Golden Dome Orbital Interceptors and the New Space-Based Missile Defense Debate

Key Takeaways

• Golden Dome now has a named space-based interceptor prototype program.
• The 2028 demonstration goal tests cost, scaling, oversight, and physics.
• The contractor mix links traditional defense primes with newer space firms.

A 2026 Contract List Turns a Policy Idea Into an Industrial Test

On April 24, 2026, Space Systems Command said the United States Space Force had awarded 20 Other Transaction Authority agreements to 12 companies for the Space-Based Interceptor program, with a potential combined value of up to $3.2 billion. The Golden Dome orbital interceptors effort moved from an executive-order concept into a named prototype program with an announced goal: demonstrate a capability integrated into the Golden Dome for America architecture by 2028.

The awards matter because they place a long-debated missile-defense idea inside the modern commercial space economy. Space-based interceptors are satellites or orbital platforms intended to support missile defense from orbit. In public descriptions, the program connects low Earth orbit, missile tracking, advanced interceptors, command-and-control software, artificial intelligence, and a broad industrial base. It also revives questions that have followed space-based missile defense since the Strategic Defense Initiative era: whether the physics, cost, scale, political support, and arms-control consequences can be made to fit a real national defense system.

The April 2026 awards do not mean the United States has fielded an operational orbital weapon layer. They mean the Pentagon has funded a competition to test whether industry can produce credible prototype options fast enough, cheaply enough, and at sufficient scale to be considered for a later architecture. That distinction frames the whole program, because the difference between a prototype demonstration and a deployed missile-defense layer involves large differences in cost, coverage, technical risk, and strategic consequence.

The official company list shows a procurement strategy that blends established defense contractors with newer space, software, robotics, and autonomy firms. Space Systems Command named Anduril Industries, Booz Allen Hamilton, General Dynamics Mission Systems, GITAI USA, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Quindar, Raytheon, Sci-Tec, SpaceX, True Anomaly, and Turion Space. The service did not disclose each contractor’s specific role, and it said no further information would be released at that time because of operational security.

The following table captures the public structure of the April 2026 announcement without treating prototype work as an operational system.

The contract list also shows how the space economy has changed. Earlier missile-defense architectures depended heavily on a small group of traditional defense contractors, specialized hardware programs, and long acquisition timelines. Golden Dome’s orbital interceptor track draws from a larger industrial field shaped by reusable launch, low-cost satellite manufacturing, commercial constellation operations, defense software, autonomous systems, and smaller firms built around space situational awareness. That shift does not prove the concept will work, but it changes who gets a seat at the table.

The Golden Dome Orbital Interceptors Concept Moves From Sensor Network to Strike Layer

Executive Order 14186, issued on January 27, 2025, directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a reference architecture and implementation plan for a next-generation missile defense shield. The order called for defense against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other aerial attacks. It also directed acceleration of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor layer, development of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept, and development of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture custody layer.

That language links two different orbital roles. The first role is sensing. Satellites can detect launches, track objects, maintain custody of fast-moving threats, and provide data to commanders. The second role is interception. Space-based interceptors would add an orbital defeat layer, meaning a system intended to engage a missile rather than simply watch it or pass tracking data to ground systems. The April 2026 awards sit in the second category.

For non-specialists, the distinction matters. Space sensors are already a central part of missile warning and tracking modernization. The Space Development Agency describes its Tracking Layer as a system intended to provide global indications, warning, tracking, and targeting of advanced missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems. That sensor-and-data role is easier to connect to existing defense space programs than orbital interceptors, because the United States has already operated missile warning satellites for decades and has active programs to expand tracking from low Earth orbit.

Orbital interceptors raise a different class of questions. A satellite in low Earth orbit moves quickly relative to Earth’s surface. A missile launch creates a short engagement window. The interceptor layer would need enough vehicles in the right orbital positions, enough tracking precision, enough command-and-control speed, enough resilience against interference, and enough replenishment capacity to matter during a conflict. Public statements describe a proliferated low Earth orbit constellation, but the government has not released architecture details for public review.

That silence is expected for a defense program, but it creates a gap between political language and engineering reality. A “dome” metaphor suggests continuous coverage. Real missile defense depends on geometry, timing, sensors, command decisions, inventories, and probability. An orbital layer may improve reaction time in some scenarios, yet it may require very large numbers of satellites to create persistent coverage against launches from many possible locations.

