What Are the Challenges to Implementing Space Traffic Management?

The Crowded Sky

The concept of “space” often brings to mind images of vast, empty blackness. But the region of space closest to Earth is far from empty. It’s a complex, crowded environment, and it’s becoming more congested every day. Low Earth Orbit (LEO), the zone where the International Space Station (ISS) and thousands of satellites operate, is a finite resource.

For decades, we’ve used this resource with limited coordination. Now, we face a future with tens of thousands of new satellites, a growing population of orbital debris, and a very real risk of collisions. The solution, in theory, is Space Traffic Management (STM).

STM is a framework for coordinating and managing all traffic in orbit. Think of it as a global Air Traffic Control (ATC) system, but for space. Its purpose is to prevent collisions, protect space assets, and ensure the long-term sustainability of the orbital environment.

While the idea is simple, its implementation is arguably one of the most complex geopolitical, technical, and economic challenges of our time. It’s not a single problem to be solved but a web of interconnected issues. These challenges span technology, law, finance, and human nature itself.

The Challenge of Detection and Tracking

Before traffic can be managed, it must be seen. This is the first and most fundamental hurdle for STM: we don’t have a complete, timely, or accurate picture of everything in orbit. This field, known as Space Situational Awareness (SSA), is the bedrock of STM, and its foundations are incomplete.

The primary tool for this has long been the United States Space Surveillance Network, operated by U.S. Space Command. This global network of ground-based radars and optical telescopes tracks objects and maintains a public catalog. While it’s an incredible capability, it has significant limitations that hamper the creation of a global STM system.

The “Lethal Non-Trackable” Debris

The network’s ground-based radars can reliably track objects in LEO that are about 10 centimeters (4 inches) or larger – roughly the size of a softball. The public catalog contains over 30,000 such objects.

The problem is that a collision in orbit doesn’t require a large object to be catastrophic. Orbital velocities in LEO are immense, averaging 17,000 miles per hour (7.8 km/s). At that speed, a 1-centimeter object – the size of a marble – can impact with the kinetic energy of a hand grenade. An object the size of a paint fleck can pit a spacecraft window, as has happened on the ISS.

It’s estimated there are between 600,000 and 900,000 pieces of debris from 1 cm to 10 cm in orbit. There are over 100 million particles smaller than 1 cm. None of these are in the catalog. They are “lethal non-trackables.”

An STM system today can only warn a satellite operator of a potential collision with another cataloged object. It cannot warn them about the marble-sized piece of shrapnel from a 1990s rocket body that is on a path to destroy their multi-million dollar asset. This is a massive data gap. Any STM system built on today’s tracking data is managing traffic while blind to 95% of the most numerous collision threats.

To illustrate the scale, consider the different classes of debris.

Gaps in Global Coverage and Timeliness

The existing surveillance network is ground-based. This means it has geographic blind spots. There is very little radar coverage over the Southern Hemisphere, particularly the south Pacific and Atlantic oceans. An object’s orbit can’t be updated when it’s in one of these gaps, so its predicted position becomes less and less accurate over time.

This inaccuracy is a major problem. When a satellite operator gets a collision warning, it’s not a single point but a “conjunction data message” (CDM). This message gives a probability of collision based on the uncertain positions of both objects. An operator might be told there is a 1-in-10,000 chance of collision.

Is that high enough to move? Moving a satellite (a “maneuver”) consumes fuel. Fuel is a satellite’s lifeblood; when it runs out, the satellite’s mission is over. A maneuver to dodge a potential threat shortens the satellite’s expensive operational life. If the warning has a high degree of uncertainty, the operator may choose to accept the risk.

This creates a “cry wolf” scenario. Operators are already flooded with low-probability warnings. A private company, COMSPOC, has stated that a typical satellite operator may receive thousands of warnings per satellite each year, of which perhaps 10-20 require serious consideration. If the data quality isn’t improved, operators will become desensitized to warnings, and a preventable collision will occur.

The Need for New Sensors

Solving this data problem requires a new generation of sensors. This includes more powerful ground-based radars, like Space Fence, which can track smaller objects.

But the real solution is to move sensors into space. Space-based sensors don’t have to look through the atmosphere, they don’t have weather (cloud) problems, and they can be positioned to cover the blind spots of the ground network. However, building, launching, and operating a constellation of dedicated space-tracking satellites is extremely expensive. It’s a massive financial commitment that no single nation or company has been willing to fully undertake for purely civil STM purposes.

The Lack of International Legal Frameworks

Even if we had perfect data, a much larger challenge remains: what are the rules? Space is a global common, like the high seas, but it lacks the detailed international rulebook that governs maritime traffic. The existing legal framework for space is old, high-level, and completely silent on the specifics of traffic management.

