What Are Space Policy Directives, and Why Are They Important?

Formal Instructions From the President

A nation’s activity in space is not a random series of missions. It’s a guided effort, directed from the highest levels of government. In the United States , one of the most powerful tools for shaping this effort is the Space Policy Directive, or SPD. These documents serve as formal instructions from the President, setting the strategic course for all national space endeavors, from human exploration and commercial enterprise to military operations and scientific discovery.

This article explores the nature of these directives, the context from which they emerged, and provides a detailed examination of the modern series of SPDs that have reshaped American space activity.

What Is a Space Policy Directive

A Space Policy Directive is a specific type of presidential directive , a formal, written order from the President of the United States to federal agencies. It isn’t a law; laws are passed by Congress . Instead, a directive is an exercise of the President’s executive authority to manage the operations of the federal government.

In practice, an SPD functions as a top-level strategy document. It answers fundamental questions: What is the primary goal of the human spaceflight program? How should the government regulate private space companies? How should the military organize itself to protect national assets in orbit?

These directives are not created in a vacuum. They are the product of extensive deliberation within the executive branch, primarily coordinated by the National Space Council . This council brings together the leaders of all relevant government bodies – such as NASA , the Department of Defense , the Department of Commerce , the Department of State , and the intelligence community – to forge a unified policy. Once the President signs a directive, these agencies are bound to follow it, realigning their budgets, programs, and priorities to match the new guidance.

The Historical Context of American Space Policy

U.S. space policy has evolved in distinct phases. The first major, coherent policy was the Space Race , driven by geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union . This policy was encapsulated by President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 challenge to land a man on the Moon , a goal that marshaled immense national resources and led to the Apollo program .

After Apollo, policy shifted. The Space Shuttle program focused on creating a reusable vehicle for routine access to low Earth orbit (LEO). This was followed by a policy centered on international cooperation, exemplified by the International Space Station (ISS), a project that brought former rivals together.

In 2010, the Obama administration released its National Space Policy . This policy canceled the Constellation program (which had been a post-Space Shuttle plan to return to the Moon) and redirected NASA. The new direction involved extending the life of the ISS, fostering the development of commercial crew vehicles (like those from SpaceX and Boeing ) to ferry astronauts to LEO, and setting a long-term, more ambiguous goal of a human mission to an asteroid, followed by Mars .

This 2010 policy set the stage for the next major pivot. The subsequent series of Space Policy Directives, beginning in 2017, represented a significant strategic realignment, building on some aspects of the 2010 policy (like commercial partnerships) while decisively changing direction on others (like the main goal of human exploration).

The Re-establishment of the National Space Council

A key development enabling the new directives was the revival of the National Space Council in 2017. This body, chaired by the Vice President, had been active under President George H.W. Bush but was disbanded in 1993.

Its re-establishment signaled a renewed White House focus on space as a cohesive national issue. The Council’s purpose is to coordinate policy across the entire government, ensuring that the diplomatic, military, scientific, and commercial aspects of space policy all work in harmony. The SPDs that followed were the direct, formal output of the Council’s deliberations, presented to the President for approval.

The Series of Space Policy Directives

Between 2017 and 2021, seven Space Policy Directives were issued. Each one addressed a specific, high-priority area of space policy, and together they orchestrated a top-to-bottom shift in America’s approach to the space domain.

Space Policy Directive 1: Reinvigorating Human Space Exploration

Signed on December 11, 2017, SPD-1 provided a new, clear, and galvanizing mission for NASA . Its title, “Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program,” directly stated its intent.

This directive formally pivoted the nation’s human spaceflight program away from the 2010 policy’s “Asteroid Redirect Mission” and back to the Moon. The directive instructed NASA to “lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with commercial and international partners to enable human expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities.”

The key instruction was to send American astronauts back to the Moon, but with a new philosophy. This was not to be a repeat of Apollo’s “flags and footprints” missions. SPD-1 called for a sustainable, long-term presence. The Moon was now framed as a proving ground – a place to test the technologies and strategies needed for the much more difficult, long-duration missions to Mars .

This new policy had immediate and massive practical consequences. The most significant outcome was the birth of the Artemis program . Artemis is the multi-faceted campaign to establish a long-term human presence on and around the Moon. This program relies on several key hardware elements that were already in development, such as the Space Launch System (SLS) heavy-lift rocket and the Orion (spacecraft) crew capsule.