The Golden Dome concept also reaches beyond intercontinental ballistic missiles. Public descriptions refer to ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and advanced aerial threats. These are not the same problem. A ballistic missile follows a different flight profile from a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle or a low-flying cruise missile. A single defensive architecture can connect sensors and command systems, but each threat type imposes its own detection, tracking, and engagement burden.

The April 2026 contracting move can be read as a test of whether industry can compress all of those requirements into prototype demonstrations. It does not settle the strategic debate. It turns the debate into funded acquisition work.

Why the Contractor Mix Matters for the Space Economy

The 12-company roster reads like a map of the modern defense-space supply base. Traditional prime contractors bring missile-defense program experience, classified systems integration, production relationships, and knowledge of Pentagon certification requirements. Newer firms bring commercial-space speed, autonomy software, smaller-satellite operations, and venture-backed product cycles. Software-focused companies matter because an orbital missile-defense architecture would depend heavily on data fusion, command-and-control systems, timing, and automation.

That mix reflects a broader change in government procurement. The Pentagon is trying to avoid a design path that locks the government into one contractor before it understands which technical approach works best. Other Transaction Authority agreements give acquisition officials more flexibility for prototypes than standard procurement contracts. That can bring faster experimentation, but it also places more weight on oversight, test criteria, funding discipline, and public accountability.

The contractor list also hints at how the space economy is being pulled toward defense and security. Companies that once described themselves through commercial launch, satellite operations, software platforms, or orbital services now sit inside national-security architectures. This does not make the commercial space sector identical to the defense sector. It does show that defense demand can shape company strategy, investment, hiring, facilities, and product planning.

For large incumbents, Golden Dome offers a way to extend existing missile-defense, sensors, command systems, and integration work into a new orbital layer. For newer firms, it creates a chance to prove that commercial-style development can meet military requirements. For launch providers and spacecraft manufacturers, any later production decision could generate demand for deployment, replenishment, testing, and support infrastructure. For ground-system providers, the command-and-control burden could become a large market in its own right.

The following table groups the industrial functions implied by the public announcement. It does not assign undisclosed roles to individual companies.

The program could also influence financing. Venture-backed defense technology firms have used Pentagon prototype awards to validate product lines, attract investors, and gain access to larger procurement pathways. Golden Dome offers a highly visible example of that pattern. A company does not need to win full production to benefit from prototype participation; it can gain credibility, data, engineering experience, and follow-on positioning.

There is a risk that the market reads prototype awards as evidence of future production before the government makes that decision. Defense programs can pass through many gates before procurement at scale. The April 2026 awards should be understood as exploratory industrial mobilization, not a settled production architecture.

Affordability Is the First Test of the Orbital Layer

Cost sits at the center of the Golden Dome orbital interceptors debate. Reuters reported that Golden Dome is expected to cost about $185 billion, and Gen. Michael Guetlein’s April 2026 written testimony stated that about $22.9 billion had been appropriated in support of Golden Dome for America and that total cost through delivery in 2035 was estimated at about $185 billion.

The problem is that the cost of a space-based interceptor layer depends heavily on architecture. A small demonstration constellation is not the same as a persistent operational layer. Coverage requirements, threat assumptions, satellite lifetime, replenishment rate, sensor integration, launch cost, orbital altitude, production scale, ground infrastructure, and command systems can all change total cost. A budget number can appear firm even when the engineering path remains conditional.

The Congressional Budget Office examined how lower launch costs affected earlier estimates for space-based, boost-phase missile defense. CBO found that lower launch costs could reduce previous 20-year estimates by 30% to 40%, but it still placed the lowest-cost alternative at $161 billion and the highest-cost alternative at $542 billion in 2025 dollars. CBO also warned that a system designed for peer or near-peer threats could require a more expansive capability than earlier studies examined.

Those numbers explain why affordability can decide whether orbital interceptors survive as a program. Cheaper launch changes the economics, but it does not erase the cost of satellites, interceptors, command systems, testing, production, replenishment, security, and operations. Lower launch prices can make architectures possible that once looked unrealistic. They cannot guarantee that an operational system will meet the budget, threat coverage, or reliability goals that political leaders attach to it.

