Synopsis
The paper argues that the UK should strengthen its deterrence by denial posture in space to protect its space-based assets and ensure freedom of action. Key points:
- Satellites play an increasingly critical role in enabling multi-domain military operations for the UK armed forces. However, threats like electronic warfare and cyber attacks challenge freedom of action in space.
- Deterrence by punishment relies on clear thresholds for retaliation which is difficult with sub-threshold threats. Deterrence by denial is better suited, focusing on resilient architectures to withstand and continue operations despite attacks.
- The UK has few legacy systems constraining its space architecture so it has an opportunity to design a resilient next-generation architecture incorporating lessons learned.
- Strategies discussed to enable deterrence by denial include:
- Disaggregation: Separate missions across platforms and orbits to avoid single points of failure. Use Skynet for high priority missions and OneWeb’s LEO constellation for lower priority ones.
- Diversification: Rely on allies like the US but also deepen partnerships with countries like Australia to provide redundant capabilities. Improve commercial relationships to access backup ISR data.
- Proliferation: Add secondary payloads for niche in-orbit space domain awareness capabilities that the US lacks to increase bargaining power as a partner.
- Reconstitution: Studies needed on responsive launch options suited to the eventual architecture chosen.
- An integrated deterrence strategy is needed encompassing both military and non-military tools across government.