SPD-1 also heavily emphasized collaboration. It explicitly directed NASA to work with “commercial and international partners.” This led to two major initiatives. The first is the Gateway (space station) , a small space station to be placed in lunar orbit. It’s being built with contributions from international partners like the European Space Agency (ESA), the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the Canadian Space Agency .

The second, and perhaps more revolutionary, initiative is the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program. Under CLPS, NASA doesn’t build and fly its own robotic lunar landers. Instead, it buys a delivery service from private companies. NASA pays these companies, such as Astrobotic Technology and Intuitive Machines , to transport NASA’s scientific instruments to the lunar surface. This model is intended to be faster, cheaper, and to help build a robust commercial lunar economy.

Space Policy Directive 2: Streamlining Commercial Space Regulations

Signed on May 24, 2018, SPD-2, “Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space,” addressed the other major component of modern space activity: the booming private sector.

For decades, space was the exclusive domain of governments. By 2018, private companies like SpaceX , Blue Origin , and Rocket Lab were not just participants but leaders, launching the majority of rockets and building vast satellite constellations. These companies faced a regulatory environment that was complex, slow, and fragmented across multiple federal agencies. A company might need a launch license from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (within the Department of Transportation ), a remote sensing license from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (within the Department of Commerce ), and a spectrum license from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

SPD-2 was a direct order to “cut the red tape.” Its goal was to make the U.S. the most attractive jurisdiction in the world for private space companies to operate.

The directive had two main thrusts. First, it ordered the Department of Transportation to overhaul its launch and re-entry licensing procedures. The old system was cumbersome, often requiring a new, bespoke license for every single launch. The directive called for a new system that was more like an airline’s certification – a single license that could cover a whole “fleet” of rockets flying similar missions. This culminated in the FAA’s “Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing Requirements” (informally known as Part 450), which took effect in 2021 to simplify and speed up the process.

Second, SPD-2 set in motion a major reform of commercial remote sensing regulations. This was handled by the Department of Commerce . The old rules were designed for a time when only governments had high-resolution “spy satellites.” They were restrictive and slow, ill-suited for a world where companies planned to image the entire Earth every day. The directive led to new, tiered regulations that are more permissive, speeding up approvals for companies in this market.

SPD-2 also tasked the Department of Commerce with creating a “one-stop shop” for commercial space, an idea that continues to evolve. The objective is to give a company a single agency to interface with for its regulatory needs, rather than navigating a maze of different departments.

Space Policy Directive 3: Managing Space Traffic

Signed on June 18, 2018, SPD-3, “National Space Traffic Management Policy,” tackled a growing and dangerous problem: the threat of orbital collisions.

Every satellite launch, every rocket upper stage left in orbit, and every accidental or deliberate satellite breakup adds to the cloud of space debris . Even a paint fleck, traveling at over 17,000 miles per hour, can cripple a satellite. With the planned launch of “mega-constellations” involving tens of thousands of new satellites from companies like SpaceX’s Starlink , the risk of a collision is growing exponentially. A single collision could create thousands of new pieces of debris, setting off a cascading chain reaction that could render certain orbits unusable.

For decades, the Department of Defense , through its Space Surveillance Network , has been the world’s de facto space traffic cop. The military tracks tens of thousands of objects and provides conjunction warnings (notifications of a potential collision) to satellite operators.

SPD-3 declared that this was not a sustainable or appropriate long-term solution. The military’s primary job is national defense, not providing a free service to global commercial operators. Furthermore, its catalog of objects was not as open, fast, or precise as the commercial sector needed.

The directive ordered a major shift in responsibility. It designated the Department of Commerce as the lead civilian agency for Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM).

Under this new policy, the U.S. Space Command would continue its national security mission of tracking objects, but it would provide its data to the Department of Commerce. Commerce’s Office of Space Commerce was tasked with taking this data, augmenting it with data from commercial SSA companies (like LeoLabs and ExoAnalytic Solutions ), and providing a modern, public, open-architecture catalog of space objects and conjunction warnings.

This policy is a long-term project. It involves building a new, complex data system (known as the Traffic Coordination System for Space, or TraCSS) and establishing new standards and best practices for satellite operators. The goal is to create a system for space that functions more like the civilian air traffic control system we have for airplanes, ensuring the safety and sustainability of the orbital environment.