Affordability also involves what defense planners call the cost-exchange problem. If an attacker can build or launch more offensive threats at lower cost than a defender can intercept them, the defender faces a long-term capacity problem. Golden Dome proponents argue that space sensors, automation, layered defenses, and new intercept technologies could improve that exchange. Skeptics argue that a capable adversary can add decoys, salvo size, maneuverability, counterspace attacks, or alternative attack paths that force the defender to spend more.

The space economy dimension is direct. If Golden Dome funds large numbers of spacecraft, sensors, and ground systems, it could become one of the largest demand sources for national-security space manufacturing. If the orbital interceptor layer fails cost review, funding may shift toward space sensors, command systems, ground-based interceptors, and theater defenses. Either path still supports defense-space spending, but the industrial winners differ.

Affordability will also shape transparency. The public can see headline award ceilings, budget requests, and congressional testimony. It cannot easily see classified requirements, threat assumptions, performance thresholds, or test design. Congress will need enough access to determine whether progress claims match measured performance. A program that grows through prototype agreements can move quickly, yet it still needs disciplined oversight because speed without cost control can create expensive dead ends.

Technical Uncertainty Keeps the Program Conditional

Golden Dome’s orbital interceptor track carries an unusual public message: the government is funding prototypes, but top officials have acknowledged that the concept must prove its affordability and scalability before production. That conditional language matters because missile defense is filled with systems that performed differently in controlled tests than they might under complex attack conditions.

The American Physical Society released a 2025 study on strategic ballistic missile defense that examined the difficulty of defending the United States against realistic missile threats. Independent scientific and policy communities have long argued that strategic missile defense requires extreme reliability because a small number of successful enemy warheads can still cause catastrophic harm.

Space-based interceptors face several high-level technical burdens. They need to be in position when needed. They need dependable sensor input. They need fast and secure command pathways. They need to operate in a contested orbital environment. They need to distinguish real threats from confusing data. They need to be produced and replenished at a cost that makes sense against the threats they are meant to defeat.

No public source has shown that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptor layer has met those burdens. The 2028 goal is a demonstration target, not an operational deployment date. A demonstration can prove pieces of a concept, such as integration, command links, or prototype behavior under test conditions. It cannot by itself prove that a complete architecture can handle large-scale attacks, countermeasures, satellite losses, cyber pressure, or wartime decision speed.

The technical challenge also involves orbital sustainment. Low Earth orbit is attractive because it places satellites closer to Earth than higher orbits. That can help with sensing, communications latency, and engagement geometry. It also means satellites move quickly across the sky and may have shorter operational lives than assets in higher orbits. An operational layer may require frequent replacement, launch scheduling, on-orbit checkout, software updates, collision avoidance, and debris management.

Another constraint is integration with existing systems. Golden Dome is described as a layered defense architecture, not a standalone orbital program. The Missile Defense Agency, Space Force, United States Northern Command, United States Strategic Command, the Space Development Agency, and other organizations all have roles tied to missile warning, tracking, command, interceptors, and operational requirements. A system-of-systems architecture succeeds only if the pieces share data, timing, authority, and tested procedures.

These issues do not make the program impossible. They make it conditional. The April 2026 awards buy answers. They do not provide them.

Space Governance and Deterrence Enter the Same Debate

Orbital interceptors bring space law, deterrence theory, and arms-race concerns into the same discussion. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, but it does not ban all military uses of space. Satellites already support communications, navigation, intelligence, early warning, missile tracking, and military command. A kinetic orbital interceptor layer would move further into weaponization than sensor networks or communications systems, even if it did not involve weapons of mass destruction.

That legal distinction can be misunderstood. A system can be lawful under existing treaty language and still generate strategic instability. Potential adversaries may treat orbital interceptors as threats to their nuclear deterrents. They may respond by expanding missile inventories, deploying counterspace capabilities, changing launch doctrine, improving decoys, hardening missiles, or pursuing their own orbital systems. Those reactions could increase space congestion, create new escalation pathways, and make crisis management harder.

