Thomas G. Roberts proposes a method for space security verification that compares declared satellite behavior with independent observations. Published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy on October 16, 2026, his Verification 2.0 policy brief describes how governments could make selected commitments testable through information sharing and monitoring. The proposal concerns evidence about operations, including satellite retirement and departures from declared behavior.
The practical question is whether other operators can establish what a satellite is doing well enough to assess a specific commitment. A declaration supplies the expected behavior. Observations provide a separate record against which that declaration can be checked. For commercial operators, the connection is direct: information used to assess security concerns can also help identify maneuverable objects and interpret activity near operational spacecraft.
A useful assessment requires more than a position plotted on a screen. Spacecraft move continuously, and their paths change through natural forces and commanded maneuvers. An observer must distinguish those causes before interpreting a departure from a predicted orbit. Radio transmissions add another kind of evidence because a spacecraft’s communications activity can reveal operations that a position measurement alone would miss.
The technical foundation is space domain awareness, which combines sensing with processing and interpretation. Radar, optical telescopes, and radio-frequency monitoring provide different observations. Ground-based and space-based instruments also have different viewing opportunities. Combining measurements can improve the description of an object’s activity, but the resulting assessment still needs an explanation of what was observed and how the conclusion follows.
This makes the distinction between measurement and judgment important. A sensor can record an apparent change in trajectory. An analyst must assess its cause, timing, and relationship to the behavior being evaluated. A government then decides what that evidence means under the relevant agreement. Treating these as separate steps allows disagreements over measurement to be distinguished from disagreements over acceptable conduct.
Michael P. Gleason’s 2024 verification study, published by The Aerospace Corporation, provides independent context. Gleason examines the relationship among agreement terms, technology, and trust. He argues that verification challenges can be addressed through specific enabling components, including nongovernmental tracking data and restrictions on dangerous behavior. His analysis helps explain why a narrowly defined operational commitment may be more manageable than an attempt to identify every potentially threatening spacecraft.
Dual-use systems make that distinction consequential. A spacecraft capable of approaching another object might perform an authorized inspection or servicing task. The same general capability can create concern in a different operational context. Assessing conduct requires information about the particular activity and the rules that apply to it. A capability description alone cannot supply that complete account.
Retirement reporting illustrates the operational value of a more specific declaration. Roberts describes comparing a stated end of operations with subsequent observations. Continued maneuvering or radio emissions could raise questions about a claimed retirement. For nearby operators, knowing whether another object can still maneuver helps distinguish an active participant in collision avoidance from an object whose path can only be monitored.
Retirement also shows why the declaration must be precise. Ending a commercial service, stopping transmissions, and losing maneuverability describe different changes. An operational record that identifies the relevant change gives observers something concrete to assess. The resulting information can support an inquiry about status without requiring an immediate judgment about hostile intent.
A second application concerns normal operating patterns. Roberts proposes sharing information that helps observers recognize expected behavior, such as a satellite’s intended operating orbit. A departure can then be compared with an explicit baseline. The value lies in making the difference identifiable and discussable, rather than expecting every observer to infer normal operations from incomplete historical records.
Existing international safety work provides relevant experience with information exchange. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space adopted its long-term sustainability guidelines in June 2019. Their subjects include contact information, orbital-data accuracy, sharing information about space objects and events, and conjunction assessment. These are practical components of coordination among organizations that operate separate systems.
Those guidelines and a security-verification arrangement serve different purposes. Safety coordination helps operators reduce operational hazards. Verification assesses a commitment against evidence. Nevertheless, both depend on usable information reaching the appropriate organization. Accurate identification, clear timing, and a contact capable of answering operational questions matter before a dispute becomes a diplomatic issue.
Commercial observation services could contribute evidence without making the final compliance decision. Their potential role includes supplying measurements that another party can compare with its own observations. Gleason identifies nongovernmental providers as a source of redundancy and broader confidence. An assessment supported by separate observations gives participants more material to examine than a conclusion that depends entirely on one government’s undisclosed surveillance system.
The information-sharing requirement must also account for security interests. Roberts’ framework asks states to disclose enough information to make declarations testable, rather than reveal every operational decision or sensor capability. That distinction allows the discussion to focus on the evidence necessary for a particular commitment. Agreements would still need to specify what information is sufficient and how questions about inconsistencies are handled.
Neither an unexplained observation nor a disagreement over interpretation automatically establishes a violation. Gleason distinguishes technical verification from the political determination of compliance. Consultative processes matter because ambiguous language, implementation mistakes, or different understandings can generate concerns. A verification arrangement needs a way to obtain clarification as well as a way to identify discrepancies.
Verification 2.0 offers a defined use for information that satellite operators and monitoring organizations already regard as operationally relevant. Its immediate contribution is a proposal for connecting declarations, observations, and assessment. For retirement reporting and declared operating patterns, that connection could make discussions more specific: participants would have a stated commitment, an observable record, and an identifiable issue to resolve.
Useful Books Available on Amazon