Space Policy Directive 4: Creating the Space Force

Signed on February 19, 2019, SPD-4 was the most organizationally disruptive of all the directives. Titled “Establishment of the United States Space Force,” it didn’t create the new service – only Congress can do that – but it laid out the Administration’s formal policy and legislative proposal to do so.

The rationale for SPD-4 was that space had become a “warfighting domain” in its own right, just like land, sea, and air. The U.S. military, and the entire global economy, is heavily dependent on space-based assets. The Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation provides navigation and timing for everything from smart bombs to bank transactions. Military communication satellites provide secure links to forces around the globe. And space-based infrared satellites provide the first warning of a ballistic missile launch.

Proponents of a Space Force argued that these critical assets were increasingly vulnerable to attack from adversaries like China and Russia , which were developing sophisticated anti-satellite weapons , jammers, and cyber-attack capabilities.

Before this, responsibility for military space was managed by the U.S. Air Force , primarily through Air Force Space Command . The argument in SPD-4 was that the Air Force, with its primary culture and budget focused on air power (fighters, bombers), could not give space the full attention and resources it needed. A new, independent service would be ableto focus 100% on training, equipping, and advocating for space power.

The directive called for a lean, tech-focused service that would consolidate space professionals from across the military branches. It also called for the creation of a new unified combatant command, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), to operate the forces provided by the Space Force. (The service – Space Force – is responsible for “organizing, training, and equipping,” while the command – USSPACECOM – is responsible for the actual “warfighting” operations).

Following this directive, Congress debated the proposal. In December 2019, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress officially created the U.S. Space Force as the sixth branch of the armed forces, housed organizationally within the Department of the Air Force (similar to how the Marine Corps is within the Department of the Navy).

Space Policy Directive 5: Cybersecurity for Space Systems

Signed on September 4, 2020, SPD-5, “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems,” addressed a critical and often-overlooked vulnerability.

A modern satellite is a sophisticated computer in orbit, connected to ground stations via radio links. This entire “space system” – the ground segment, the communication links, and the satellite itself – is vulnerable to cyberattack. An attacker could try to jam or spoof the command link, inject malicious code, take control of the satellite, or simply steal the data it’s collecting.

The consequences could be severe. A successful attack on a GPS satellite could disrupt transportation and financial networks. An attack on a weather satellite could blind forecasters. An attack on a communications satellite could cut off vital data links. In a worst-case scenario, a hacker could use a satellite’s own propulsion system to intentionally crash it into another satellite, creating a catastrophic debris field.

SPD-5 established a set of “key cybersecurity principles” for all space systems, both government and commercial. These principles are not highly technical rules but rather strategic guidelines. They include:

• Integrating cybersecurity into the design and development of space systems from the very beginning, not adding it as an afterthought.
• Protecting the ground systems, communication links, and the spacecraft itself.
• Using encryption and authentication to secure data and commands.
• Developing secure supply chains to ensure that components (like computer chips) haven’t been tampered with.
• Creating plans for intrusion detection and “graceful degradation,” allowing a system to maintain its most essential functions even when under attack.

This directive pushed cybersecurity to the forefront for space operators. It directed federal agencies to incorporate these principles into their contracts and encouraged the commercial sector to adopt them as a best practice, helping to secure the nation’s critical space infrastructure from digital threats.

Space Policy Directive 6: Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion

Signed on December 16, 2020, SPD-6, “National Strategy for Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion (SNPP),” looked to the future of high-performance space systems.

For most missions in the inner solar system, solar panels are an excellent power source. But for missions to the outer planets like Jupiter and beyond, sunlight is too faint. And for powering a base on the Moon, which endures 14-day-long nights of extreme cold, solar power and batteries are inefficient. Likewise, traditional chemical rockets are powerful but “gas guzzlers” – they are not efficient enough for rapid, large-scale transport to Mars.

SPD-6 recognized that nuclear power is a key enabling technology for the next era of space exploration and national security. The directive established a national strategy to develop and use two key nuclear technologies.