Proponents argue that a stronger defensive shield can deter attacks by reducing confidence that missiles will reach their targets. Executive Order 14186 states that U.S. policy is to defend citizens and infrastructure against foreign aerial attack and guarantee secure second-strike capability. In that view, Golden Dome supports deterrence by making attack less attractive and by protecting decision-makers from coercion.

Skeptics counter that strategic defense can unsettle deterrence if other nuclear-armed states believe their retaliatory capability is threatened. The stability problem is not limited to technical performance. Even a partially effective defense can change an adversary’s planning. A state that fears its missiles might be intercepted could build more missiles, use more confusing attack profiles, or place greater emphasis on early use during a crisis.

Space governance also faces practical concerns. A large orbital interceptor layer would add objects to already busy orbital regimes. Space traffic coordination, debris prevention, deorbit planning, satellite safety, and attribution of hostile actions become more difficult as military constellations grow. The system would need to coexist with civil, commercial, scientific, and allied spacecraft that depend on predictable orbital behavior.

Allied participation adds another layer. Executive Order 14186 directed a review of theater missile defense cooperation with allies and partners. Missile defense has always involved geography, basing, sensors, command relationships, and political trust. Golden Dome’s orbital elements could expand allied dependence on U.S. space systems, but allies may ask how decisions get made, what data gets shared, what risks they inherit, and whether participation affects their relationships with other powers.

For the space economy, governance risk can become business risk. Contractors may receive funding, but they also face export controls, classification rules, congressional scrutiny, international criticism, supply-chain security requirements, and reputational pressure. The more a commercial firm depends on defense and security work, the more its business strategy must account for policy shifts.

What April 2026 Says About Defense Procurement and Commercial Space

April 2026 shows a Pentagon acquisition system trying to move faster without giving up competition. The Space Force chose multiple prototype agreements instead of naming one winner for a full orbital interceptor architecture. That approach gives the government optionality. It also creates pressure to define objective test measures, because competition loses value if the government cannot evaluate performance consistently.

Other Transaction Authority agreements are attractive because they can reduce some procedural barriers in early-stage prototype work. They can help attract firms that may not want to enter traditional defense procurement. They can also encourage companies to invest internal funds and move quickly. The tradeoff is that fast contracting can make public visibility thinner, especially in classified defense programs.

Golden Dome also shows how space and missile defense are merging into a single procurement conversation. The Space Development Agency’s proliferated satellite architecture, the Missile Defense Agency’s interceptor programs, Space Force acquisition offices, command-and-control consortia, and commercial launch capacity all sit near the same budget center. The result is a larger, more complex market than a narrow “missile shield” label suggests.

The contractor mix points to four business consequences. Defense primes remain important because they know how to build complex classified systems. Commercial-space firms matter because cost and deployment cadence are now central to architecture choices. Software and autonomy firms matter because speed, data fusion, and command support may decide whether systems can react fast enough. Smaller space-domain-awareness and servicing companies matter because large orbital constellations need monitoring, maintenance concepts, and support infrastructure.

Those business consequences will depend on whether Golden Dome stays funded through multiple budget cycles. Defense programs require appropriations, political sponsorship, test results, and institutional support. A large defense initiative can grow quickly under one administration and slow under another. The 2028 demonstration target may arrive before the architecture, threat model, production costs, and international reaction are settled.

The program also illustrates a wider procurement pattern: the government is using national-security demand to push the commercial space sector toward capabilities that might not be funded by civil or consumer markets alone. Missile tracking, resilient communications, space-domain awareness, protected command systems, and responsive launch all have commercial technology roots, but defense missions can pull them into classified, higher-assurance forms.

For investors, the April 2026 awards make Golden Dome a signal of defense-space demand, not a guarantee of revenue at production scale. For policymakers, they create an oversight challenge. For the public, they raise a basic question about national priorities: whether a space-based missile defense layer can deliver enough protection to justify the expense, strategic risk, and industrial commitment.

The Public Debate Is Really About Scale

The easiest part of Golden Dome to describe is the contract announcement. The hardest part is scale. A prototype can show that a concept has technical promise. A working homeland defense architecture must cover more geography, more threat types, more attack paths, and more contested conditions. It must also survive budget pressure and strategic reactions.