The Antiquated Outer Space Treaty

The foundational law of space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. It was a product of the Cold War, and its main purpose was to prevent the Moon from being militarized. It establishes broad principles:

• Space is the “province of all mankind” and free for exploration and use by all states.
• No state can claim sovereignty over any part of outer space or any celestial body.
• States are responsible for their national activities in space, whether by government or private companies.

This treaty is a remarkable document, but it offers no help for STM. It doesn’t define what “space debris” is. It doesn’t mention traffic coordination. It doesn’t establish a “right of way.” It gives every nation the right to use space, but provides no rules for how to use it responsibly in a crowded environment.

Defining “Right of Way”

This is the most practical and vexing legal question. When two objects are on a collision course, who moves?

• Is it the more maneuverable satellite?
• Is it the satellite that got there later (the “junior” operator)?
• Is it the satellite with the lower-cost mission?
• Is it the active satellite (vs. a dead satellite or piece of debris)?

Right now, there are no rules. Collision avoidance is a voluntary, ad-hoc, and often frantic process of personal coordination. If SpaceX‘s Starlink system sees a potential collision with a European Space Agency (ESA) satellite, engineers from both organizations have to get on the phone or email each other to coordinate who will move.

This “handshake” method worked when there were only a few hundred active satellites. It is already failing. In 2019, ESA had to conduct a maneuver to avoid a Starlink satellite after automated warnings and emails apparently failed to result in a move from SpaceX. It’s completely unworkable in an environment with 50,000 or 100,000 satellites.

An STM system must have clear, automated, and internationally agreed-upon rules for right-of-way. But getting nations to agree on these rules is a diplomatic nightmare. A nation may not want to agree to a rule that forces its multi-billion-dollar national security satellite to move for another country’s commercial satellite.

Liability and Enforcement

The 1972 Space Liability Convention attempts to address “who pays.” It states that a “launching State” is absolutely liable for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the Earth. In space, liability is based on “fault.”

This “fault” standard is almost useless for STM. To prove fault, you would have to prove which party acted negligently. But if there are no agreed-upon rules of the road, how can negligence be proven? If two satellites from different countries collide, and both were operating within their rights under the Outer Space Treaty, who is at fault?

What if the collision involves debris? If a piece of a 30-year-old Soviet rocket (which is now Russia‘s responsibility) hits a new Amazon Kuiper Systems satellite, proving fault is impossible. The debris wasn’t being controlled.

Without a clear system of liability, there is no strong financial incentive to be a “good actor.” And without an enforcement mechanism, what stops a nation or company from ignoring the rules? There is no “space police” to pull over a non-compliant satellite, and no international court with the power to penalize a sovereign nation for its orbital practices.

Obstacles to Data Sharing and Collaboration

Even if the legal framework existed, STM requires a level of data sharing and trust that is in short supply. The core of the problem is that Space Situational Awareness data is, and has always been, military data.

National Security Concerns

The same radar that tracks a dead satellite can also track an adversary’s spy satellite. The ability to see what’s in orbit – and to know what other nations can see – is a cornerstone of modern defense.

The United States military, which provides the public catalog, doesn’t share all of its data. The public catalog is a lower-fidelity version of the one the military uses. Highly classified objects are not included. The exact capabilities of the sensor network are classified.

This creates a fundamental conflict. A robust, global STM system requires all major spacefaring nations to share high-fidelity sensor data with a central body. This means Russia and China would need to share data with the United States and Europe, and vice-versa.

From a national security perspective, this is a non-starter. Sharing sensor data reveals sensor capabilities (how good your radar is, where it is). Sharing the exact orbital paths of all your satellites reveals the location of your classified military assets. No major power will willingly give up this information to a potential adversary, even in the name of space safety. This geopolitical friction means any STM system will likely be “balkanized,” with different blocs (e.g., U.S. and its allies, China, Russia) managing their own systems, which defeats the purpose of a single, unified traffic plan.

Commercial Reluctance

It’s not just nations that are reluctant to share. The new players in space are mega-constellation operators like SpaceX, OneWeb, and Amazon. Their satellites are their business.

These companies have highly sophisticated, proprietary data on their own satellites. They know exactly where their satellites are and, more importantly, where they will be. They plan their maneuvers weeks in advance. This “ephemeris” data is a trade secret.

Sharing it with a central STM system, which might then share it with the public or competitors, is commercially undesirable. A competitor could use that data to analyze their business. Furthermore, if their system is automated, they may feel they are already managing their own risk and don’t need to participate in a broader system that might impose restrictions on them.