The first is Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS). These are essentially nuclear batteries. They use the heat from the natural decay of Plutonium-238 to generate a small, steady supply of electricity for decades. They have been used successfully on deep-space probes like the Voyager program and Mars rovers like Curiosityand Perseverance . SPD-6 called for securing the nation’s supply of Plutonium-238 and developing next-generation RPS systems.

The second, and more advanced, technology is Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP). In an NTP system, a small nuclear reactor heats a liquid propellant (like liquid hydrogen) to extreme temperatures and expels it out a nozzle to create thrust. An NTP rocket is two to three times more efficient than the best chemical rocket. This high efficiency would make it possible to cut the travel time to Mars from 7-9 months down to 3-4 months, reducing crew exposure to radiation and the psychological strains of long-duration spaceflight.

SPD-6 set clear goals to develop, demonstrate, and use these technologies. This policy gave a major boost to programs like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) DRACO (Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations), which is a partnership with NASA to build and fly an NTP demonstration vehicle in orbit. It also solidified NASA’s “Fission Surface Power” project, which is developing small reactors that can be landed on the Moon to provide power for Artemis astronauts.

Space Policy Directive 7: Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

Signed on January 15, 2021, SPD-7, “The United States Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy,” focused on protecting and evolving the nation’s most ubiquitous space utility: GPS.

The Global Positioning System , operated by the U.S. Space Force , is a military system that the U.S. provides free of charge to the entire world. It has become a silent, invisible backbone of the modern economy. It’s used for far more than just navigation. The “T” in PNT (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing) is just as important. The precise time signals from GPS satellites are used to synchronize cell phone networks, manage power grids, and timestamp financial transactions.

This dependence creates a massive vulnerability. An adversary that could successfully jam (overpower) or spoof (broadcast false signals to) GPS could cause economic and military chaos.

SPD-7 reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to providing global GPS services. But it also formally recognized the threat of over-reliance on a single system. The core theme of SPD-7 is resilience.

The directive tasks the Department of Defense with protecting GPS from threats and continuing to modernize the satellite constellation (like the new GPS Block III satellites) to make it more accurate and harder to jam.

More importantly, it directs other government agencies, like the Department of Transportation and Department of Homeland Security , to encourage the development and adoption of alternative PNT services. The goal is to create a “PNT ecosystem” where critical infrastructure doesn’t rely on GPS alone. These alternatives could include signals from other satellite constellations (like Europe’s Galileo ), ground-based systems, or even novel techniques like using signals from LEO communications satellites.

SPD-7 is a policy of prudent preparation, ensuring that the nation’s economy and military can continue to function even if GPS signals are lost or compromised.

The Evolution of Policy Beyond the Directives

When the Biden administration took office in 2021, it reviewed the space policies it inherited. In a sign of the broad, bipartisan consensus that had formed around these issues, the new administration endorsed the core tenets of the SPDs.

The Artemis program continues. The U.S. Space Force continues to be built out. The push for commercial deregulation and space traffic management remains a high priority.

In December 2021, the administration released its own “United States Space Priorities Framework.” This document doesn’t replace the SPDs but rather builds upon them. It highlights new areas of emphasis, particularly the use of space-based systems to monitor and combat climate change – re-elevating NASA’s Earth Science mission. It also places a heavy emphasis on strengthening international norms of behavior, a priority sharpened by the 2021 Russian anti-satellite missile test that created a massive new debris field. This led to the U.S. declaring a moratorium on destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) testing , urging other nations to follow.

Summary

The Space Policy Directives issued between 2017 and 2021 represent one of the most significant and rapid transformations of U.S. national space policy. They are not abstract documents but concrete instructions that have demonstrably altered the course of American space activity.

They redirected the human spaceflight program to the Moon and Mars, leveraging commercial and international partnerships in an unprecedented way (SPD-1). They unleashed the power of the commercial space industry by committing to regulatory reform (SPD-2). They began the difficult but necessary work of managing the orbital environment to prevent a “tragedy of the commons” (SPD-3). They created the first new branch of the U.S. military in over 70 years, recognizing space as a domain of national security (SPD-4). And they established forward-looking strategies to protect space systems from cyberattack (SPD-5), develop next-generation nuclear power (SPD-6), and ensure the resilience of the nation’s critical GPS services (SPD-7).

Together, these directives have set the strategic trajectory for NASA , the Department of Defense , and the private sector, laying a new foundation for American leadership in space for decades to come.