assessments on the record.

The most significant recent development involving the DF-31 family was confirmed in a draft Pentagon report reviewed by Reuters and published in late December 2025: China had likely loaded more than 100 solid-fueled DF-31-class ICBMs into silo fields near the Mongolian border. Three silo complexes, at Yumen in Gansu province, Hami in Xinjiang, and Yulin in Shaanxi, were identified by commercial satellite imagery analysts beginning in 2021. The total silo capacity across these three fields exceeds 300 launchers. Pentagon analysts confirmed for the first time the number of loaded missiles, representing a transition from empty silos under construction to operationally significant deployed weapons.

China also conducted a remarkable demonstration in September 2024, launching a DF-31B variant from Hainan Island on a trajectory that flew approximately 11,000 kilometers before impacting near French Polynesia in the open Pacific. This was China’s first open-sea ICBM test since 1980 and demonstrated both the range and the confidence to conduct a long-range test without the restrictions of landing inside Chinese territory.

DF-41

The Dongfeng-41, NATO designation CSS-X-10, is China’s most capable road-mobile ICBM and its first land-based system confirmed with MIRV capability. Solid-fueled and capable of deployment from road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers, the DF-41 has a range estimated at 12,000 to 14,000 kilometers and can carry up to three MIRV warheads per Pentagon assessment. China publicly paraded at least two brigades of DF-41 missiles at the October 2019 national day parade, and satellite imagery has tracked continued production.

Pentagon analysis anticipates China may deploy the DF-41 in silo-based configurations at the new silo fields in addition to road-mobile operation, and may also explore rail-mobile basing. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates China currently has 276 ICBM-range warheads deployed, and if the new silo fields are fully loaded with MIRV-capable missiles the total could rise dramatically during the late 2020s.

JL-2 and JL-3

At sea, China operates six Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 12 JL-2 missiles. The JL-2, China’s first credible sea-based deterrent weapon, has a range of approximately 7,400 to 8,000 kilometers and carries a single large warhead or, in some assessments, a small number of MIRVs. China has been refitting its Type 094 submarines with the longer-range JL-3, a larger missile with a range potentially exceeding 10,000 kilometers that brings the contiguous United States into range from Chinese coastal waters. The Type 096 submarine, designed from the outset to carry the JL-3 or its successor, is under development.

Strategic Posture Shift

China’s stated doctrine remains no-first-use of nuclear weapons, meaning Beijing pledges it will not launch nuclear weapons unless struck by nuclear weapons first. Analysts now question whether the operational reality matches that public position. Pentagon reporting describes an early-warning counterstrike posture, in which China’s early warning radar network detects an incoming missile, and the response launches occur within minutes on trajectories computed in advance. December 2024 training imagery showed the PLA Rocket Force launching multiple ICBMs in rapid succession from training silos, an exercise consistent with launch-on-warning practice rather than a purely retaliatory posture. This represents a significant and unacknowledged shift if accurate.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated China possessed approximately 600 nuclear warheads as of 2025, of which 276 were associated with intercontinental-range systems. The U.S. intelligence community projects this number will exceed 1,000 by 2030. SIPRI data confirms the arsenal is growing by roughly 100 warheads per year, faster than any other state.

France

France maintains a strictly submarine-based nuclear deterrent since the retirement of its land-based Plateau d’Albion missiles in 1996. The Force de frappe, or nuclear strike force, consists of four Le Triomphant-class ballistic missile submarines, each armed with the M51 SLBM. At least one submarine is on patrol at all times under the principle of permanent deterrence.

The M51 is a three-stage, solid-fueled submarine-launched missile weighing approximately 52 tonnes and measuring roughly 12 meters in length. It carries up to six MIRV warheads, each estimated at approximately 100 kilotons, and has a range that official French sources describe as exceeding 10,000 kilometers. The M51.1 entered service in 2010, the M51.2 with improved guidance accuracy arrived from 2015, and the M51.3 variant was projected to begin entering service from approximately 2025 onward, featuring further improvements. France maintains a stockpile of approximately 290 nuclear warheads and operates its deterrent as an entirely independent capability, outside any joint targeting arrangements with NATO allies.

The United Kingdom

Britain is the smallest nuclear weapon state in the NPT’s recognized five-power structure. The Royal Navy operates four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines, each capable of carrying 16 Trident II D5 missiles, though operational loadings are lower. As of 2016, the UK maintained a stockpile of 215 warheads with 120 operationally available. The UK government committed in 2021 to raising the ceiling on warhead numbers from 180 to 260, a decision that drew considerable political controversy.