The Lack of a Central Clearinghouse

Who would even manage this system? There is no single, trusted international body to act as the “air traffic controller” for space.

• The FAA: In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of Commerce are tasked with civil STM, but their authority is domestic.
• The United Nations: The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) is a body for policy and discussion, not a 24/7 operational center. It has no staff, budget, or technical capability to manage orbital traffic.
• A New Body? Creating a new international body, like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for air travel, would take decades of diplomatic negotiation.

This leaves a vacuum. Without a trusted, neutral, and competent operator, there is nowhere to send the data and no one to issue the “traffic” instructions.

Technological and Economic Hurdles

The physical and financial realities of space add another layer of complexity. We are not just managing a few hundred large buses on a highway; we are managing tens of thousands of high-speed, often un-steerable, objects.

The Rise of Mega-Constellations

The single biggest driver for STM is the explosion of commercial satellites. In all of history, from Sputnik in 1957 to 2019, humanity launched about 9,000 satellites. In the next few years, companies plan to launch 50,000 to 100,000 more, primarily for global internet.

This is a change in kind, not just degree. The sheer density of objects in LEO will increase by an order of magnitude. This makes the “big sky” theory – the idea that space is so large collisions are unlikely – completely obsolete. Collisions will become a mathematical certainty without active management.

This new scale also makes manual collision avoidance impossible. A human-in-the-loop system cannot manage 100,000 satellites, each generating conjunction warnings with 30,000 pieces of debris. The system must be automated.

Automation and Artificial Intelligence

The only viable STM system is one run by AI. An autonomous system would receive tracking data, predict collisions, and send maneuver commands to satellites automatically, all in milliseconds. Starlink‘s network already operates this way internally.

But this introduces a new set of challenges:

1. Trust: Who is liable if the AI makes a mistake and causes a collision?
2. Negotiation: What happens when one company’s automated system wants to move a satellite “up,” and another company’s system wants to move its satellite “down” into the same space? How do two AIs from competing companies negotiate right-of-way?
3. Transparency: How does a government regulator audit a “black box” AI system to ensure it’s safe and fair?

The High Cost of Implementation

Who pays for all of this? Building a global network of new sensors, developing the complex software, and staffing operational centers will cost billions of dollars.

• Do taxpayers in spacefaring nations foot the bill?
• Do satellite operators pay a “user fee” or “orbital tax”?
• Do companies that create debris have to pay for its removal?

The economic models are as undefined as the legal ones. Many operators, especially small CubeSat developers like universities, have no budget for active collision avoidance. Their satellites are “un-maneuverable” and are essentially just more high-speed obstacles.

The “Junk” Problem: Active Debris Removal

STM is primarily about preventing new debris. It doesn’t solve the problem of the junk that’s already there. The most dangerous regions of LEO are already polluted with large, dead objects from decades of launches – things like old rocket upper-stages and defunct satellites.

These objects are “zombies” – they are large, uncontrolled, and just waiting to be hit. A collision with one of these “super-spreaders” would be a Kessler Syndrome event, creating a cascade of new debris that could make entire orbits unusable.

A complete STM strategy must include Active Debris Removal (ADR). But ADR is technically difficult, extraordinarily expensive, and legally fraught. Missions like ESA‘s ClearSpace-1 are only now being tested.

The legal challenge is that under the Outer Space Treaty, a satellite remains the property of its launching state forever. Even a 50-year-old dead satellite “belongs” to its country. You cannot legally “salvage” it without that country’s permission. This “non-interference” rule, meant to protect satellites, now makes it illegal to clean up the worst-offending pieces of junk without a complex diplomatic agreement.

Summary

Implementing a comprehensive Space Traffic Management system is not a single challenge but a “wicked problem” of interlocking difficulties.

The technical challenge is immense. We lack the sensors to track the most numerous and dangerous debris, forcing us to manage traffic with an incomplete picture.

The legal challenge is a vacuum. The 60-year-old laws governing space were not written for a world of mega-constellations and are silent on the fundamental “rules of the road,” liability, and enforcement.

The political challenge is one of trust. The data needed for STM is deeply entwined with national security, and major world powers are not in a position to share their most sensitive data with each other.

The economic challenge is one of cost and incentive. The “who pays” question is unanswered, and the economics of maneuvering a satellite often conflict with the long-term health of the orbital environment.

These challenges are not sequential; they must all be addressed at once. They require a new era of international cooperation, technological innovation, and legal creativity. Without a concerted global effort to solve them, the “crowded sky” above us risks becoming an impassable barrier of high-speed junk, closing the door to the future of space exploration and the orbital economy on which we are fast becoming dependent.