Scale changes everything. A few satellites can test communication, command relationships, and prototype behavior. A persistent defense layer requires many orbital assets, replacement capacity, ground support, launch availability, software updates, cybersecurity, space traffic management, testing infrastructure, and trained personnel. The political language of a shield can make those details sound secondary. In real programs, they define cost and performance.

That is why the 2028 date should be read carefully. Space Systems Command described a capability demonstration integrated into the Golden Dome architecture by 2028. It did not say a complete orbital interceptor shield would be fielded by then. A demonstration may help decide whether to proceed, narrow the contractor pool, change the architecture, or shift money toward other layers.

The same point applies to the $3.2 billion figure. It is a prototype ceiling, not the cost of the full system. A larger Golden Dome architecture includes sensors, ground systems, command-and-control networks, interceptors, legacy defenses, and other elements. CBO’s range for space-based boost-phase missile defense shows how much architecture assumptions can change total cost, even after accounting for reduced launch prices.

Scale also shapes strategic meaning. A limited orbital layer may support warning, testing, or defense against smaller attacks. A larger layer designed against peer-level threats would carry greater cost and greater international consequences. The more ambitious the architecture becomes, the more it pressures adversary planning, orbital governance, and U.S. industrial capacity.

The space economy tends to celebrate scale because constellation economics can reduce unit costs and support recurring launch demand. Missile defense treats scale differently. More satellites can improve coverage, but more assets also require more maintenance, more security, more testing, and more budget. The commercial lesson that scale can lower costs may still apply, but it does not remove the defense lesson that scale multiplies operational burden.

Golden Dome orbital interceptors will be judged less by the drama of the concept than by whether prototype data supports the next spending decision. April 2026 created a race among companies. It also created a public test of whether a space-based interceptor layer can move from political symbol to practical defense architecture.

Summary

Golden Dome’s orbital interceptor awards mark a significant moment in the relationship between missile defense and the space economy. The United States has funded a prototype competition, named 12 companies, set a 2028 demonstration goal, and tied the work to a broader architecture intended to defend the homeland against advanced missile and aerial threats. The announcement gives the concept institutional weight, but it does not make the system operational or inevitable.

The central issue is not whether space can support missile defense. Space already supports warning, tracking, communications, navigation, and military command. The harder question is whether orbital interceptors can be produced, deployed, controlled, protected, replenished, and afforded at a scale that changes real defense outcomes. That question remains open.

The April 2026 announcement is best understood as a test. It tests industry’s ability to build prototypes. It tests the Pentagon’s ability to run fast competition without losing oversight. It tests whether commercial-space economics can reduce costs enough for a mission that has defeated earlier architectures. It also tests whether the United States can expand space-based defense without increasing instability in orbit and on Earth.

Golden Dome may become a large driver of defense-space spending even if the orbital interceptor layer changes shape or fails to reach production. Sensors, command systems, ground networks, launch services, modeling tools, and space-domain-awareness capabilities will remain central to missile defense modernization. The space economy impact may come as much from those supporting layers as from interceptors themselves.

The larger story is a national choice about scale, risk, cost, and deterrence. The next important milestone is not a slogan or a budget number. It is whether the 2028 demonstration produces evidence strong enough to justify the next stage of investment.

Appendix: Top Questions Answered in This Article

What Are Golden Dome Orbital Interceptors?

Golden Dome orbital interceptors are proposed space-based systems intended to support missile defense from orbit. Public descriptions place them inside a broader Golden Dome for America architecture that also includes sensors, command-and-control systems, ground-based defenses, and other defensive layers. As of April 2026, they remain in prototype development rather than operational deployment.

Which Agency Announced the April 2026 Awards?

Space Systems Command, the acquisition arm of the United States Space Force, announced the April 2026 awards. The command said the Space-Based Interceptor program had 20 Other Transaction Authority agreements with 12 companies. The stated public goal is an integrated capability demonstration by 2028.

Do the Awards Mean Golden Dome Is Operational?

No. The awards fund prototype work and demonstration activity. They do not mean the United States has deployed an operational orbital interceptor shield. Production, fielding, operational doctrine, full budget support, and long-term architecture decisions remain separate steps.

Why Is the 2028 Demonstration Goal Important?

The 2028 goal creates a public schedule for testing whether the prototype architecture can connect to Golden Dome’s wider system. A demonstration can provide evidence about integration, command pathways, and prototype performance. It cannot by itself prove that a complete architecture can handle full wartime conditions.