The Vanguard submarines are at the end of their designed service lives and have already exceeded their 25-year expected lifespans, now projected to serve past 36 years. Their replacement, the Dreadnought-class submarine, is being designed and built by BAE Systems, with operational capability planned for around 2028, though timelines in British submarine construction have historically slipped. A new warhead, designated the Astraea (A21/Mk7), is under development as a sovereign British design to replace warheads sharing technology with U.S. devices. The Astraea is expected to enter service with the Dreadnought-class boats in the 2030s, making it the first UK warhead deployed without live explosive testing, relying instead on simulation and modeling at AWE Aldermaston and the joint UK-French EPURE facility.

India

India’s strategic missile program is managed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation and operated by the Strategic Forces Command under the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority. India possesses one formally accepted ICBM as of March 2026: the Agni-V.

The Agni-V is a three-stage, solid-fueled, road-mobile system with an official range declared by Indian authorities at approximately 5,000 kilometers, though independent researchers consistently assess the actual range as being closer to 7,000 to 8,000 kilometers. India has underplayed its range publicly, which most analysts attribute to diplomatic caution given regional sensitivities. The missile is capable of carrying MIRV warheads; India announced and demonstrated the successful test of a MIRVed Agni-V configuration in a March 2024 test designated Mission Divyastra.

The Agni-V has been inducted into service with the Strategic Forces Command following a series of successful developmental and user trials, including a night trial conducted from Abdul Kalam Island in Odisha in December 2022. India’s nuclear doctrine calls for a no-first-use posture with a credible minimum deterrent, and the Agni-V provides India with a capability against China that shorter-range missiles in the Agni series could not offer.

India is also developing the Agni-VI, a longer-range system with reported specifications of 8,000 to 12,000 kilometers and potentially rail-mobile and silo-based basing options in addition to road-mobile. A submarine-launched derivative, the K-5, is under development as part of the K missile family, designed to provide India with a sea-based second-strike component.

North Korea

North Korea’s ICBM force is the most opaque in the world and has undergone the most rapid qualitative transformation of any national force in the past decade. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2025 testimony that North Korea currently has 10 or fewer operational ICBMs, but also projected that the country could possess 50 ICBMs by 2035.

Hwasong-17

The Hwasong-17 is a two-stage, liquid-fueled road-mobile ICBM carried by a massive 22-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher. North Korea’s Japanese and South Korean defense analysts estimated its range at 15,000 kilometers or more when flown on a standard operational trajectory, sufficient to reach any point in the continental United States. The missile has a payload capacity estimated at 2,000 to 3,500 kilograms, giving it the physical dimensions to carry multiple warheads, though it almost certainly deploys only a single warhead at present. North Korea claims to have conducted a successful first launch of the Hwasong-17 in March 2022; some Western analysts believe the vehicle launched that day was actually an earlier design and that the genuine Hwasong-17’s first successful test was in November 2022.

Hwasong-18

The Hwasong-18 represented North Korea’s breakthrough into solid-fuel ICBM technology. Unveiled at a February 2023 parade, it conducted its maiden flight on April 13, 2023. A second test on July 12, 2023 achieved the longest flight time and highest altitude of any North Korean ICBM test to that date, nearly 75 minutes in flight and an apogee of 6,648 kilometers. A third successful test occurred in December 2023. The solid fuel makes it significantly faster to prepare for launch than its liquid-fueled predecessors, reducing the window in which an adversary might detect pre-launch activities and attempt a preemptive strike. The December 2023 launch was characterized by North Korean state media as a “launching drill of an ICBM unit,” strongly suggesting the system was by then operationally deployed.

Hwasong-19

The Hwasong-19 was first tested on October 31, 2024. It is a three-stage solid-fueled missile carried on an 11-axle transporter-erector-launcher and is, at 28 meters in length, the largest operational road-mobile ICBM in the world by that measure. Its test achieved greater altitude and longer flight time than the Hwasong-18. Analysts noted the presence of thrusters on the warhead section consistent with a post-boost vehicle capable of guiding multiple reentry vehicles to separate aim points, raising the possibility that the Hwasong-19 is intended as North Korea’s first MIRV-capable ICBM. South Korean military officials assessed that the Hwasong-19 could deliver a nuclear payload to targets throughout North America. A U.S. congressional official confirmed this assessment in April 2025 testimony.

North Korea unveiled the Hwasong-20 in an October 2025 parade, marking another design generation. Technical details remain limited as of March 2026.

The cooperation between North Korea and Russia in the context of the Ukraine war has added a new dimension to Pyongyang’s development trajectory. Russia has been sharing space, nuclear, and missile-applicable technology with North Korea in exchange for ammunition and troops, and U.S. intelligence officials assess this technology sharing will meaningfully accelerate North Korean weapons development over the next three to five years.

