Countries can develop domestic space capabilities through international partnerships and retain meaningful control over how those capabilities are used. Marina Yue Zhang’s October 27 conceptual analysis, published in Frontiers in Political Science, explains strategic autonomy through that relationship between national capabilities and international connections.
Zhang distinguishes a country’s ability to participate actively in space activities from its ability to preserve independent choices. Her framework connects three practices: specializing in valuable technologies, maintaining alternative suppliers and partnerships, and influencing international standards and rules. The analysis draws on existing scholarship and selected examples from South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
A specialized supplier gains bargaining power when its contribution is difficult to replace. Procurement creates another form of influence when a government can choose among usable alternatives. Participation in standards and international institutions adds influence over the conditions under which technologies and services operate.
Zhang argues that these practices interact. A partnership can expand access to technology and customers at the same time that it links a domestic industry more closely to another country’s regulations. In her account, strategic autonomy concerns the choices available within these relationships.
Australia’s Launch Agreement Defines Access and Authority
Australia’s Technology Safeguards Agreement with the United States provides a concrete example of how international access and national authority coexist. The agreement entered into force on July 23, 2024, establishing a legal and operational framework for protecting sensitive American launch technology used in Australia.
The Australian Space Agency explains that the arrangement enables American entities to conduct launch activities from Australian territory using US launch vehicles. Its scope can also include spacecraft, satellites, equipment, and data associated with those activities.
Australia implements the safeguarding conditions through its launch licensing and permit system. The Australian government remains responsible for decisions on Australian licenses and permits, and Australian authorities retain their statutory powers, including emergency functions.
The agreement generally does not affect cooperation with other countries when American technology is absent. It also recognizes Australia’s intention to develop domestic launch vehicles. The arrangement combines access to foreign technology with defined Australian regulatory authority.
Canada Combines Domestic Production and Allied Procurement
Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy describes another approach to organizing domestic capability and international relationships. Its Build–Partner–Buy framework prioritizes Canadian production, particularly in sovereign capability areas and fields where Canadian industry already has strengths.
The strategy also provides for joint development with allies and purchases of existing equipment. It states that partnerships and purchases will be structured to support domestic industry and Canadian sovereign control. Procurement, industrial development, and access to allied capabilities are connected within the same policy.
New Space Economy’s discussion of space sovereignty and self-sufficiency makes a related distinction between the nationality of a supplier and control over a mission. Tasking authority, access to data, operation, maintenance, and replacement are separate dimensions of that control.
The Australian agreement specifies how foreign launch technology can operate under domestic licensing authority. Canada’s strategy specifies how domestic production, allied development, and purchases fit within national procurement policy. Both arrangements show how governments define control through the terms of international participation.