Why Does Cost Dominate the Debate?

Cost dominates because a persistent orbital interceptor layer may require large numbers of satellites, replenishment launches, ground systems, secure communications, testing, and support. Lower launch costs help, but they do not remove spacecraft, operations, and architecture expenses. Independent estimates vary because assumptions about scale differ sharply.

How Does This Relate to the Commercial Space Economy?

Golden Dome connects defense demand to commercial-space capabilities such as reusable launch, satellite manufacturing, space operations, software, autonomy, and orbital awareness. Prototype awards can help firms gain credibility and experience. The largest economic effects would depend on later production decisions and long-term funding.

Why Are Space Sensors Less Controversial Than Orbital Interceptors?

Space sensors have long supported missile warning and tracking. Orbital interceptors move beyond observing threats and into defeating them from space. That shift creates harder questions about scale, legality, crisis stability, arms-race effects, and space traffic management.

Does the Outer Space Treaty Ban Golden Dome?

The Outer Space Treaty bans placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit. It does not ban all military space activity. A non-nuclear orbital interceptor layer may raise strategic and governance concerns even if it does not fall under the treaty’s weapons-of-mass-destruction prohibition.

Why Are Multiple Companies Involved?

The Space Force is using multiple prototype agreements to preserve competition and test different approaches. This structure can help the government avoid early dependence on one design. It can also bring newer firms into a field long dominated by established defense contractors.

What Happens If Orbital Interceptors Prove Too Expensive?

If the orbital interceptor layer proves too expensive or difficult, Golden Dome could shift emphasis toward sensors, command systems, ground-based interceptors, theater defenses, or other layers. The broader missile-defense modernization effort could continue even if space-based interceptors do not move into production.

Appendix: Glossary of Key Terms

Golden Dome for America

Golden Dome for America is a proposed U.S. homeland missile defense architecture directed by Executive Order 14186. Public descriptions include space sensors, interceptors, command-and-control systems, and existing defenses. The program remains under development, with several parts moving through prototype, planning, and budget processes.

Space-Based Interceptor

A space-based interceptor is a proposed orbital defensive system intended to engage a missile or related threat from space. Public Golden Dome descriptions refer to a proliferated low Earth orbit interceptor layer, but detailed architecture information remains limited because of defense classification and operational security.

Other Transaction Authority

Other Transaction Authority is a contracting method that lets U.S. defense agencies fund prototype work with more flexibility than standard procurement contracts. It can attract nontraditional companies and accelerate experimentation, but it requires strong oversight to measure progress and control spending.

Low Earth Orbit

Low Earth orbit is the region of space relatively close to Earth where many imaging, communications, tracking, and scientific satellites operate. It offers lower communications latency and closer observation geometry than higher orbits, but spacecraft there move quickly and may require regular replacement.

Missile Defense

Missile defense refers to systems designed to detect, track, intercept, or otherwise defeat missiles. It can include sensors, radars, interceptors, command systems, and supporting networks. Strategic missile defense against long-range nuclear threats is especially difficult because reliability requirements are extremely high.

Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture

The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture is a Space Development Agency satellite architecture built around many lower-cost satellites in low Earth orbit. Its layers support missions such as communications, missile tracking, targeting, navigation, and related military functions.

Boost-Phase Intercept

Boost-phase intercept refers to engaging a missile during its powered flight after launch. The concept is attractive because the missile may be easier to detect during powered flight, but the engagement window is short and requires demanding timing, positioning, and command links.

Command And Control

Command and control refers to the systems, people, procedures, and software used to make decisions and direct military operations. In missile defense, command and control must process sensor data, identify threats, support engagement decisions, and coordinate defensive systems under severe time pressure.

Space Domain Awareness

Space domain awareness means monitoring objects, activity, and conditions in space. It supports collision avoidance, satellite safety, threat detection, and understanding of orbital behavior. Large military constellations increase demand for accurate tracking and orbital coordination.

Strategic Deterrence

Strategic deterrence is the use of military capability, survivability, and credible response options to discourage an adversary from attacking. Missile defense can support deterrence by reducing confidence in an attack, but it can also create concern if other states believe their retaliatory forces are threatened.