Israel

Israel neither confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons, a policy known as nuclear opacity or ambiguity. The Jericho III is generally assessed by independent analysts as Israel’s primary ICBM-class system. It is a road-mobile, three-stage solid-fueled missile that entered service in approximately 2008 and has an assessed range of 4,800 to 11,500 kilometers depending on payload. Israel conducted what was described as an ICBM test in November 2011, believed to be an upgraded Jericho III variant. Because of Israel’s opacity policy, exact warhead counts, deployment numbers, and specific technical parameters are not publicly confirmed.

The Arms Control Void

For most of the nuclear era, ICBM deployments operated within some framework of mutual constraint, however imperfect. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limited missile defenses in ways that stabilized the deterrence relationship. The INF Treaty banned an entire range of intermediate systems until the United States withdrew in 2019. New START limited deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 per side and provided inspection and data exchange mechanisms that allowed verification of compliance.

New START’s expiration in February 2026 leaves a structural void. President Trump expressed interest in a new agreement but stated on February 5, 2026, that nuclear experts should work toward a “new, improved and modernized” treaty. U.S. Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno indicated at the Conference on Disarmament the following day that the United States would seek to include China in any future agreement and limit all Russian nuclear warheads rather than only deployed strategic systems, not just the deployed strategic warheads that New START covered. Russia and China have shown no inclination to negotiate on those terms so far. China continues to refuse any formal nuclear arms control discussions, citing the far larger U.S. and Russian stockpiles as justification.

The practical consequence is that Russia can now quietly load additional warheads onto its deployed Yars missiles, which have the technical capacity to carry more than they were restricted to under New START, without any formal verification or notification requirement. The RS-24 Yars can reportedly carry up to six warheads; it was deployed with three to four under treaty constraints. Similarly, the United States could in theory upload warheads from storage to deployed delivery systems. Whether either side does so depends on political decisions, production capacity, and strategic logic rather than any treaty obligation.

China’s refusal to engage in arms control discussions while conducting the largest ICBM expansion since the Cold War represents a problem that no amount of bilateral U.S.-Russia negotiating can solve. The trajectory toward a genuine three-cornered nuclear competition, which New START’s advocates had long warned about, is now clearly underway with no diplomatic mechanism in place to slow it.

A Structural Observation on Deterrence Claims

There is a persistent analytical error in coverage of nuclear programs, namely treating every disclosed missile as an equivalent strategic asset. It is not. A deployed, tested, and operationally integrated ICBM with trained crews, verified warheads, and functional command and control is categorically different from a system that exists in a silo with uncertain warheads, questionable guidance reliability, and a test record of five failures.

The evidence weighs heavily toward the conclusion that Russia’s declared nuclear modernization is significantly overstated relative to operational reality. The RS-28 Sarmat program has failed repeatedly, the R-36M2 Voevoda is aging without verified maintenance support, and Russia’s defense industrial base has been under sustained pressure from the war in Ukraine and Western export controls on components. None of this means Russia’s nuclear deterrent has collapsed, far from it, the Yars force is real and validated and the submarine fleet carries substantial capability. But the gap between Putin’s rhetorical framing of an invincible, modernized nuclear force and the actual verified operational picture is wider than most public commentary acknowledges.

The Silo Geometry of Future Deterrence

The most consequential physical change in global ICBM architecture between 2020 and 2026 has been the construction of China’s three northern silo fields. More than 300 silos across Yumen, Hami, and Yulin, with over 100 now confirmed as loaded, represent a transformation in the geography of nuclear risk. These silos are sufficiently numerous that any adversary contemplating a disarming first strike against Chinese ICBMs would need to allocate an enormous number of warheads to suppress them, which structurally changes the strategic calculus in ways that favor China’s deterrent posture regardless of how many missiles are actually loaded at any given time.

What remains genuinely unresolved as of March 2026 is the pace of China’s actual warhead production relative to its silo expansion. If warheads are being produced fast enough to fill the new silos, China’s effective ICBM force will triple or more within this decade. If production lags the infrastructure, many silos remain empty shells that complicate targeting without contributing survivable weapons. The intelligence community’s acknowledgment that China’s warhead count in 2024 reflected “a slower rate of production compared to previous years” suggests some tension between Beijing’s ambitions and its production capacity, but does not resolve the question of how that gap will evolve.

Summary

Nine countries field operational ICBMs or submarine-launched missiles of intercontinental range as of March 2026: the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Israel, and North Korea. A tenth, India, is actively developing its sea-based leg and longer-range land systems.

Russia operates the numerically largest land-based ICBM force but is navigating simultaneous challenges: the Sarmat program’s repeated failures, the Voevoda’s declining maintenance integrity, and the economic strain of sustaining conventional combat while funding nuclear modernization. The Yars remains capable and fielded in significant numbers, but the narrative of seamless modernization does not match the satellite imagery and test records.

