NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel used its August 31, 2026, public meeting to examine a question that follows the agency into every commercial partnership: who owns the safety risk? The meeting minutes, posted October 5, describe progress in management, technical oversight, and procurement. They also warn that clearer organization and stronger contracts still require evidence that the arrangements work.
The implications reach beyond NASA’s internal administration. Commercial spacecraft, future orbital stations, lunar landers, and spacesuits depend on decisions shared between government and industry. A company may control a component’s design, but NASA still depends on that component to carry astronauts or complete a mission. The panel’s assessment makes responsibility at those boundaries a central test of NASA’s commercial transition.
The minutes record a specific period, rather than a comprehensive statement of present readiness. Panel members visited Ames Research Center August 24–27 before holding the August 31 public meeting. Chair Susan J. Helms transmitted the minutes on September 28. Their observations need to be read alongside later announcements, particularly when a program’s plans have changed since the meeting.
Panel member Katharina McFarland described procurement changes connected to an existing recommendation, ASAP Recommendation 2025-05-01. She pointed to mission directorate reorganization, rebuilding government technical competence, and reconsidering the balance between NASA and contractor capabilities. The panel saw potential benefits in greater accountability at the mission level and clearer technical authority. Those changes could reduce fragmented responsibility for acquisition execution and outcomes.
McFarland cautioned that it was too early to declare success. She emphasized explicit risk allocation, incentives that match the desired outcome, objective measures of progress, and sufficient evidence before important decisions. Commercial procurement should avoid assigning companies risks they cannot reasonably control. A stronger government role should also preserve a meaningful distinction between buying a commercial capability and directing its development in detail.
That distinction matters because financial exposure and mission exposure behave differently. A contract can distribute development costs between NASA and a supplier. It cannot, by itself, make a delayed spacecraft available, establish that a thruster works safely, or provide another destination for astronauts. As NASA’s commercial partnership model has expanded, the agency’s ability to evaluate the services it buys has become part of the infrastructure supporting those services.
The panel linked that ability to NASA’s workforce. Its review described progress in approving positions, onboarding employees, and retaining contractor expertise under an initiative to restore core competencies. Questions remained about how employees would acquire new skills and move between assignments as programs evolved. The panel reported no immediate major concern from the effort, but called for continued attention to communication, attrition data, safety culture, contract risk, and risk management.
Workforce capacity has a practical safety function. Engineers who understand a system can challenge assumptions, interpret test results, and recognize when apparently separate problems share a cause. Moving responsibilities into NASA requires more than filling an organizational chart. Conversely, retaining industry expertise requires arrangements that give technical specialists usable information and a clear route for raising concerns.
Starliner illustrates the connection between engineering and governance. At the August meeting, the panel reported interim closure for two major propulsion problems associated with the Crew Flight Test: helium leakage and crew-module thruster failure. Work remained on service-module reaction-control thrusters, which help maneuver the spacecraft. The panel also described improved mission management, training, and hazard-report processes, together with technical and cultural work still needed before future crewed flight.
NASA’s September 28 Starliner update supplies a later planning context. The agency said an uncrewed Starliner-1 mission could fly in December 2026 or January 2027 to evaluate modifications and collect qualification data. Its stated plan was to return astronauts on Starliner-2 by 2028. Those are plans dependent on testing and certification. Neither an interim issue closure nor an intended flight date establishes readiness to transport crews.
The panel’s commercial-station discussion extends the same logic to an entire orbital market. Members viewed recent Commercial Low-Earth Orbit Destinations planning positively but continued assessing its risks. They warned that a gap after International Space Station operations could erode expertise in flight operations, manufacturing, and supply chains. Maintaining a destination also requires a dependable way to transport people and material to it.
At the meeting, the panel said it was unclear whether current plans addressed that longer-term transportation risk adequately. Its concerns included the lead time needed to develop and certify vehicles, SpaceX’s plans to retire Falcon 9 and Dragon, and Starliner’s design challenges. These were risks identified in August, not a declaration that orbital access would disappear. The distinction is essential when evaluating proposals for future private stations.
Artemis offers another example of why organizational improvements need technical proof. The minutes describe increased NASA involvement with Axiom Space, including embedded experts and access to agency facilities for spacesuit development. They also identify the integration challenge of developing suits, lunar vehicles, and related systems concurrently. Better communication can help teams resolve interfaces, but it does not remove the need to demonstrate that the equipment works together.
The panel’s tone was measured. Members recognized substantial progress in strategy, contracts, organizational alignment, and leadership communication, and expressed confidence in leaders assigned to NASA’s major areas. They also committed to observing whether the changes deliver results. The minutes discuss existing recommendations and continuing oversight; they do not constitute a new formal recommendation or approval of a flight system.
NASA’s commercial transition ultimately needs responsibility to follow knowledge and control. Industry needs room to develop capabilities and bear risks it can manage. NASA needs enough expertise, access to evidence, and authority to judge whether those capabilities meet mission requirements. The panel’s assessment supports that direction, with an unresolved condition: stronger governance must be demonstrated through the decisions, tests, and operational performance that follow.
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