The United States is operating a Minuteman III that predates the current generation of nuclear weapons designers and will do so for at least another decade. The Sentinel replacement program is expensive, delayed, and now committed to building new silos from the ground up, a generational infrastructure investment with a first test not until 2027.

China’s expansion has definitively ended the era in which Beijing was treated as a distant third in nuclear capability. The construction pace, the silo field investments, and the confirmed MIRV testing on both land and sea-based systems together describe a country building toward nuclear parity with the major powers rather than minimum deterrence. How that expansion interacts with a world now operating without any bilateral or multilateral arms control constraints is the defining strategic question of the decade ahead.

North Korea’s force is small by any measure but is being produced and tested with evident seriousness. Ten or fewer operational ICBMs can kill millions of people. The trajectory toward 50 such missiles within a decade, combined with technology assistance from Russia and the demonstrated ability to build solid-fueled systems of global range, converts North Korea from a regional nuclear problem into a genuine intercontinental threat that no missile defense architecture yet deployed can reliably suppress.

The expiration of New START in February 2026 removed the last framework for mutual transparency between the two states that together hold roughly 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. What replaces it, if anything, will shape how the ICBM forces described in this article evolve over the coming years.

Appendix: Top 10 Questions Answered in This Article

How many ICBMs does the United States currently have on alert?

The United States keeps 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles on continuous alert in underground silos at three Air Force bases in Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming. An additional 50 silos are maintained in warm reserve status, for a total silo count of 450.

What is the RS-28 Sarmat’s operational status as of March 2026?

The RS-28 Sarmat is not verified as operationally deployed as of March 2026. Its only confirmed successful full-range flight test occurred in April 2022, followed by five publicly documented failures including a silo-destroying accident in September 2024 and a crash near the launch site in November 2025. Russia’s state media reported in January 2026 that final flight tests are expected during 2026.

Why is China building so many new ICBM silos?

China constructed three major silo fields in its western and northern regions between 2020 and 2025, with a combined capacity exceeding 300 launchers. Pentagon analysis assessed in late 2025 that more than 100 of these silos had been loaded with DF-31-class ICBMs. The construction reflects a shift from minimum deterrence toward a larger, more survivable force capable of sustaining a second strike after absorbing an adversary attack.

When will the LGM-35A Sentinel replace the Minuteman III?

The Air Force confirmed in February 2026 that the LGM-35A Sentinel will achieve initial operational capability in the early 2030s, later than the original 2029 target. The program restructure is expected to be completed by the end of 2026, with a first test launch planned for 2027. Some Minuteman III missiles will now serve into the 2050s.

How many nuclear warheads does China have?

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute both estimated China’s nuclear stockpile at approximately 600 warheads as of 2025. Of these, around 276 are associated with intercontinental-range delivery systems. U.S. intelligence projects the total will exceed 1,000 by 2030.

What is North Korea’s ICBM capability in 2026?

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in 2025 that North Korea has 10 or fewer operational ICBMs, including the liquid-fueled Hwasong-17 and the solid-fueled Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19. The Hwasong-19, first tested in October 2024, is the world’s largest operational road-mobile ICBM and may have MIRV capability. A new system, the Hwasong-20, was unveiled in October 2025.

Does the United Kingdom have its own ICBMs?

The United Kingdom does not operate land-based ICBMs. Its nuclear deterrent is entirely sea-based, consisting of four Vanguard-class submarines armed with U.S.-built Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles fitted with British warheads. The Vanguards are being replaced by Dreadnought-class submarines expected to enter service around 2028.

What happened to New START and why does it matter for ICBMs?

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expired on February 5, 2026, without a replacement agreement. The treaty had limited both the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads each and required data exchanges and on-site inspections. Its expiration means neither country now faces formal treaty constraints on how many warheads they load onto their deployed missiles.

What is the Avangard and how does it relate to Russian ICBMs?

The Avangard is a Russian hypersonic glide vehicle deployed on a small number of modified UR-100N missiles at Dombarovsky. Unlike a conventional ballistic reentry vehicle, it glides through the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds on a maneuverable path, which in theory reduces the effectiveness of existing missile defense systems. It is considered operationally deployed in limited numbers.

How does India’s Agni-V compare to other ICBMs?

India’s Agni-V is a three-stage, solid-fueled, road-mobile ICBM with an official range of 5,000 kilometers and an independently assessed range closer to 7,000 to 8,000 kilometers. India demonstrated a MIRV-capable version in March 2024. It is the only Indian missile that meets the standard ICBM range threshold and is inducted into service with the Strategic Forces Command, giving India a credible nuclear strike capability against targets across China.